The impact of secret intelligence on western governments policy-makers can be hard to assess because, by its very nature, these events are not likely to be recognised for what they were, at the time. Understandably, if an intelligence operation has been undertaken successfully, those responsible may want to repeat the exercise on another occasion. For example, in July 1961 British Royal Marine 42 Commando was landed off HMS Bulwark in Kuwait as part of Operation VANTAGE to deter a threatened invasion of the country by Iraqi troops. As a consequence of this deployment, the regime in Baghdad withdrew its forces from the border. When in January 1972 Guatemalan troops prepared to occupy Belize, Buccaneer fighter-bomber off HMS Ark Royal, flew along the frontier as part of a mission to protect the territory.
Similarly, in 1977, it was feared in London that Argentina intended t launch a surprise invasion of the Falkland Islands, but the aggression was prevented by the deployment of a nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought, as part of a naval task force codenamed JOURNEYMAN to strengthen the British colony’s defences.
Britain’s failure in 1982 to detect the Argentine junta’s plan to occupy the Islands led to the conflict which would have a profound and lasting influence over British politics and served to transform Margaret Thatcher’s reputation and popularity. Indeed it can be argued that Mrs Thatcher’s eleven years as prime minister was dominated by security and intelligence issue dating back to the Suez crisis of 1956 which split the Conservative Party and led to the recall of the U.S. ambassador in London, an unprecedented act of protest offered by the Eisenhower administration.
Tony Blair’s government was equally preoccupied with security and intelligence concerns, ranging from the domestic preoccupation of defeating the Provisional IRA’s 32-year campaign of terrorism in Northern Ireland, to the controversial decision to join the U.S.-led Coalition to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his alleged stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Determined to win over sceptics within his own Labour Party, Blair authorized the release of a crucial 2002 Joint Intelligence Committee report that had been largely rewritten by Downing Street staffers. Crucially, Blair insisted that “the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt… that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons”.
In the House of Commons Blair described the WMD reporting as “extensive, detailed and authoritative” when in reality it had been “sporadic and patchy”. Perhaps even more egregiously, in February 2003 the government published a briefing paper entitled Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation, which purported to draw “upon a number of sources, including intelligence material”. Actually, detailed analysis of the content showed that substantial parts of the text had been plagiarised from off the internet.
Many of embarrassments that have afflicted governments of all stripes can be seen to have had their origins in security and intelligence lapses, as demonstrated by hostile penetration of all the major agencies; the Profumo scandal, the SpyCatcher affair, and a dozen other incidents that have undermined successive administrations.
Nigel West
www.nigelwest.com
