During the Cold War, secret back channels operated through intelligence services served as vital tools for the foreign policy of state leaders. Finnish President Urho Kekkonen maintained close, decades-long connections with both Soviet and British intelligence agencies. Similar examples globally include U.S. President John F. Kennedy and German Chancellor Willy Brandt. However, in light of current knowledge, the scope and duration of Kekkonen’s intelligence contacts were exceptional.
A back channel refers to unofficial communication used in foreign policy, bypassing official diplomatic institutions. Such a channel can operate either directly through a foreign power’s diplomatic mission or intelligence service, or it might involve several intermediaries. A one-way or two-way channel can facilitate the exchange of information orally, through the delivery of written materials, or both.
Urho Kekkonen’s close ties with foreign intelligence services apparently began in 1943 when he met Wilho Tikander of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Stockholm. Through Tikander, Kekkonen could convey his thoughts directly to the West and, conversely, learn about U.S. perspectives on Finland’s situation.
Kekkonen established connections with British and Soviet intelligence services, according to current information, in the fall of 1944 when he was the Minister of Justice. His first Soviet intelligence contact was the chief of Helsinki station Jelisei Sinitsyn. Sinitsyn was introduced to Kekkonen through Kustaa Vilkuna. Sinitsyn left Finland in 1945 but before doing so, transferred the contact to his successor, V.F. Razin.
British intelligence contacts included Reginald ”Rex” Bosley and James H. Magill. Bosley appears to have been Kekkonen’s most important contact with Western intelligence services throughout the Cold War. Their communication remained active until the 1980s, with Bosley regularly visiting Finland for political intelligence gathering.
The connection with Magill also remained close until the end of Kekkonen’s presidential term. Although Magill officially resigned from intelligence work in the mid-1950s and moved into British export industry, he continued to visit Kekkonen in Finland on business trips, lobbying for everything from nuclear power plants to jet aircrafts.
Wilho Tikander’s communication with Kekkonen ended in 1948 when Tikander was transferred back to the United States. Americans apparently failed to establish a direct back channel to Kekkonen thereafter. However, a roundabout connection was built in the late 1950s when Frank Friberg became the CIA’s station chief in Helsinki.
Urho Kekkonen was by no means the only Cold War statesman to leverage back channels for foreign communication. U.S. President John F. Kennedy had at least two secret back channels to Moscow. One connection went through his brother, Robert Kennedy, then Attorney General, who met with Soviet intelligence officer Georgi Bolshakov over 50 times in 1961 and 1962, relaying messages between Kennedy and the Kremlin. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy’s secret channel to Soviet leader Khrushchev went through KGB Washington rezident Aleksander Fomin and ABC news correspondent John A. Scali. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, for his part, utilized a back channel to Soviet intelligence during his new eastern policy (Ostpolitik).
Having worked for years in his youth in Finland’s secret police, the Etsivä keskuspoliisi, President Urho Kekkonen understood the value of intelligence resources and how to wield them as a political instrument. Information obtained from Moscow ”through the kitchen,” as it were, allowed him to gauge the Soviet leadership’s policies and motives, as well as assess the likely effects of his own actions.
The importance of long-standing personal relationships is highlighted in Kekkonen’s dealings with both Eastern and Western intelligence services. Contact with both SIS’s Rex Bosley and KGB’s Mikhail Kotov was maintained from the 1940s into the 1970s. Both Bosley and Kotov spent several years in Finland, developing a strong rapport with Kekkonen. They also spoke fluent Finnish. Both advanced to high positions within their respective intelligence services; perhaps their contact with Kekkonen facilitated this. Later, they were approached when something significant occurred in Finland or when it was crucial to obtain confidential, high-level information. Personal, confidential relationships were not easily transferred to successors, and connections could be severed with personnel changes.
Soviet intelligence appears to have been a practical tool for political action for Kekkonen, whereas with Western intelligence, the primary exchange was information. The former must also be considered more significant, both for Finland and for Kekkonen himself. The KGB provided a direct line to Moscow, allowing Kekkonen to understand the Soviet leadership’s intentions. Through Soviet intelligence, Kekkonen not only propelled himself to power but also fought for Finland’s independence.
Western intelligence supplied Kekkonen with information on the Soviet Union, Finnish communists, and world events. Kekkonen, in turn, kept Western powers informed about developments in Finland. Starting during his premiership in 1950, Kekkonen adopted the practice of leaking information from discussions with Soviet leaders to Western intelligence services. This practice continued later as president. Based on current knowledge, there are few known instances where Kekkonen sought to arrange concrete political matters with Bosley, Magill, or Tikander in the way he did with the KGB.
Kekkonen’s secret Western connections can be divided into two categories: direct and indirect. The former were more important because information flowed in both directions, allowing Kekkonen to communicate his thoughts directly to London and Washington. When operating through intermediaries, it was primarily about receiving information.
Among the intermediaries, Kustaa Vilkuna and adjutant Urpo Levo appear to have been the most important. Levo had contacts with both Americans and Britons. Information to U.S. intelligence apparently flowed also through Anne-Marie Snellman and possibly through Eljas Erkko and Marcus Wallenberg.
Western powers also provided Kekkonen with intelligence through other adjutants and the Finnish Security Service (Suojelupoliisi, Supo). The connection through Supo continued during the tenures of Armas Alhava, Arvo Pentti, and Seppo Tiitinen. Additionally, Western ambassadors seem to have provided some material while visiting the president. Through them, Kekkonen could also convey his own thoughts to the West.
Mikko Virta
Doctor of Social Sciences
University of Helsinki
Finland
