Nicolai von Ondarza: A wider Europe of security is emerging

Faced with growing questions about the reliability of the US security guarantee, the EU and its member states are turning to novel formats: new security partnerships and the renaissance of flexible, intergovernmental groups. Neither alone will deliver European strategic autonomy, but together they might be a step towards a greater capacity to act.

A new generation of security partnerships

The first new format is the EU’s Security and Defence Partnerships (SDPs) with major partners. Since 2024, the EU has agreed twelve such partnerships with accession candidates and partners from the European Economic Area, such as Norway or Iceland, with like-minded non-EU NATO countries like Canada and the United Kingdom as well as with global partners like Australia, Japan, South Korea and even non-aligned India.

These partnerships are not traditional alliances with pledges of mutual assistance, so they are by no means a direct or even partial replacement for US security guarantees. But they allow closely connected third countries to coordinate with the EU on joint security challenges such as hybrid threats or cyber-attacks and let them join EU exercises, operations or defence-related instruments. Canada is a prime example: Faced with increasing (trade) aggression from the US, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney first signed an SDP with the EU. He then negotiated access on this basis to the EU’s €150 billion SAFE instrument for defence procurement and shifted major Canadian procurement projects, such as submarines, to European partners. Australia and India both signed new trade agreements and security partnerships with the EU on the same day. Closer cooperation with other partners offers both sides a way to hedge against uncertainty over US commitments.

An emerging ‘Wider Europe’ of Security

At the same time, the EU is neither the only nor the primary framework for organising European defence. Amid uncertainty about US and NATO security guarantees and the EU’s capacity to act in the face of long-standing blockages, European countries have increasingly turned towards bilateral, minilateral and flexible formats since 2022, with the shift accelerating in 2025. According to a 2025 study, since 2014 over 160 defence partnerships have been signed among EU countries, the UK and Ukraine, most of them after 2022. Recent examples include additional bilateral mutual defence clauses, such as the 2025 British-German Kensington friendship treaty or a new defence treaty between France and Poland.

European countries have also invested considerable diplomatic resources in various minilateral formats, particularly those involving larger European countries. The most notable is a revival and broadening of the E3 format of France, Germany and the UK, with closer coordination, regular meetings and joint communications on Russia/Ukraine or the Middle East. A broader format is the ‘Weimar-Plus’ grouping of France, Germany, Poland plus the UK and sometimes Spain, Italy or Ukraine. Added to this are regional formats like the Nordic Baltic Eight or the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) by the UK, the Netherlands as well as several Nordic and Baltic partners, both of which have intensified their security cooperation. At the broadest level, the European Political Community, launched in 2022, and the ‘coalition of the willing’ in support of Ukraine bring together larger groups of countries in informal settings to discuss European security.

What is emerging in these various formats is a ‘Wider Europe’ coming together on issues of European security and defence. These flexible groups do not include the US, but stretch beyond the EU or even Europe. The UK plays a leading role alongside France and Germany, while Ukraine is an important participant. Symbolic of this was a recent informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Ireland attended by ministers from the UK, Ukraine, Norway, Iceland and Canada.

Linking the patchwork

Europe’s increasingly complex security architecture reflects doubts about existing institutions and a willingness to experiment. The challenge is to prevent fragmentation and duplication from weakening collective security. Here, the combination of EU Security and Defence Partnerships and the ‘Wider Europe’ approach could be helpful.

To link the patchwork, the SDPs should be developed further: First, by extending them to the missing major European security partners, Ukraine and Turkey. The EU already cooperates with Ukraine in other ways, but bringing it into an SDP framework could further enhance the growing support and cooperation with Ukrainian defence efforts. Second, by gradually using the SDPs to link major non-EU NATO countries to EU and minilateral initiatives. Full use of SDPs could provide for a broad connection of non-EU NATO countries into EU defence instruments, while smaller groups organise joint projects among willing states. Third, by using the combination of SDPs and flexible formats to move from a bilateral approach to a broader Wider Europe approach. This could bring together the EU, its member states and security partners such as Canada, the UK, Norway and Ukraine.