Introduction
Democracies have evolved as a form of government designed to safeguard citizens against the abuse of power concentrated into the hands of single leader. When the United States was founded in 1787, the idea was to establish a constitutional government based on a division of power among an executive branch led by a president, a legislative branch run by lawmakers, and a judicial branch comprised of judges. The backbone of this system was the rule of law. America’s spy agencies at the time were expected to follow the law, but they were exempt from the day-to-day procedures of accountability (“checks-and-balances” or “oversight”) designed to monitor the fidelity of government officials to the law. Intelligence was considered too sensitive and fragile for “normal” and ongoing government reviews. This was a big mistake.
Many years later, in 1974, it became clear that America’s secret agencies had often violated the nation’s laws. A major Senate investigation, known as the Church Committee (named after its chairman, Senator Frank Church, Idaho), uncovered domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against anti-Vietnam war protestors. The Committee found, as well, the existence of harassment operations carried out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against these same antiwar protestors as well as civil rights activists. Further, the Committee uncovered illegal espionage activities carried out by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) aimed at anti-war activities. The fact that America’s Intelligence Community had violated the nation’s laws on a number of occasions and had spied on peaceful demonstrations inside the United States created a firestorm of controversy in the country. Before these discoveries, formal laws specifically tailored to control America’s spy agencies had been non-existent; now, after 187 years of “intelligence exceptionalism,” things were about to change.
The domestic misuse of intelligence powers made it clear that America’s spy agencies required closer supervision, similar to the rest of the U.S. government. Lawmakers realized, too, that more rigorous accountability would have to be directed not only toward preventing spy activities against American citizens, but to ensure that U.S. secret operations overseas were also closely monitored. The CIA and its companion agencies would be expected henceforth to remain within the boundaries of U.S. law at home and abroad.
The Hughes-Ryan Act watershed
The first step toward improved intelligence accountability occurred with respect to CIA covert action—an overseas dimension of intelligence activity. The use of covert action (CA) involves secret operations designed to harass or disrupt other nations, as opposed to intelligence collection activities (classic espionage). Congress enacted the Hughes-Ryan Act on December 30, 1974—just a few weeks prior to the establishment of the Church Committee.
Under these new rules, the president was required to formally approve all CAs. Gone were the days of presidential “plausible deniability.” Now the paper trail for CA approvals led directly to the Oval Office and the president. More sweeping still, the president had to report all presidential approvals (“findings”) to the appropriate intelligence oversight committees on Capitol Hill. Suddenly lawmakers were also explicitly in the intelligence loop.
The Hughes-Ryan law was majestic in its departure from previous practices. Here is the language of that law: “… No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the [CIA] for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operations to the appropriate committees of Congress.”
That last phrase was revolutionary. Lawmakers at last had the opportunity to examine America’s use of CAs before they were implemented. This reporting stipulation did not include all 435 members of Congress, of course, with the problematic security implications that would carry, but rather a small number of their colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI, pronounced “sissy”) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI, pronounced “hip-see”). The creation of these two panels was the core recommendation of the Church Committee; their members would act as surrogates monitoring intelligence on behalf of the entire Congress.
How wise was it to bring some degree of democracy into the dark corners of CA—an experiment unprecedented at home, in other nations, or throughout history? From the vantage point of decreasing ill-considered—and at times even illegal—covert actions, it made sense. What about intelligence collection (espionage) and counterintelligence, however? Should they be closely monitored by a president and lawmakers as well?
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980
In 1980, the United States enacted a sweeping Intelligence Oversight law to supplement and refine Hughes-Ryan. This new law underscored that “prior” reporting to lawmakers on SSCI and HPSCI would be mandatory for “all” intelligence activities, not only covert action. Intelligence collection operations and counterintelligence would also have to be reviewed by lawmakers in advance of their implementation. With this chance for genuine debate within the confines of SSCI and HPSCI, lawmakers could now rebuke untoward proposals across the intelligence board—even threaten budgetary retaliation should the executive branch ignore guidance from SSCI and HPSCI. Prudently, the statute permitted a two-day reporting delay in times of dire emergency. Even then, though, the law required reports in advance to a small group of eight congressional leaders who became known as the “Gang of Eight.”
The Oversight Act of 1980 established clearer boundaries for intelligence activities. This unprecedented attempt to bring America’s secret agencies into the full workings of a democratic society was remarkable—and supported not only by intelligence reformers, but by leaders of the secret agencies themselves, who welcomed lawmakers to the burden of sharing in this difficult decision-making process. This approach to intelligence accountability carries high merit—indeed, is a lynchpin of democracy—since a truly free society must perpetually guard against the misuse of powerful secret agencies within their midst.
See, also: Loch K. Johnson, Spy Watching (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); The Third Option: Covert Action and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022); and National Security Intelligence, 3d ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2025).
Regents Professor Emeritus of International Affairs
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA)
University of Georgia
USA
