Foreign Intelligence collection is performed in different ways, depending on resources, national requirements, and levels of risk acceptance. Non-clandestine information collection using human sources or intelligence collectors gathering open information are options with minimal risks and costs. Much information can be secured relatively openly. Such information, while correct and valuable, is not always supported by documentary evidence. Its strength is that it often reflects interpretations and observations.
The prime goal of foreign intelligence is understanding of the international environment, together with warnings and contextual interpretations of evolving events. Warnings are not predictions but highlight emerging trends, attitudes, changes, and new issues. Such information, when merged with all-source material, becomes intelligence. Intelligence analysis, separate from collection, should exist in close and active proximity to collection operators and work closely with the foreign ministry, since diplomatic information-gathering is an important facet of intelligence collection. Analysts with depth of knowledge, understanding of, and experience with a subject can prepare valuable assessments, even when some details are not available.
Intelligence assessments are a valuable tool for decision-making, explaining situations, clarifying emerging issues, and putting context to information while interpreting the material through the cultural, historical, ideological/religious perspectives of the actors on the other side. Analytical organizations where rotationality is a constant factor diminish the understanding and interpretation acquired from lengthy and intimate knowledge of a country, a leader, or a region.
Much information is accessible in published material which can be secured through various strategies. Social media is a treasure trove and can be managed through AI. Travellers, including tourists, businesspeople, technical experts, academics, journalists and others observe and hear things during visits abroad, and can be debriefed. Refugees from denied areas can be of significant intelligence value depending on their education/training or employment experience. Casual conversations with visa applicants can elicit valuable information. Trained debriefers can often elicit more information than a person is consciously aware of possessing. Coercion should never be an option in seeking information.
Intelligence gatherers are often posted as diplomats. However, intelligence gatherers go beyond conventional diplomats to focus more narrowly on individuals with possible knowledge of or access to subjects of national security interest. There are often persons with access to parts of the targeted information, but not within targeted institutions, and not aware that their knowledge is sensitive. Such persons may be frank in their discussions. An approach to such persons can be facilitated by demonstrating innocence or naivete, or simple seeking explanations of complex issues. Many questions should be asked in such approaches, most of which should be innocuous. Local security personnel may interrogate the contact. The contact must respond freely and frankly, to underscore the innocent nature of the meeting. With many questions asked by the diplomat, many on non-sensitive subjects, it is less likely that the source will recall anything more than queries from a diplomat with little knowledge of local events or circumstances.
There are additional strategies to securing information. Observation is one – walking through an industrial park, attending conferences, and checking out harbours is easy. Persons with access to information about denied areas can be approached at a social level. Travel to provincial areas of a nation can facilitate casual intercourse with persons less sensitive about secrecy, often when accompanied by a good meal.
Training in human behaviour and the reading of body language eases the diplomatic intelligence gatherer’s task. An open ‘diplomatic’ inquiry approach may not necessarily gain access to a well-placed critical source but imposes few risks and can be very revealing. Understanding people and how truthful and comfortable they are, is critical to successful information gathering. Interpretation of non-verbal body language can guide the ‘diplomat’ to home in on valuable information or detect negative responses from interlocutors.
Intelligence organizations must understand their roles. They ‘tell truth to power’ providing contextual data which should be understood by policy makers. Intelligence organizations are only one source of information used by policy makers. Policy outcomes reflect many strains of input some of which may be rated more significant than the intelligence input.
Kurt F. Jensen
Dr., Adjunct Professor
Carleton University
Canada
kurt.jensen4657@gmail.com
Back to Table of Contents