These developments necessitate a reconceptualization of the traditional dichotomy of intelligence producers and consumers. The debate on the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers has been going on for more than half a century, with two predominant schools of thought – based on a predominantly Anglo-Saxon and civilian context – that continue to lead the discussion. The traditionalists, following Sherman Kent, prefer distance in the relationship between intelligence producers and their clients, whereas the activist approach following Willmoore Kendall and Robert Gates advocates for close interaction instead. Although they differ in their views on how intelligence producers and consumers should relate to one another, both schools generally portray the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers as hierarchical and dichotomous, with mutually exclusive roles and norms. As a result, the roles of intelligence producer and consumer are often considered as strictly separated both in academic literature as well as in practice. In the Dutch defence intelligence network, this view has translated in the often-heard statement “we provide the weather forecast, but we do not tell if they should bring an umbrella”. In other words: it is the task of an intelligence analyst to tell the ‘objective’ truth, but they should refrain from any advice on what to do with the information.
Practice however shows us that the relationship between different (defence) intelligence entities is often much more layered and networked than this dichotomous portrayal would suggest, creating the need for a “team of teams” like approach to national defence intelligence cooperation. Defence intelligence agencies often have an interdependent relationship with the intelligence branches of the armed forces: depending on the level and type of product, they can be producer and consumer at the same time. An armed forces intelligence branch might for example receive a strategic intelligence product from a defence intelligence agency and use this as input for its own intelligence product intended for the operational and tactical level. The other way around can also be the case, as defence intelligence agencies become intelligence consumers when they use (raw) intelligence collected by ISR assets of the operational branches of the armed forces.
We should therefore consider Dutch defence intelligence – and potentially other national intelligence networks as well – as a network of intelligence “prosumers”: intelligence entities that both produce and consume intelligence while working towards a common goal. By going beyond the traditional dichotomy, the notion of intelligence prosumerism can help us gain more insight and understanding in the complex and multifaceted nature of (defence) intelligence relationships. Furthermore, as current regulations concerning intelligence services and the armed forces often limit the information gathering possibilities of the armed forces especially when they are not formally employed, cooperation between the service and the armed forces is often complicated by legal restraints. Recognizing that national defence intelligence cooperation is often more multilayered than the traditional producer-consumer framework suggests can therefore also lead to legal and policy frameworks that are better connected to the realities of day-to-day practice and create a closer working relationship between different national defence intelligence actors.
Saskia Pothoven
PhD, Researcher
Netherlands Defence Academy and Leiden University Institute of Security and Global Affairs
The Netherlands
