Russia’s brutal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led, to put it bluntly, to the withdrawal of Russian troops from this area, from our vicinity, more or less completely, with the exception of the Kaliningrad enclave, of course. From a purely military perspective the situation was excellent. The threat of Russia’s aggression against its neighbouring countries with traditional, conventional military means became quickly very unlikely.
Nevertheless, one need only look at a map to see that this northern region is extremely important to Russia. The Greater St. Petersburg area, including the city itself and its ports, is a significant logistics hub for the export and import of Russian goods and commodities. Forty percent of Russia’s foreign trade passes through the Baltic Sea and it is Russia’s most important route for oil exports. The isolated Kaliningrad enclave is supplied via the Baltic Sea, either by sea or by air. Its lifeline is very thin. Alongside St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, the strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula from the perspective of Russia’s strategic deterrent is undeniable. The key capabilities of the Russian nuclear first strike capabilities are located in the Kola region.
For the reasons stated above it is Russia’s strategic interest to secure the use of the Baltic Sea in all situations. Especially for its Northern Fleet the entire Arctic region means unrestricted access to the Atlantic via the northern sea routes and it is clear that the region’s importance will continue to be emphasized.
Russia was undoubtedly a military power in the Arctic before the outbreak of the war. The Russian leadership announced major changes to the armed forces in December 2022. Aspiration to restore that role and the influence that it brings with it will most probably be emphasized in its foreign and security policy.
According that announcement the size of the armed forces is planned to increase in the coming years, which will include changes in the force structure and the establishment of new forces. Build up of infrastructure for its future military deployment and military infrastructure along Finland’s eastern border is already visible.
The war in Ukraine will end, someday. Then the troops that left here will return to their homes, which will in no way be the same as when they left. Finland and Sweden are members of NATO, and all the Nordic and Baltic countries have bilateral defense agreements with the United States.
During the war, the border against NATO has doubled to 2,556 kilometers, and the Baltic Sea has become, in practice, even if the term is unfortunate, NATO’s inland sea. The NATO countries in the region will significantly increase their defense spending in the coming years, not to mention the contingency measures launched by the alliance. The threshold for attacking again a smaller neighboring country has risen dramatically… and the Northeast Passage continues its inevitable thawing. I will return to this briefly later.
Direct military threat from Russia is currently very low, but the expansion of the war in Ukraine cannot be ruled out and, notwithstanding the foregoing, no conventional attack at a later date. We must prepare, in any case, for the threat of a large-scale attack. Broad scale influencing is already a reality. Russia considers itself to be in a systemic conflict with the West, and it seeks to influence, in particular, the unity of NATO and the European Union, as well as the commitment of the United States to European defence arrangements. Russia remains a valid threat that requires continued preparedness, the strengthening of our military power and capabilities, and, on the other hand, the continuous improvement of the crisis resilience of our civil societies as a whole.
Russia’s dealings with other countries have always been based on lies, blackmail, threats, and empty promises. Why would anything change now? We already know that Russia is prepared to take greater political and military risks to achieve its goals. It will continue its malicious and evil deeds despite the war, and especially after it.
Russian intelligence activities in Finland have increased, and I would assume this is also the case in other countries in the region. Russian military intelligence service has sought to update its intelligence methods to better reflect the changed operating environment. The methods are more diverse and partly improvised than before. This can be seen, for example, in the increasing use of proxies and intermediaries and in more straightforward information gathering.
It goes without saying that intelligence in digital networks remains significant. In addition to these, the Russian intelligence services have the ability to carry out sabotage and disruption of critical infrastructure. We have experienced cyberattacks, seen link masts fall, airspace violations conducted in a grossly blatant manner, GPS-jamming, drones harassing airports, etc etc. It is good to keep in mind that Russia has the readiness, if necessary, to increase the intensity of its operations and to target also military targets or critical infrastructure largely and security of supply as well.
In these changed circumstances, the enemy is not always necessarily a recognizable ”little green man or woman”. Identifying the opponent and verifying their identity is quite challenging from the ”ones and zeros, the ”guys and gals” in the community, whether it be a work or friend community where the person has been ”one of us” for years, not to mention those faceless calculating agents who, using deviousness and secretive tactics, get those foolish but useful people to talk out of turn. War is now being waged in the realms of cyber and disinformation, as well as in the more traditional ”cloak and dagger” environment. It is important to be aware of this and recognize it. The Russians have been among us for a long time. I dare say that they are very familiar with our transparent societies and our legislation, which they also know how to exploit for their own purposes. And we have brought this situation upon ourselves.
Finally, very briefly about the thawing of the Northeast Passage…. the Arctic region holds probably more than 10% of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources and some 30% of its undiscovered conventional natural gas resources. In addition to oil and natural gas, the Arctic region possesses significant metal deposits and fish resources. China is already preparing its merchant fleet and Navy to face the conditions of Arctic waters and the challenges they bring, but above all, to enable the exploitation of the natural resources offered by the region in a larger scale and to secure this and other national interests in this region as well.
It doesn’t really fit with the Russian image of a great power that China would come with a barrage of merchant ships and naval forces into areas it considers its own, or at least to which it thinks it has a pre-emptive right. Even if the strategic partnership between Russia and China were to endure beyond the war and the burden of history, it would of course be reasonable to raise the question of how prepared we Europeans are for the day when Chinese intelligence ships and aircraft begin to operate in our nearby waters and airspace, not to mention any overt hostile actions that we may also encounter. It is good to remember that Panda is a bear too.
Finland
