Intelligence is a component employed on behalf of National Security. These two words, intelligence and National Security have different meanings. The meaning of intelligence is straightforward and is objective. Intelligence means information and the analysis of information for the purpose of either understanding a problem or issue and/or taking an action based on that information. All intelligence is information but not all information is intelligence. Intelligence as a component of National Security is generally limited to the sovereign political state. The sources of Intelligence for governments are 1) Open Source, information gathered from the always proliferating public domain, 2) Human Source, information gathered secretly or semi-secretly from recruited, controlled agents and cooperating contacts, 3) Signal Source, information gathered through the monitoring of communications, 4) Imagery Source, information gathered through photography 5) Measurement Source, information gathered through the signatures of materials. These sources of intelligence are funneled together to produce a product of facts and analysis for those political leaders making decisions.
National Security is a subjective concept which can have multiple meanings, depending on how and when this concept is used. On its most basic level, National Security is about keeping the citizenry of a country safe from foreign threats of violence, invasion or subversion. Beyond that, the definition becomes murkier. Anyone can make almost anything a threat to National Security. After the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, the political reaction included viewpoints describing Al Qaeda terrorism as a threat to the existence of the United States. The attacks definitely were a threat to American lives and property, and the government of the United States is constituted for the purpose of protecting American lives and property, however, the attacks did not threaten the existence of the government. Threats can be exploited by politicians, sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, to galvanize the population in favor of a political agenda.
What the policymaker would most like to have from intelligence is a warning about events which are about to happen. In other words, the policymaker does not want to be surprised because she/he does not want to be embarrassed by media questions. The policymaker always should have known. The policymaker exists in the present while the intelligence officer also needs to live in the future. That is a fundamental difference. The policymaker is uninterested in applying resources on issues decades ahead because his/her legacy is over when his or her term is over. Before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had no human reporting sources in Iraq. In order to have had sources in Iraq in 2003, the CIA needed to begin recruiting sources half a century earlier when Iraq was not viewed as necessarily important to American policy. While not a threat in the 1950s, it was an important country, based on its natural resources and geography. The policymaker should listen to intelligence leaders with an eye beyond the present in the service of National Security.
Prior to the invasion by the United States of Iraq in 2003, the United States did not have dependable, validated sources in Iraq. Instead, the government of the United States government depended on unverified Italian, German, British and Egyptian sources to justify the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. There were no other sources to verify or to disparage evidence provided by these individual sources. Another open question remains, did the CIA analysts have sufficient background on Iraq and its leader to voice strongly enough their skepticism about these unverified sources?
Intelligence analysis is an essential component for the policymaker’s formulation of national security policy. Any analysis, pre-AI, is impossible without the analyst. The intelligence analyst must have the requisite education and must be able to communicate with the policymaker on a high level both orally and the written word. The analyst should have an area of expertise. The division is between analysis from analysts within their area of expertise or analysis from analysts serving multiple requirements not in their area of expertise. Many analysts have been moved about depending on the requirements of the present, independent of their area of expertise. An example would be moving analytical expertise from the Russia account over to China, the Middle East or Counterterrorism. The problem is when analysts are thought of separate from expertise. True, a good analyst has gained skills required to analyze events not in her or his area of expertise whenever such a need arises. Yet, expertise, even if imperfect, is absolutely essential for intelligence as a service to the policymaker’s responsibility to the National Security.
Perhaps the most routine contribution intelligence makes to National Security is keeping the policymaker informed about current events. While media does the same, it does not do so in the same way. Current intelligence for the policymaker is facts and analysis of the facts in a condensed form. The policymaker can ask for detailed answers based on the facts or order a detailed briefing, a ‘deep dive’ on an issue of important to the National Security. Intelligence for the policymaker is focused on the policymaker’s agenda, not the media’s attention to events.
Strategic Intelligence is produced in the service of National Security but rarely penetrates the attention of the policymaker. The value of strategic intelligence to the National Security is the effort by intelligence to see into the future. For instance, what might happen in Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Egypt etc. in 10, 20 or 30 years. When a surprise event occurs, as it always has and always will, these strategic analytical studies become a baseline not only for intelligence analysis but also for intelligence collection. Much depends on Intelligence, much more depends on the policymaker.
It is not just about intelligent professionals writing or briefing intelligence but also intelligent policymaker readers and listeners. It helps if the policymaker has had background in international affairs but a good education and willingness to learn with good advisors is sufficient. Without intelligence, making decisions has no building blocks. Any decision then is arbitrary based on instinct rather than facts. Great intelligence from all sources of Intelligence on behalf of National Security does not make policymaker decisions easier rather it makes decisions harder. Great intelligence forces the policymaker to deal with and focus on the consequences of decisions. Great intelligence takes away the option of not knowing or not understanding an issue having to do with National Security.
From Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan to Washington to Bismarck to Churchill and a number of others, many of the great political and military leaders in history demanded to have intelligence and knew how to use intelligence to their advantage. They also had a realistic view of the meaning of National Security and how to advance the National Security.
Joseph Wippl
Professor of the Practice
Pardee School of Global Studies
Boston University
USA
jwippl@bu.edu
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