In this brief essay I chart a selected interface between the fields of strategic foresight and intelligence studies. I view these fields through a lens of future uncertainties and argue that both of these fields need to cope with varied levels of uncertainty in a context, be it a set of future pathways or other substance matter. I argue that in both of these fields it is crucial to understand two related aspects of future uncertainties: 1) horizon of uncertainty and 2) emergence in a context.

The first connecting feature between the two fields is the need to define the horizon of uncertainty. Horizon of uncertainty refers to an analytical continuum ranging from known and projectable events to unknown entities looming on the edge of imagination. In strategic foresight, so-called “futures cone” is among the most widely known methodological frameworks for conceptualising future uncertainties, unravelling a variety of future pathways extending from probable and likely futures to possible futures, occurring only under certain conditions, and eventually landing on preposterous futures that are radically different from the present (see, e.g., Voros 2003).

However, there are also other frameworks that could be considered. For example, in a classic article Kahneman and Tversky (1982) discuss variants of uncertainty. They propose that there are two basic sorts of uncertainty: external, referring to the instances themselves, and internal, referring to a reasoning process. External uncertainty can be further divided into distributional perspective, based on multiple instances, and singular perspective, based on a single instance. Internal uncertainty can be also divided into two perspectives: reasoned perspective is based on rational arguments and evidence and introspective perspective is based on confidence. This framework opens intriguing options for assessing uncertainties in an operational environment. For example, is the event identified in the operational environment an objective novelty, that is, new in a context, or is the newness of the event based on an interpretation, that is, on an internal view? If the event seems to be objectively novel, one could firstly assess if it is based on distributions of multiple instances or just on a singular instance, and then move towards interpretations. Then again, if the event is based on interpretation, one could assess if there are rational arguments and evidence endorsing it or is it based on mere confidence, a strong hunch. After this internal assessment it is possible to move towards external assessment.

Furthermore, combination of the futures cone and Kahneman-Tversky frameworks would enable analysts to pose relevant future-directed questions and provide value-added information. Analyst could, for example, scrutinise potential future events from two perspectives, firstly evaluating the scope of future uncertainty horizon and then assessing the variants of uncertainty ranging from external to internal.

The second connecting feature between the fields of strategic foresight and intelligence studies is the need to understand emergence in a context. Both fields aim at analysing novelties, that is, new phenomena, that could catalyse significant changes in the operational environment. The operational environment is, basically, characterised by two kinds of dynamic elements: continuous trajectories and discontinuous events. Continuous trajectories spring from history, and, with varying probabilities, some of them can be expected to continue in the future. Discontinuous events are instances that disrupt the flow of continuities, something that could escalate and result in game-changing transformations. In strategic foresight, continuous trajectories are usually called trends or megatrends, and discontinuous events are called weak signals or emerging issues. But how to assess these?

This is where the context steps in. In an earlier article (Ahlqvist & Uotila 2020), we argue that when interpreting signals in the operational environment, with whatever method, it is crucial to understand the relations between the signal context and the context of the signal observer. This insight enables the analyst to differentiate between signals that are novelties in multiple contexts and signals that are novel only in one context. Thus, the analyst could find valuable information of the signal, and reduce the related uncertainty, by knowing its contextual setting. Contexts could also be purposefully moulded through a stream of artificial signals, thus producing uncertainty with intent (see Ahlqvist & Uotila 2025). This practice has become increasingly prevalent in the current geopolitical conjuncture.

To conclude, there are plethora of connections between strategic foresight and intelligence studies. Metaphorically, both fields are based on a future-oriented sensemaking process that is realised with a partial and selective present perspective, with one hand grasping for yesterday’s evidence and the other hand reaching towards tomorrow’s novelties that could become.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Research Council of Finland (project numbers 353056 and 348531) and Business Finland (project number 6819/31/2023) for financial support.

Toni Ahlqvist
Professor
Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku
Finland

References

Ahlqvist, T. & Uotila, J. (2025). Context moulding and the production of uncertainty: Exploring future signals in geopolitical (dis)information spaces. Forthcoming in Liuhto, K. & Sipilä, J. (eds.) Inevitable Instability in Russia: Strategic information, intelligence and foresight on Russia. Springer Nature. Palgrave MacMillan.

Ahlqvist, T. & Uotila, T. (2020). Contextualising weak signals: Towards a relational theory of futures knowledge. Futures 119, 102543.

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1982). Variants of uncertainty. Cognition 11: 143–157

Voros, J. (2003). A generic foresight process framework. Foresight 5(3): 10–21.

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