When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the Nordic countries recognized the new government relatively quickly compared with other Western states, such as the United States of America (USA). Although each Nordic country maintains its own distinct relationship with China, Nordic–PRC relations can generally be characterized as relatively functional and marked by fewer frictions than China’s relations with major powers such as the USA.
From China’s perspective, even though the Nordic countries are less politically and economically significant than larger states such as Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), or the USA, they are nonetheless of both practical and symbolic importance. China seeks to ensure that its core domestic and foreign policy interests are acknowledged and respected in the Nordic region. Moreover, as some Nordic countries are members of the European Union (EU) and other influential international organizations, China expects that, when necessary, its interests and positions can be channeled and amplified through Nordic participation in these forums.
The pragmatic and relatively welcoming approach adopted by the Nordic countries toward the PRC has, however, shifted in recent years due to a range of geopolitical developments at the European and international levels, which need not be repeated here. Broadly speaking, an increasing number of issues and potential areas of cooperation have come to be viewed through a security lens. While there are sound reasons for this shift, it nevertheless raises questions about the extent to which relations should be securitized, as well as the potential costs and benefits of such an approach.
These securitization measures have emerged across various domains, including educational cooperation, technological collaboration, and investment. They are largely responses to a series of “wake-up calls” articulated by other EU and US actors at both the European and international levels. In this context, the Nordic countries are gradually coming to terms with a more challenging China than they had previously anticipated.
Although China under Xi Jinping has become more authoritarian and more assertive in the international arena, China has, in many respects, remained fundamentally the same. Its political system and modes of governance have been in place since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and many of its contemporary characteristics can be traced even further back to its long historical and civilizational traditions. Thus, despite China’s dramatic economic and technological advances, and notwithstanding Xi Jinping’s comparatively draconian style of rule, the underlying nature of the Chinese state has not changed as profoundly as is often assumed. At its core, the Chinese civilizational state is grounded in a long-standing tradition of culture, governance, and identity that predates the PRC. This tradition has consistently prioritized unity, stability, and cultural continuity over other values that tend to be emphasized in Western political cultures.
While the core nature of China has remained relatively consistent, the Nordic countries have struggled to develop a sustained and nuanced understanding of the Chinese state. In the early period following the PRC’s founding, the Nordic countries’ swift recognition of the new regime, combined with the disillusionment of some Nordic elites with their own societies, contributed to an idealized perception of China as an imagined utopia. This early romanticization hindered a more sober and accurate understanding of the PRC.
In the subsequent era, China’s growing economic power encouraged Nordic countries to view China primarily through the lens of opportunity and prosperity, often sidelining serious engagement with its political system and modes of governance. More recently, this economically driven perspective has been replaced by a steep learning curve focused on China’s potential risks to Nordic security and to Western liberal values. Across these different periods, Nordic interpretations of China have consistently been filtered through Nordic or broader Western priorities and motivations, rather than being grounded in a sustained analysis of China on its own terms.
The current wave of securitization can be understood as a rapid effort to grasp the political nature, intentions, and ambitions of the Chinese state. Yet excessive securitization risks reducing a vast and complex country to a homogeneous entity, obscuring important regional, institutional, and social nuances.
The recent budget cuts to Asian and China-related studies in the Nordic countries are a worrying trend. Rather than retrenching, Nordic societies should invest more in educating their citizens about China. The Finnish case of Ähtäri Zoo’s acceptance of two giant pandas illustrates this well: it was not a diplomatic failure but a case in which non-state actors engaged with China on overly simplistic terms, without fully considering the broader economic, political, and diplomatic implications.
Careful diplomacy on both the Finnish and Chinese sides ultimately prevented the issue from escalating, demonstrating the effectiveness of expert-level China specialists. However, reliance on a small group of experts is insufficient, underscoring the need for broader and more specialized education to ensure that future generations can engage with China knowledgeably and responsibly.
Julie Yu-Wen Chen
Professor of Chinese Studies
University of Helsinki
Finland
Photo: Ma Kang
