On 1 July 2025, Poland assumed the Presidency in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). For more than 30 years, cooperation within the CBSS has focused on regional development. However, due to the worsening geopolitical situation, Poland sees a need to strengthen the political pillar of the organization and focus more on security. Poland’s views are aligned with the recommendations of Wise Persons’ report on the future of the CBSS, which was publish in May 2025.
Russia’s illegal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine has diminished regional security. Simultaneously to the war against Ukraine, Russia is continuing its hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea region. Consequently, Polish Presidency in the CBSS will pay attention to three issues: operation of the shadow fleet, threats to the critical infrastructure and disturbance to the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).
The Baltic Sea is known for its shallow depth and unique ecosystem with networks of waterway and archipelagos. The Danish Straits are narrow, busy and hard to navigate. A full turnover of water in the Baltic Sea takes approximately 30 years. Consequently, even a minor incident could have devastating and very expensive consequences.
The term “shadow fleet” refers to an informal network of vessels that are used to transport oil and petroleum products from Russia, bypassing the Western sanctions. Their activities finance the Russian war machine. Moreover, there is a long list of dangers that the shadow fleet causes, such as risk of collision and causing harm to the natural environment.
On the one hand, these dangers stem from the fact that the shadow fleet vessels are old, poorly maintained, lack proper insurance and transport dangerous cargo. On the other hand, the shadow fleet vessels deliberately engage in provocative behavior, such as Automatic Identification System manipulation, refusal to use pilotage in dangerous waters and ship-to-ship transfer in open waters, known also as bunkering.
Moreover, since November 2024, we are also observing the involvement of the shadow fleet vessels in incidents damaging the critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea is vital for energy and data transmission, hosting a web of subsea cables – power lines, communication lines and pipelines. The disruption of critical infrastructure constitutes for Russia a low-cost, but high-impact instrument, which also allows for plausible deniability.
On three separate occasions: in November and December 2024 and in January 2025 cables at the bottom of the Baltic Sea were damage. These includes communication cable (Sweden-Lithuania), data cables (Finland-Germany, Sweden-Latvia) and power cable (Estonia-Finland). What the vessels responsible for these incidents had in common was travelling to/from Russia.
Poland itself has observed disturbing activities by the shadow fleet vessels above the SwePol Link power cable in May and August 2025. Immediate reaction of the Polish Navy allowed for the effective deterrence. Since January 2022, the Polish Navy is conducting Operation ZATOKA, which monitors and protects critical infrastructure located within the Polish exclusive economic zone in the Baltic Sea
Recently, Russia has decided to escalate its actions in the Baltic Sea by granting protection to the shadow fleet vessels. In May 2025, in the Gulf of Finland, Russian Su-35 violated NATO airspace in order to protect shadow feel vessel “Jaguar”, which was being escorted by the Estonian authorities. Since then, we have observed Russian Navy escorting shadow fleet vessels and expanding capabilities to protect substandard vessels transporting oil. Growing presence of Russian Navy to secure shadow fleet may increases the possibility of further escalations.
Simultaneously to the shadow fleet activities and the damage to the critical infrastructure, Poland is observing serious Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) disturbance in the Baltic Sea region.
A study conducted by the Gdynia Maritime University and GPSPATRON shows that between June and November 2024, the GNSS signal was interfered for the total of 84 hours. In some cases, it lead to serious positioning errors, ranging up to 35 meters, which pose a serious risk to the safety of navigation and critical infrastructure. The study also shows that the interference came from a mobile source, which opens up another potential use of the shadow fleet vessels, confirming previous reports of high-power radio equipment being observed aboard these vessels.
Despite major involvement of means in war with Ukraine, Russian military assets in Baltic remain almost intact. In line with Russian Maritime Doctrine adopted in 2022, growing presence of NATO in Baltic Sea is defined as a source of challenges for Russia. The New Maritime Doctrine also indicates that Baltic Sea will be a place of increasing competition with NATO.
With Russia’s such threatening behavior in the Baltic Sea, Poland sees the Council of the Baltic States as a useful forum of discussion on pressing security issues within the like-minded regional group, complementary to NATO and its structures. At the same time, the CBSS allows the states around the Baltic Sea to elevate their shared concerns at the level of the EU and to obtain founding for the regional initiatives, such as the Baltic Defence Line and the East Shield. The Polish Presidency of the CBSS plans to introduce new formats of consultation, where the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s political directors and officials in charge of security policy could maintain regular dialogue. The security of the Baltic Sea states is closely intertwined and we need to work together in different formats in order to ensure safety and security of the region.
Robert Kupiecki
Undersecretary of State
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Poland
Professor
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies
Poland
