Athena Tong is a Visiting Researcher at the Economic Security Intelligence Lab at RCAST, University of Tokyo, a Research Associate at the China Strategic Risks Institute, and a Non-resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum. Her research focuses on PRC political warfare, infrastructure resilience and economic security in East Asia.

Abstract

Repeated cable failures around Taiwan have disrupted civilian services and raised concerns about Chinese grey-zone coercion. These cases have produced different legal outcomes, from criminal convictions to decisions not to prosecute for insufficient evidence. This briefing examines that record and the measures available to protect communications while investigations continue. It draws on the author’s earlier research, including the September 2026 China Strategic Risks Institute report commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the Baltic comparison raised at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s April 2026 hearing. Taiwan’s experience supports closer cooperation on evidence collection and emergency repair, with continuity plans tested against the services people need during an outage. The briefing assesses Taiwan’s legal reforms, the abuse of navigational freedoms and the limits of satellite backup. It proposes wider Taiwanese participation through operators and industry associations, with the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) supporting training grounded in Taiwan’s experience. These arrangements can improve protection and recovery while governments address the jurisdictional limits of enforcement.

Key words: Taiwan; submarine cables; grey zone coercion; maritime law; communications resilience; Baltic Sea; critical infrastructure

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this report represent those of the author and do not represent the opinion of the Centrum Balticum Foundation, and thus, the Centrum Balticum Foundation does not bear any responsibility for the opinions expressed in the report.

1. Introduction

When Matsu’s two principal connections to Taiwan’s main island failed in February 2023, residents struggled to book medical appointments, and businesses lost access to online orders and hotel reservations; some people bought Chinese telecommunications SIM cards to obtain a usable connection near the coast. Microwave backup provided connectivity, albeit limited, at a level well below the service households and businesses depended on (Wu and Lai, 2023). For emergency planners, that experience demands a more exacting definition of continuity than the continued availability of a signal.

Taiwanese authorities linked the two failures to Chinese vessels, although public evidence did not establish that Beijing ordered deliberate interference. Later investigations have produced a three-year prison sentence for the captain of Hong Tai 58 and a decision not to prosecute the captain of Hai Hong Gong 66 (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025; Pan, 2026). Given the difficulty in prosecution, Taiwan has grounds to strengthen protection against deliberate interference while also addressing the accidents and operational failures that leave its communications exposed.

The September 2026 China Strategic Risks Institute report commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), co-authored by Andrew Yeh, Zack Liao, Owen Au and this author, identifies cables connecting the United States with Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines among the more vulnerable parts of the trans-Pacific network under its grey zone risk model (Yeh et al., 2026, pp. 17-24). Its scenarios examine how simultaneous failures could consume spare capacity and force traffic onto longer routes (Yeh et al., 2026, pp. 25-30). Regional partners consequently have an interest in Taiwan’s ability to withstand disruption, including the experience gained from failures on domestic connections.

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry depends on cross-border data exchange to coordinate chip design, manufacturing and logistics, a dependency emphasised in this author’s earlier analysis (Tong, 2026a). As such, foreign customers and suppliers have reason to include communications failure in their assessments of supply-chain risk. The consequences of a prolonged outage would depend on the affected routes and each firm’s continuity arrangements. Governments concerned about access to advanced chips need to examine those arrangements with operators and manufacturers, alongside the physical security of fabrication plants.

At the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on 30 April 2026, Benjamin Schmitt argued that Europe could learn from Taiwan’s prosecution of the Hong Tai 58 captain (Schmitt, 2026, p. 3). Since then, the Hai Hong Gong 66 investigation has ended without prosecution, and Finland’s appeals court has revived the Eagle S case after its earlier jurisdictional dismissal (Centre for Maritime Law, 2026). Comparing those outcomes can help agencies improve evidence collection and clarify when they can intervene. The comparison should also include the repair process, since a successful prosecution cannot restore a damaged connection.

Taiwan’s experience protecting telecommunications cables offers practical grounds for shared standards, an argument developed in this author’s earlier work (Tong, 2026a). This discussion focuses on communications; power cables enter where they share an enforcement problem or help explain supplier dependency, the subject of separate research (Lu and Tong, 2025). Taiwan and its partners need arrangements that keep services usable during an investigation and make subsequent repair easier. Those are decisions about contracts, budgets, and authority that governments can make without first resolving who directed each incident.

2. Cable incidents and their consequences

Matsu’s inadequate backup

The Matsu cables failed six days apart, on 2 and 8 February 2023, leaving approximately 14,000 people dependent on constrained alternative communications. Contemporary reporting recorded the National Communications Commission’s suspicion of a Chinese fishing vessel in the first incident and its attribution of the second to a Chinese cargo ship, alongside the government’s reluctance to describe the events as deliberate action by Beijing (Wu and Lai, 2023). This made responsibility and intent harder to prove, hence its classification as a grey-zone warfare incident.

Businesses dependent on online bookings or orders suffered direct losses, and residents had to adapt routine transactions to an unreliable connection. Recording an island as “connected” would have missed whether a patient could arrange care or a business could receive its orders. Testing those services while the backup handles normal demand would give emergency planners a more useful assessment of what residents can expect during a prolonged outage.

China Mobile offered technical assistance during the disruption, while some residents obtained Chinese SIM cards. Reliance on such alternatives creates an opportunity to influence residents’ perceptions of who provides dependable services, whatever the cause of the original failure. Effective Taiwanese provision of civilian communications would reduce the practical need to seek alternatives across the strait.

Investigations and legal outcomes

Table 1 separates suspected vessel involvement from criminal findings. The Taiwan Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) records both referrals and convictions (MODA, 2026a). Those outcomes need to remain distinct in any account of cable interference.

Table 1. Selected vessel-related cable incidents and documented legal outcomes

Incident and cableReported findings and legal outcomeLimit on interpretation
Shunxin 39
3 January 2025
Trans-Pacific Express
Anchor damage recorded by MODA. Evidence referred to prosecutors; the report gives no conviction (MODA, 2026a).The referral does not establish criminal intent or state direction.
Hong Tai 58
25 February 2025
Taiwan-Penghu No. 3
Captain sentenced to three years on 12 June 2025. Prosecution’s sentence appeal rejected on 29 August 2025 (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025).Judgment concerns anchor damage and individual responsibility; the published statement does not establish state direction.
Minlianyu 60138
7 October 2025
Taiwan-Matsu No. 2
Negligence conviction; three months, commutable to a fine, on 4 December 2025 (MODA, 2026a).A negligence conviction must not be counted as a finding of deliberate sabotage.
Hai Hong Gong 66
30 March 2026
Taiwan-Matsu No. 3
Wreckage damaged the cable during salvage. Non-prosecution reported on 15 July 2026 for insufficient evidence of intent or negligence (Pan, 2026).The reported outcome does not establish criminal responsibility. The approval and survey procedures still warrant review.

Sources: MODA (2026a); Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch (2025); Pan (2026).

The Hong Tai 58 judgment rested on the captain’s conduct, including his knowledge of the charted cable and his anchoring (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025). Taiwan established individual responsibility without requiring proof of a state sponsor.

The appeal concerned sentencing rather than guilt. The published statement records more than NTD 17 million in repair costs and NTD 1.8 million in shipping-agency costs as losses considered in sentencing, without confirming a compensation award or payment (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025).

Dongyin’s salvage operation

In the case of Hai Hong Gong 66, which case was ultimately not prosecuted, the captain had consulted Chunghwa Telecom about anchoring positions, but the approved salvage operation proceeded without an underwater survey establishing the wreck’s precise relationship to the cable. Investigators found that he had followed the approved arrangements, making criminal fault difficult to establish (Pan, 2026).

The authorisation procedure warrants review regardless of the prosecution decision. Approving salvage without reliable information about the infrastructure beneath or near a wreck leaves workers to act on incomplete instructions. A trusted survey, or another technically adequate assessment, belongs in that approval process. Responsibility for obtaining it needs to be assigned before work begins, including when security concerns restrict who can inspect the site.

Cable failures elsewhere during 2026 have also had different operational consequences. In May, MODA announced that one Taiwan-Matsu No. 2 break had been repaired while partial damage from October 2025 remained, with enough surviving fibre capacity to meet Matsu’s peak demand (MODA, 2026c). The fault register dated 9 October records a new TPE break on 3 October and a Taiwan-Matsu No. 2 break on 6 October, together with alternative routes and estimated repair dates, but without establishing their causes (MODA, 2026f). These entries describe the condition of the network and the work still required.

What the fault statistics record

MODA’s detailed 2025 domestic and nearshore international-cable dataset contains seven faults: three anchor-damage cases, two cases of suspected external-force damage, one fishing-related case and one involving natural fibre degradation (MODA, 2026a). Its separate offshore dataset records 25 international-cable faults beyond 24 nautical miles, eleven attributed to earthquakes (MODA, 2026a). An annual total needs to state which geographical area and cable categories it covers.

Across the 2022-2025 nearshore and domestic dataset, thirteen of 34 faults, approximately 38.3 per cent, involved anchor damage (MODA, 2026a). “Anchor damage” describes how a cable was damaged, leaving intent to be established through investigation. The classification helps choose protective measures even when intent remains uncertain. Better anchoring compliance and prompt warnings can prevent accidental damage while making suspicious conduct easier to identify.

3. Chinese capabilities and the evidence of coercion

Chinese military-academic publications discuss control of the deep sea, while research and development encompass submersibles, remotely operated vehicles, seabed sensing and cable-cutting designs with civilian and military applications (Yeh et al., 2026, pp. 8-16). Protection planning needs to account for these capabilities alongside the anchor damage already visible in the incident record.

Patents record claimed designs, and demonstrations show what equipment can do under particular conditions. Strategic publications help explain institutional interests but leave open questions about deployment. A threat assessment can use all this material, provided it specifies the evidence for operational capability and the further evidence required to connect that capability to an actual incident.

Repeated interference with thinly connected outlying islands could let an adversary observe response times and impose recurring costs while limiting immediate disruption to international traffic. This concern was raised in this author’s May analysis of suspected grey-zone coercion, which situated cable interference alongside military pressure, cyber intrusions, and information operations (Tong, 2026a). Such a strategy is plausible; the incident record does not establish that every failure forms part of it. Exercises can nevertheless test repeated local outages, including the effects on public confidence when repairs and official explanations take longer than residents expect.

The USCC-commissioned report observes that publicly reported suspected China-linked incidents have involved commercial or fishing vessels, whose presence near a route can appear routine (Yeh et al., 2026, pp. 19-20). Recognising dangerous conduct aboard an ordinary vessel quickly enough to intervene remains an immediate protection task. Spending on advanced underwater detection will have limited value if an alert about that conduct cannot reach an agency authorised to respond.

Investigators have to establish the mechanism of damage and connect it to an actor before assessing that actor’s knowledge or intent. Attributing the conduct to a state raises another question about instructions or the relationship between the actor and the state. Each conclusion requires its own supporting evidence. A strong finding about the vessel that caused a break does not necessarily resolve who, if anyone, directed its actions.

Proximity to a cable may justify closer observation. A matching seabed trace, recorded warnings, and recovered equipment could strengthen the causal assessment, while ownership records and crew nationality provide context for further investigation. Public statements need to identify the status of such findings so that an allegation in a prosecution is distinguishable from a judgment. The same care applies to intelligence assessments whose supporting material cannot be fully disclosed.

Operators can reroute traffic and preserve logs as soon as they detect a fault. Maritime authorities can investigate within their existing powers and seek assistance from a vessel’s flag state or next port, with agreed thresholds for each action. These precautions can be justified while a criminal investigation remains incomplete. However, seeking assistance from the vessel’s flag state is extremely difficult if it is friendly with malign actors, rendering the prosecution of suspected sabotage incidents where flag states have jurisdiction arduous.

MODA has paired repair announcements with requests that the public consult official fault information rather than circulate rumours (MODA, 2026c). Residents trying to make payments or obtain medical referrals also have practical questions. An announcement can tell them which applications remain available, explain likely delays and give a contact for help if a connection fails. That information is useful even before investigators can explain why the cable broke.

The public record needs a correction procedure as well as an alert procedure. An entry initially describing suspected interference ought to carry the later engineering finding or prosecutorial decision, with the date of the change. Evidence that strengthens an allegation deserves the same visible treatment. Keeping those updates together would let researchers trace a case without reconstructing it from disconnected announcements and help residents judge whether official warnings have proved reliable over time.

4. Enforcement across maritime jurisdictions

Taiwan’s legal reforms

Amendments to Articles 72 and 72-1 of the Telecommunications Management Act took effect in June 2023, before the Hong Tai 58 incident and prosecution (MODA, 2026a). A subsequent seven-law package passed the legislature in December 2025 and was promulgated in January 2026, adding vessel-confiscation provisions and stronger ship-identification requirements (MODA, 2026a). The June 2025 conviction thus belongs to the earlier phase of reform; the later package expanded the available response.

MODA identifies telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, water supply, meteorological, commercial-port and ship legislation among the affected laws (MODA, 2026a). Together, the changes address offences against infrastructure and the management of vessels involved. Evaluation now needs to follow their use in actual cases, including whether identification requirements make intervention easier and whether confiscation provisions are applied to vessels used in offences.

Under the enacted ship-law amendments, vessels within the specified categories must maintain Automatic Identification System (AIS) operation and transmit correct identification information, with administrative fines ranging from NTD 30,000 to NTD 10 million for the relevant violations (Lin, 2025). These penalties operate alongside the criminal provisions for cable damage. Keeping their legal bases clear allows authorities to explain what they are enforcing at each stage, including when they have evidence of an identification violation but are still investigating the damage itself.

Taiwan-Matsu No. 4 uses the Submarine Cable Automatic Warning System (SAWS), combining AI recognition with AIS and cooperation with the Coast Guard (MODA, 2026d). An alert must reach personnel who can assess the vessel’s behaviour, issue a warning, and request intervention. Recording the time taken at each stage would reveal whether investment in detection is shortening the response.

Independent observation remains necessary when a vessel’s transmissions are missing or inconsistent. Taiwan’s Coast Guard describes using radar tracks to reconstruct activity after operators report suspected damage, with boarding and further investigation depending on identification, sea conditions, and jurisdiction (Coast Guard Administration, 2025). Comparing AIS with those observations can help establish what occurred. A signal anomaly is a reason to verify a vessel’s activity, with its significance assessed alongside the other evidence.

Authority under the law of the sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) assigns different powers and duties to each maritime zone. Table 2 sets out the distinctions relevant to cable protection; an intervention requires attention to both location and conduct.

Table 2. Maritime jurisdictions and implications for cable protection

Zone and extentRelevant coastal-state powersNavigation and cable enforcement
Territorial sea
Up to 12 nautical miles
Coastal-state sovereignty. Cable-protection laws permitted; criminal jurisdiction aboard passing foreign ships remains subject to Article 27.Foreign vessels retain innocent passage. Enforcement must satisfy the applicable conditions (arts. 2–3, 17, 21 and 27).
Contiguous zone
Beyond the territorial sea, up to 24 nautical miles
Control to prevent or punish customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary infringements within the territory or territorial sea.No general cable-security boarding power arises from this zone. Applicable navigation freedoms continue (arts. 33 and 58).
Exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
Beyond the territorial sea, up to 200 nautical miles
Resource-related sovereign rights and specified jurisdiction over installations, marine science and environmental protection.Navigation and cable-laying freedoms remain, subject to due regard. EEZ rights are not territorial sovereignty (arts. 55–58).
High seas
Outside EEZs, territorial seas, internal waters and archipelagic waters
Generally flag-state jurisdiction, subject to treaty and Convention exceptions.Navigation and cable-laying freedoms apply. Cable damage is not a separate Article 110 right-of-visit ground (arts. 86–87, 92 and 110).

Source: United Nations (1982), UNCLOS, articles indicated in the table.

Distances are measured from lawful baselines and indicate the maximum extent of each zone under UNCLOS. Where maritime entitlements overlap, separate delimitation rules apply. The contiguous zone and EEZ overlap where both are established. A cable-protection designation does not itself create boarding authority (United Nations, 1982, arts. 3, 33, 55–58, 74 and 110).

“International waters” obscures the distinction between the EEZ and high seas. Article 79 separately protects cable laying and maintenance on the continental shelf, with qualifications including coastal-state authority over cables entering its territory or territorial sea (United Nations, 1982, arts. 58, 79 and 86). Agencies should identify the relevant maritime zone when reporting an incident.

Taiwan should consider using the 24-nautical-mile area for coordinated observation and early warning, with operators reporting faults and coastguard units preserving evidence of nearby vessel activity. MODA already uses a 24-nautical-mile boundary in its statistical analysis, but that classification does not establish enforcement authority (MODA, 2026a; United Nations, 1982, art. 33). Procedures should specify when an alert warrants a warning, a request for flag-state cooperation or an intervention supported by an identified legal power.

Article 113 requires states to criminalise specified wilful or culpably negligent cable damage by their flagged ships or persons under their jurisdiction, but does not itself authorise another state to board the vessel (United Nations, 1982, arts. 58, 92, 110 and 113). Joint patrol arrangements must respect the separate conditions for visiting foreign ships and hot pursuit; suspected cable damage is not a freestanding right-of-visit category under Article 110 (United Nations, 1982, arts. 110-111). Participants should agree on how to transfer evidence when one agency’s observations become relevant to another’s investigation, as well as the authority for intervention and limits on force.

Flag-state accountability belongs in that work programme. Participating governments could agree how to verify vessel registration and ownership, preserve records after a change of flag, and refer evidence to the authority responsible for investigating an alleged offence. They could also publish whether requests receive a substantive response. These procedures would help investigators pursue cases involving flags of convenience without treating a vessel’s registration or crew nationality as proof of sabotage.

Freedom of navigation and deliberate interference

MODA identifies flags-of-convenience vessels asserting innocent passage as a grey-zone concern and records the use of altered or disabled identification systems to complicate tracking (MODA, 2026a, p. 14). A deliberate operation could exploit access to shipping routes and the time investigators need to establish what a vessel has done. Planning for Chinese grey-zone operations therefore needs to include interference by civilian vessels, while attribution to the Chinese state requires evidence beyond the vessel’s nationality or commercial links. Monitoring must distinguish dangerous conduct from routine traffic and alert an agency authorised to respond.

Navigational freedoms carry obligations. Articles 58 and 87 require due regard for other states’ relevant rights and interests, and Article 300 requires States Parties to exercise Convention rights and freedoms in good faith and without abuse (United Nations, 1982, arts. 58, 87 and 300). In the territorial sea, Article 19(2)(k) expressly identifies acts aimed at interfering with a coastal state’s communications systems as prejudicial to innocent passage (United Nations, 1982, art. 19). Deliberate cable interference cannot acquire legal protection simply by being conducted from a civilian vessel engaged in otherwise lawful navigation.

The response must distinguish innocent passage in the territorial sea from navigational freedoms in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas; Article 300 does not itself confer a new boarding power (United Nations, 1982, arts. 17-19, 58, 87, 110 and 300). Taiwan and its partners can defend lawful navigation while investigating and prosecuting deliberate damage under the authority available in each case. Evidence-based intervention preserves that distinction. Blanket restrictions on Chinese-linked shipping would risk obstructing legitimate traffic without resolving the difficulty of proving an offence.

Targeted cable-protection zones

Taiwan could assess targeted restrictions on anchoring and seabed-contact activities around vulnerable cable segments, beginning with shallow-water approaches to landing stations. Australia offers an example of activity-specific regulation: its Sydney protection zones prohibit trawling and dredging, while anchoring restrictions vary with location, water depth and equipment (ACMA, 2026). ACMA’s declaration process requires a published proposal and public submissions, with environmental consultation and consideration of other sea users (ACMA, 2025). Taiwan can examine that process without assuming the same boundaries or restrictions would suit its waters.

Operators could identify segments where anchoring or fishing gear presents a recurring risk, then work with maritime authorities and fishing communities to assess proposed boundaries. A declaration would need clear coordinates and permitted activities, published through nautical charts and notices to mariners. Its rules would also need to address emergencies and authorised repair work. SAWS alerts and recorded warnings could support enforcement, but each zone would require an identified legal authority and a response procedure that officers can use before a cable is damaged.

A charted cable, an advisory warning area and a legally designated protection zone have different legal effects. In the Hong Tai 58 case, the appellate statement records the captain’s knowledge of the cable’s charted location; it does not itself establish a formal no-anchoring designation (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025). Clear notices can help establish what a crew knew, while any allegation of violating a zone must identify the applicable rule and the conduct that breached it. Where legislation creates an offence for a prohibited activity, enforcement could address that activity without first proving state-sponsored sabotage, which requires a much higher threshold. With grey-zone tactics in place, direct attribution to a malign state actor is virtually impossible.

The location of a proposed zone determines which powers are available. UNCLOS Article 21 permits coastal-state laws protecting cables during territorial-sea passage, while Articles 58 and 110 preserve distinct rules on navigational freedoms and boarding beyond the territorial sea (United Nations, 1982, arts. 21, 58 and 110). Designating a zone cannot by itself expand those powers. Any offshore proposal would require a separate assessment of its application to foreign vessels, with measures proportionate to the activities that threaten the cable. Operators can supply technical evidence and participate in monitoring. Binding restrictions and enforcement remain governmental responsibilities.

The Eagle S appeal

On 27 August 2026, the Helsinki Court of Appeal overturned the dismissal of the Eagle S case on jurisdictional grounds and returned it to the district court (Centre for Maritime Law, 2026). The court distinguished the initially unexpected anchor drop from the alleged continuation of anchor dragging after authorities contacted the crew, concluding that the conduct described no longer fell within the relevant “incident of navigation” limitation in Article 97 (Centre for Maritime Law, 2026).

The ruling concerned jurisdiction rather than guilt and remained subject to an application for leave to appeal to Finland’s Supreme Court, with a reported deadline of 26 October 2026 (Martin, 2026). Its reasoning makes the communications between authorities and a crew particularly relevant. Recording a warning and the vessel’s subsequent behaviour may help establish both the alleged conduct and the legal basis for a court to hear the case.

Taiwanese and European agencies could compare how they issue warnings and establish receipt, then reconstruct a vessel’s movements afterwards. Such work would give investigators a basis for improving their procedures before another incident. It would also clarify how the Hong Tai 58 experience applies to an EEZ case, where the jurisdictional questions may differ from those accompanying an offence closer to shore.

5. Maintaining services through disruption

Additional routes and shared exposure

MODA’s April 2026 release reported fifteen international and ten domestic cables as of the end of February; its current network page lists sixteen international and eleven domestic cables, including Taiwan-Matsu No. 4 and the Taiwan-Philippines-US system (MODA, 2026b; MODA, 2026e). These inventories need dates attached whenever they are used in an assessment. Network expansion can change the assumptions behind both a risk model and a contingency plan.

E2A provides a specific basis for shared investment in protection. Its consortium comprises Chunghwa Telecom, SK Broadband, SoftBank and Verizon, with a planned 12,500-kilometre route linking Toucheng, Busan, Maruyama and Morro Bay (Alcatel Submarine Networks, 2025). The supplier announced design capacity exceeding 192 terabits per second and an expected service date in the second half of 2028 (Alcatel Submarine Networks, 2025). Those are project specifications, not capacity available during an outage today. The participating operators and their governments can use the construction period to agree on repair access and test how each landing connects to alternative routes.

Taiwan-Matsu No. 4 entered service on 18 September 2026, connecting Taiwan’s main island with Dongyin, Nangan and Xiju along a route nearly 300 kilometres long (MODA, 2026d). MODA reports that its addition increased overall Taiwan-Matsu transmission capacity to about 1.9 terabits per second, and describes double armouring, a target burial depth of 2.5 metres, and an automatic warning system as protective measures (MODA, 2026d). The new capacity provides an opportunity to test how much civilian service can be sustained if an existing connection fails.

Routes may share approaches to landing facilities, power supplies or onward terrestrial connections, so counting cables does not establish how many independent alternatives are available. An operator-level assessment would calculate usable capacity after plausible combinations of failures and check that traffic can reach the surviving systems. A cable provides little redundancy for a particular service if that service loses access to its landing facility or onward connection in the same event.

MODA’s 2025 analysis separates offshore earthquake-related disruption from nearshore vessel damage, including multiple international-cable failures associated with an earthquake near the end of the year (MODA, 2026a). Route planning needs to consider the possibility that several alternatives share that geological exposure. Moving traffic away from a busy shipping corridor can reduce one risk while leaving another largely unchanged, which is why natural hazards belong in the same continuity exercise as deliberate interference.

Securing repair access

Taiwan participates in the Yokohama and Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean cable-maintenance regions, arrangements the premier described in March 2026 (Bilinski, 2026). Cable Retriever and its Subic Bay depot in the Philippines support the Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean Cable Maintenance Agreement (SEAIOCMA), whose coverage extends from Djibouti to Guam and Taiwan to Australia. MODA identifies long-term maintenance agreements and priority-dispatch mechanisms as ways to shorten waiting times (MODA, 2026a). The breadth of a maintenance zone makes simultaneous demand across countries essential to contingency planning.

Existing arrangements already provide for some regional surge assistance. During the 2006 Taiwan earthquake, the North American, Yokohama, and SEAIOCMA zones also provided mutual assistance, which was invoked and named the Pacific and Indian Ocean Cable Mutual Assistance. (Global Marine, n.d.)  Planners need to establish whether comparable assistance would remain available during repeated suspected sabotage or a confrontation that raises insurance costs. An exercise can test whether the promised vessel and equipment can be dispatched within the period assumed by the continuity plan.

A regional agreement can settle dispatch priority when several cables fail and identify equipment held near likely repair areas. It also must specify who obtains crew entry and work authorisations, and who pays for insurance or security. Governments can negotiate the risks they will underwrite and the circumstances in which an operator can decline a mission. A continuity plan that leaves these terms unresolved overstates the repair access available in an emergency.

Usable spare capacity likewise depends on preparation. Activating capacity requires submarine line terminal equipment, and substantial upgrades may take days to months depending on supply chains and operator agility. A continuity plan needs separate figures for immediately available capacity and capacity requiring equipment or installation. Stocking that equipment can shorten recovery, provided the plan also identifies the people authorised and trained to install it.

Keeping essential applications usable

This author’s earlier analysis of Taiwan’s satellite resilience examined how satellite connectivity can preserve priority communications during cable disruption but cannot replace ordinary economic traffic at fibre capacity (Tong, 2026b). It also identified dependence on ground infrastructure, foreign operators and continuing operational funding. Cable-contingency exercises like the Han Kuang Exercise this year need to test those dependencies along with the satellite connection itself.

Bandwidth allocation needs to reflect the functions each institution must perform. A hospital may require patient records and referral systems as well as remote consultation, with access dependent on authentication or external cloud services. Testing those applications under congestion and intermittent connectivity would show whether the intended backup is usable. The exercise needs to include the people who run the services, since they must decide which tasks can wait when capacity is limited.

Restoration needs rehearsal too. Delayed transactions must be cleared, offline records created and reconciled, and uneven recovery explained to the public. Outlying-island administrations can help define the scenarios and the minimum civilian service expected throughout an outage. Recording how long an essential service takes to recover, and how many people can use it, would make exercise results more useful than capacity figures alone.

6. Cooperation with the Baltic States and Europe

The Senate hearing supplied by the editors was titled “Sabotage in the Baltic Sea, Implications for European Security, and Lessons for the Indo-Pacific,” with Benjamin Schmitt and James C. O’Brien listed as witnesses (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2026). Schmitt’s published written testimony drew on field research in both regions and identified Taiwan’s legal response as relevant to Europe (Schmitt, 2026). His assessment provides a basis for policy discussion, though the evidentiary status of each incident still depends on the underlying investigation.

The Hong Tai 58 record and the Eagle S appellate reasoning both give weight to what a crew knew and did in relation to a cable hazard (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025; Centre for Maritime Law, 2026). Investigators can compare the records needed to establish that knowledge and conduct, even where the jurisdictional setting differs. Similarities in vessel behaviour support this kind of exchange; establishing a shared command structure or a coordinated campaign would require additional evidence.

Eagle S is associated with damage to the Estlink 2 electricity interconnector and four telecommunications cables (Martin, 2026). Investigators may use evidence relevant to both sectors, while operators face distinct repair requirements and commercial arrangements. Planning for such an episode means determining in advance which recovery resources can be shared and which are specific to electricity transmission or telecommunications.

NATO launched Baltic Sentry in January 2025, combining an enhanced maritime presence with surveillance assets and cooperation through its Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, which includes industry (NATO, 2025). The Indo-Pacific can adapt functions such as shared observation and operator liaison to its own institutions. Planning around those functions avoids making useful cooperation dependent on replicating the Baltic’s alliance arrangements.

European funding also addresses repair and civilian coordination. In February 2026, the Commission announced a cable-security toolbox and EUR 347 million for strategic cable projects, including repair-capacity measures (European Commission, 2026a). In June, it announced EUR 5.8 million for the first two regional cable hubs, in the Baltic and Mediterranean, and a EUR 40 million call for cable-repair capacity (European Commission, 2026b). These allocations provide models for financing shared capabilities, with their eventual operational readiness still to be assessed.

Taiwan could begin with a smaller group of willing agencies and operators able to agree on incident formats and emergency contacts. A repair-permitting exercise would test whether those relationships are sufficient to authorise work promptly. Partners would retain responsibility for their own attribution decisions while exchanging evidence and coordinating protection, allowing cooperation to continue when their political assessments differ.

S. 2222, introduced in July 2025 as the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act, was reported to the U.S. Senate in February 2026 under the short title Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act; the congressional record lists its placement on the legislative calendar, not enactment, as the latest action (U.S. Congress, 2026). Any cooperation plan relying on that proposal needs to distinguish measures already authorised and funded from those dependent on further legislation.

Taiwan’s legal record offers material for that cooperation in both successful prosecutions and cases that do not proceed. Hong Tai 58 established individual accountability; the Hai Hong Gong 66 disposition required prosecutors to revise the initial suspicion when they found the evidence insufficient (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025; Pan, 2026). Partners need to examine both kinds of outcomes to understand whether their procedures distinguish offences from other causes of damage.

Taiwan brings experience of protecting communications under sustained geopolitical pressure, while European programmes offer examples of pooling monitoring and repair resources. Joint work can build on those contributions through exercises with named participating agencies. The test is whether a partner can obtain evidence or authorise a repair faster because the arrangement exists.

7. Priorities for Taiwan and its partners

Preserve evidence across jurisdictions

Taiwan MODA could convene operators, maritime authorities and prosecutors to agree a minimum evidence package and assign responsibility for retaining each part. The package would cover the first fault notification and relevant radar and AIS records, alongside warnings issued to vessels, engineering findings and recovered material. Synchronised clocks would allow investigators to reconstruct the sequence across organisations. An exercise requiring participants to assemble a case from those separate records would expose omissions.

Taiwan’s Coast Guard already describes seeking help through diplomatic, maritime and judicial channels when sea conditions or the location of a foreign-flagged vessel prevents immediate boarding (Coast Guard Administration, 2025). Designated contacts and standard request templates would make that process easier to use under time pressure. If the request reaches the appropriate authority in time, arrangements with likely next ports could help preserve records after a vessel leaves the immediate area.

Public reporting needs consistent categories for technical faults, suspected interference and established vessel causation, with separate entries for criminal findings and state-attribution assessments. An incident can acquire more than one classification as an investigation proceeds. Each update needs a date and an indication of whether its evidence is public, allowing scrutiny of the case record while protecting sensitive operational details.

Make repair commitments enforceable

An audit of existing commercial maintenance agreements would establish Taiwan’s emergency dispatch rights and identify personnel constraints, including which equipment can be mobilised without procurement. Regional partners could then test simultaneous failures across jurisdictions to identify where commitments conflict. Governments would have a basis for funding specific readiness gaps and requiring the additional capacity to be available under agreed conditions.

Partners could negotiate standing emergency repair permissions and co-finance additional vessels with priority access, alongside equipment stocks near likely repair areas. Implementation involves the authorities responsible for notification, customs clearance, crew entry and work approval. An exercise can establish whether they can act within the proposed dispatch window, including when exceptional insurance or security escort is required. The agreement must also protect crews’ ability to suspend work if conditions become unsafe.

A jointly financed, multi-role cable-repair vessel programme can also be explored. Partners could compare a dedicated new vessel with long-term chartering and reserved capacity in existing fleets. That assessment needs to cover trained crews, maintenance downtime and spare equipment, and the ship’s purchase price. Survey work could support normal operations, but additional missions must not compromise the agreed repair readiness. Taiwan’s financial contribution would need to secure explicit dispatch rights during a regional emergency.

Japan’s cable ecosystem combines system supply, operations, investment and maintenance capabilities. That makes repair scheduling and compatible equipment stocks useful starting points for Taiwan-Japan cooperation. Operator participation would allow both sides to test whether an agreement meets their continuity needs and remains workable when commercial priorities compete during a regional emergency.

Taiwan’s participation through industry and practical cooperation

Taiwan can expand its participation through the companies that own and operate cables, without making every activity dependent on Track 1 diplomacy. E2A’s multinational consortium and Taiwan’s regional maintenance arrangements already organise cooperation through operators and service providers (Alcatel Submarine Networks, 2025; Bilinski, 2026). Operators can negotiate joint work within their contractual rights and regulatory obligations, and engage officially when government decisions are required.

Chunghwa Telecom is a member of the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), whose membership includes commercial companies and government administrations (ICPC, 2026a; ICPC, 2026b). The committee develops recommendations and exchanges technical and legal information on cable protection (ICPC, 2026a). Taiwanese operators can use that participation to contribute incident experience and propose common practices. Commercial arrangements can address repair access and evidence retention; research networks can compare cases; Track 1.5 exchanges can bring officials into discussions requiring regulatory decisions.

Taiwan’s experience offers material for those common practices. The Hong Tai 58 conviction and the Hai Hong Gong 66 non-prosecution allow investigators to compare evidence sufficient for criminal responsibility with an operation in which approved procedures left cable risks inadequately assessed (Taiwan High Court, Tainan Branch, 2025; Pan, 2026). Taiwanese practitioners could develop anonymised case exercises, model evidence-retention procedures and repair-permitting checklists with overseas counterparts. These would address implementation and coordination problems that the Convention’s allocation of rights and duties leaves to national authorities and practical cooperation. Any power to compel disclosure, board a vessel or prosecute an offence would still require its own legal basis.

Give RISK and GCTF a continuing work programme

Taiwan launched the RISK Management Initiative on International Undersea Cables in October 2025, proposing cooperation on risk mitigation, information sharing, systemic reform and knowledge building (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2025). That scope accommodates participants from Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan can help set the agenda by drafting incident-reporting standards and hosting exercises for smaller coastal and island states. A first annual programme needs assigned institutions and agreed outputs so that participants can judge whether the initiative is improving their ability to respond.

Regular Track 1.5 meetings, bringing officials together with operators, insurers and researchers, could prepare that work. The Australia-India Cables Dialogue convened industry, government and research participants around connectivity and supply-chain resilience in 2025 (Australia India Institute, 2025). The US-ASEAN Business Council subsequently announced a three-part subsea-cable policy roundtable series among its 2026 projects (US-ASEAN Business Council, 2025). Taiwan can seek working relationships with such programmes, with a continuing working group preparing joint risk assessments between meetings.

The Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) already provides a venue for this exchange. Its Taipei workshop on 21-23 January 2026 brought together 197 participants from 26 countries to discuss communications-infrastructure resilience, including private-sector roles, legal frameworks and subsea-cable protection and repair; participants were also scheduled to visit the Toucheng cable landing station (American Institute in Taiwan, 2026). GCTF is jointly administered by Taiwan’s foreign ministry and partner representative offices, so its mixed participation operates with official support.

A continuing GCTF cable-security programme could use Taiwan’s cases to train investigators and operators together. Participants could test an evidence-preservation protocol and rehearse a repair request, then return to report which procedures their institutions had adopted. RISK could set shared priorities while GCTF convenes the training, with implementation left to the responsible agencies and companies. Researchers and civil society could assess public communication during an outage.

Data-sharing rules would distinguish routine exchanges from information released following an alert, with limits on further disclosure of commercially sensitive or security-relevant material. Recording access would make those restrictions auditable. A correction procedure for erroneous vessel or incident information would serve a different but equally practical purpose, preventing an unsupported allegation from continuing to circulate within the shared system.

Measure the delays that cooperation can reduce

Exercise reports would record detection-to-notification time and the time required to authorise a repair mission, while checking whether relevant records were preserved. Service providers could document how long essential applications remained degraded. Repeating the exercise would show whether a procedural change had reduced delays and identify the decisions still holding up the response.

Enforcement needs its own record, distinguishing convictions and administrative penalties from confiscation decisions, non-prosecution and successful appeals. Recording the legal basis would help determine whether the reforms improve accountability while preserving due process. Legislators would then have evidence for further changes, rather than relying on a count of alleged sabotage cases assembled from reports using different standards.

7. Conclusion

Taiwanese operators and researchers can begin this work through existing industry relationships, with official participation where permits or enforcement powers are involved. Taiwan’s cases can supply the training material, and GCTF can convene the practitioners who will use it. Agreeing on evidence retention and repair procedures in advance would allow those relationships to support an actual response.

Taiwan can also work with operators and maritime authorities to assess protection zones around exposed cable segments. That process would require public consultation and a legal review of proposed restrictions, followed by testing the warning and response procedures. Funding decisions would then be tied to the capacity to enforce those rules and maintain civilian services during a failure.

Within the next year, Taiwan and willing European and Indo-Pacific partners should complete a joint evidence-preservation exercise and simulate an emergency repair authorisation. They should test essential civilian applications through a sustained loss of cable capacity, then publish the procedural changes and funding commitments that follow. Each participating agency would be responsible for correcting the delays identified before the next exercise.

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