Throughout history, the Baltic Sea has undeniably been of greater geopolitical importance than its size, and it remains at the heart of European security policy. The Baltic Sea has al-ways been a channel, not only for trade, but also for cooperation and cultural exchange. On the other hand, it is also a scene of competition, power struggles and conflicts. During Czar Peter the Great’s time in the 18th century, the establishment of the city of St. Petersburg changed the strategic position of the Baltic Sea and especially the Gulf of Finland. The city was founded, not only as “Russia’s window to the West”, but also to challenge the position of Sweden, a rival superpower at that time. Stalin, on the other hand, once said: “The Baltic Sea is a bottle, but we don’t have its cap.” According to this reasoning, the Baltic Sea is an area where Russia is vulnerable to external influencing. After a period of brief openness fol-lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the current Russian leadership has chosen to close the windows, and in the present geopolitical situation, the Baltic Sea is once again a sea of tensions.
The economic and political importance of the Baltic Sea to the eight NATO countries along its coasts is indisputable. While Russia, despite the significance of the Baltic Sea, also has the possibility of compensatory transport arrangements, a free access to the sea plays a cru-cial role especially for Finland, which is practically completely dependent on sea traffic. Thus, Finland and Sweden’s NATO memberships will further increase the strategic im-portance of the Baltic Sea, also from the Alliance’s perspective.
A considerable part of Russia’s foreign trade and energy transport continues to pass through the Baltic Sea. In 2024, for example, the volume of oil transported through the Koivisto oil harbour in the Karelian Isthmus was equivalent to about one fifth of the total oil exports by Russia. Russia does neither have the capacity to store crude oil, nor, at least for the time be-ing, enough capacity and infrastructure to transport it to the Asian market by land. From the Russian point of view, the importance of the Baltic Sea is emphasised, not only from the economic point of view, but also for the Kaliningrad enclave and St. Petersburg area. While NATO as a defence alliance does not in reality pose any threat to Russia, in the rhetoric of the Russian leadership, protecting St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad from the imagined military threat of the West is central.
The confrontation between Russia and the West in the Baltic Sea region has escalated as the war in Ukraine continues. The war in Ukraine reflects in the Baltic Sea in increased military tensions, drone strikes and countermeasures, airspace violations and ambiguous activities of the Russian shadow fleet. NATO’s deterrence to Russia’s open use of military force is cred-ible. However, Russia’s means of hybrid influencing are versatile and it exploits the oppor-tunities that open up opportunistically to question the credibility of NATO.
The importance of data cables and energy infrastructure at the bottom of the Baltic Sea has been emphasised, especially for Finland and the Baltic states. At the same time, the risk of them becoming targets of external influencing has increased significantly. Attributing any damage to a specific actor is difficult. Russia’s ability to utilise vessels in the Baltic Sea re-gion as a tool for hybrid influencing remains considerable.
The presence of the Russian Navy and its measures to protect the undisturbed passage of its shadow fleet vessels will continue in the Baltic Sea. Russia has shown its readiness to ag-gressively intervene in Western attempts to control its shadow fleet’s vessels, for example in connection with ship inspections. Russia’s stronger action, combined with the varying condi-tion of the vessels, the expertise of the crews and the large-scale disruption of positioning systems increase the risk of an intentional or unintentional collision between Russia and the West. Russia’s actions show a disregard for the damage caused to neighbouring countries. Russia also seeks to politicise the events and blame the West. At the same time, Russia’s ac-tions will force NATO to react, and it is likely that Russia’s is also testing NATO’s deter-rence and unity.
The significance of the Baltic Sea both for the West and for Russia will remain considerable. The question is, however, whether the Russian leadership will at some point be ready to open the windows to Europe again. For the time being, even a slight opening of the win-dows seems unlikely. At least in the short term, relations between Russia and the West con-tinue deteriorating in the Baltic Sea region, regardless of the development of the war in Ukraine. This underlines the importance of up-to-date and high-quality intelligence analysis, where close cooperation between the NATO countries of the Baltic Sea region plays a key role.
Markku Pajuniemi
Colonel, Director
Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency (FDIA)
Finland
