Russia’s intelligence collection in Western countries has become significantly more difficult since the outbreak of its war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, Russia’s need for information about Europe has deepened as geopolitical dividing lines sharpen. As a result, Moscow is now urgently seeking new sources of information in the West.
For a hundred years, the principal method of Russian foreign intelligence has been long-term human intelligence. Russian intelligence culture—and its celebrated successes of the twentieth century—has rested largely on effective human-source recruitment.
The contemporary importance of human intelligence for Russia is illustrated by international prisoner exchanges. In these exchanges, Russia has reclaimed from Western prisons deep-cover illegals, assassins, hackers, and arms traffickers. Western states, by contrast, have received opposition leaders, a basketball player arrested for cannabis possession, and a civic activist detained for swapping price labels in a supermarket. This disparity does not mean that Western agents are never caught, but more likely that the West relies predominantly on other methods of intelligence collection.
For Russian authorities, human intelligence is not merely one collection discipline among others. It is an organisational culture — a way in which these Russian organisations have always operated. Intelligence gathering has traditionally been organised through officers deployed to the West under diplomatic cover or false identities.
That world changed when the West unexpectedly closed ranks in response to Russia’s aggression. The precursor was the 2018 poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury. More than 150 Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover were expelled from various countries. The United States expelled 60 diplomats, the United Kingdom 24 — other states smaller numbers — but nevertheless the common front held.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the West expelled an unprecedented number of Russian diplomats. Russia’s traditional “residency” networks and human-source operations were weakened, as was access to many elite circles. Managing networks and meeting agents became more difficult. Russia’s brutal conduct of the war has damaged its global reputation. Therefor it is probable that recruitment no longer proceeds smoothly even among previously sympathetic circles in politics, business, science, or the media.
As geopolitical divides deepen, Russian intelligence services cannot accept a paralysis of their collection capabilities. Lost channels and networks must be replaced — but there are very limited ways to do so.
Other intelligence disciplines will certainly be strengthened, yet organisational culture cannot be transformed quickly. Russia will continue to rely heavily on human intelligence, once its networks can be rebuilt.
Since motivating Western partners to assist Russia has become more difficult, pressure is now placed increasingly on the Russian population residing in Western countries.
Under Russian law, Russian authorities have the right to issue administrative orders to their citizens. Individuals are obliged to obey these orders regardless of the country in which they reside — or whether such orders violate the laws of their country of residence. Failure to comply is criminalised. Russia does not recognise dual citizenship in a way that would release individuals from their obligations as Russian citizens. Vulnerability is further deepened if a person has family members, property, or other interests in Russia.
Where the recruitment of Western citizens often requires identifying vulnerabilities — or actively creating them — the vulnerabilities of Russian citizens exist by default and are usually documented in state registers. These may include, for example, a parent or child living in Russia.
Western intelligence and security agencies thus face a difficult task. Everyone’s rights must be respected, and no individual may be monitored solely on the basis of origin. At the same time, Western countries host large numbers of people whom Russia considers its citizens and who are, without question, more vulnerable to pressure from a foreign state than the population at large.
Western authorities must therefore proceed with vigilance and be equipped with adequate legal powers. Equally important, however, is how we treat members of our Russian-background minorities. Every discriminatory act gives grounds to Russia’s claims of Russophobia or the need to defend its citizens living abroad.
Ensuring equal treatment and respectful conduct toward all individuals — regardless of minority or citizenship — is therefore essential for our national security. In this regard, the struggle for the hearts and minds of Russians living abroad is one of the most important challenges Europe will face.
Mikko Porvali
Author, Doctoral Researcher
University of Jyväskylä
Finland
