In November 2025, information appeared in the public domain about the idea of creating a new intelligence structure (institution) within the European Commission. The concept proposed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen would involve the establishment of a unit within the Commission’s Secretariat-General to collect and coordinate intelligence gathered by the national services of Member States and existing EU structures.
This proposal should be seen as yet another manifestation of the EU bureaucracy’s efforts to create a transnational structure (in the very important but extremely sensitive area of national security), which is conceptually and organizationally dysfunctional and therefore extremely limited in its capabilities and, as a result, ineffective and even dangerous due to the risks that will arise around it.
What arguments and facts support this assessment?
- Lack of sufficient trust between EU member states – the activities of (special services) in the field of intelligence and security are based on limited trust and secrecy, as well as the need-to-know rule. Any country that takes its internal and external security seriously is reluctant to share data from its special services, even with its allies, and does so only to a very limited extent (cooperation in the fight against terrorism is an exception to some extent). It is therefore difficult to imagine EU countries passing on truly important and sensitive information to EU “intelligence” structures over which they do not have full control and which they cannot fully trust.
- Risk of information leaks – the more countries (and their institutions) involved in the circulation of intelligence data, the greater the risk of secret information being disclosed to enemies (or even to “partner” services for their individual needs and benefits). Such leaks could have disastrous consequences for the security of each of the participants (countries) involved in the project. It should also be added that the state structures of some European countries are, unfortunately, much less resistant to infiltration by hostile intelligence services – e.g., the Russian Federation or China.
- Conflict of competence within existing international structures – the EU already has an entity with similar competences (but limited effectiveness) – the Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen) within the European External Action Service (EEAS), which performs a similar role – it analyzes the analytical data obtained and supports the decisions of EU institutions. In fact, IntCen officials openly oppose the concept of a new intelligence unit, as it would duplicate activities and disperse limited resources, exacerbating chaos in this area. Similarly, President Ursula von der Leyen’s concept could have a negative impact on intelligence cooperation within NATO (to which most EU countries belong). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has much more efficient and realistic mechanisms and structures capable of exchanging intelligence, especially in the military sphere. Duplication of such entities could, among other things, weaken transatlantic cooperation and generate unnecessary tensions, especially with the US.
- Risk of politicization – an EU intelligence unit could become a political tool, and its supervisory dependence on the European Commission (or the influence of the European Parliament) could limit its analytical independence. There is a very real and high risk that those managing of such an entity at a given time will create and impose the directions and substantive (practical) results of the final analytical products produced.
- Last but not least, legal issues and data protection – the proposed concept could violate national sovereignty, as according to EU treaties, national security (including in the institutional context and the functioning of special services) remains the exclusive competence of Member States. Furthermore, any joint intelligence activities (also based on classified data) would require the harmonization of regulations on classified information and other legal solutions related to the use of such specific and sensitive knowledge.
In conclusion, the idea of establishing a new intelligence unit within the EU structures is unrealistic and potentially harmful. In the short term, it can only serve as a symbolic and apparent declaration of the will to integrate, which is politically advantageous for the current leadership of the European Commission and its political base, among other things in the face of criticism of the weakness of the EU as an institution (but also of specific member states) towards Russia in the past and at present. Pushing for such a solution would result in the creation of yet another ineffective entity (institution), wasting EU funds, creating inconsistency and misunderstandings, and posing serious counterintelligence threats.
Norbert Loba
President of the Board
FRONTLINE FOUNDATION
Poland
loba@frontlinefoundation.eu
