The Russian state sees the domestic media field as an intrinsic part of its operation, not differentiating between public and privately owned mediums, utilising them as a vehicle for propaganda narratives. In this regard, the changes in Russian media attitudes do not reflect the true focus of journalism, as with independent free media, but state attempts to manipulate public opinion.
Since the launch of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine in February, prominent political talk show hosts have regularly beaten the drum in support of Russia. Although it’s easy to dismiss them as extremists with a limited reach among younger Russians, these hosts have been able to maintain their older audience, for whom television is still their main source of information, and are a good indicator of the Kremlin’s position and the general attitude of the media.
Pro-Kremlin propagandists have been producing content along the lines of that seen related to Ukraine since at least the invasion of Georgia in 2008, and this experience has provided plenty of opportunities to develop their technique to reach and attract the greatest audience and coat their propaganda with a veneer of respectability. Aware of the generation gap and growing understanding of bias, many Russian propagandists have shifted to social media, mainly Telegram, and video hosting platforms. And while this may seem an attempt to engage greater audiences, it hides a sinister tactic to offer an illusion of choice to the Russian public. Television is broadcast into the living room, whereas the viewer has the choice of selecting a hosted video, making a seemingly impartial choice. Herein lies the plot, with the majority of propagandists becoming avid internet sensations. Investigations by FBK and others have repeatedly uncovered bought bot-like activity driving viewing figures of propagandist videos. Although investigators linked fake views to financial accountability before the Kremlin for a job well done, these actions have a deeper effect on platform algorithms, increasing the likelihood of video suggestions to viewers, facilitating the illusion of choice for the Russian audience.
Many pro-Russian social media pages do not start off life as propagators of propaganda. Instead, they initially spread conspiracy theories about aliens, and other such topics. This attracts a susceptible base audience. Once these natural sceptics have been reeled in, these pages shift their focus from conspiracy theories to peddling pro-Russian propaganda. This not only attracts Russians that might not be politically minded, but it can be used to attract people of other nationalities, susceptible to accepting unchecked statements as fact.
In an effort to further legitimise their reports, pro-Kremlin media pages quote legitimate Western news sources liberally, giving credibility to their propaganda. Quotes from the BBC, The Guardian, The New York Times and the Associated Press are commonplace, albeit almost always taken entirely out of context, and are paradoxically used to discredit the organisations that published these quotes in the first place and defend the Kremlin’s line.
While the domestic consumers remain seemingly oblivious to state manipulations, Kremlin’s hold on the media has become transparent from February 24th. The initial dearth of voices critical of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ is telling, crafting a narrative that those opposed to the invasion are unpatriotic and therefore western agents, as well as projecting the false narrative of Russian unity behind the war effort. Yet, as Russia’s invasion faltered, voices critical of the war effort have appeared. The key to understanding them in the context of the Russian state is the realisation that these media voices are not critical of the invasion itself, but of its conduct and Russia’s failures. The prominent host, nicknamed Putin’s ‘Iron Doll’, Olga Skabeyeva, for example, has criticised the Russian military and negatively compared Russia’s efforts to that of Ukraine’s but has at all costs refrained from criticising Putin himself.
The general trajectory of Russian media attitudes in relation to the war of aggression in Ukraine are, thus, intrinsically linked to the successes and failures of military operations and the need to praise or allocate blame. The main market for this, is the domestic audience which after more than twenty years of media manipulation has become susceptible to accepting the falsehoods and conflicting information offered, sometimes within a single reportage. The notorious “strategic retreats” being a great example of this manipulation.
While there are voices within Russia that still present a viable independent viewpoint, the overall exodus of free Russian media which has happened since the introduction of the “foreign agent” status, limiting funding and visibility, as well as the greater exodus since the start of the February 2022, there is a wider question of whether the Russian media should be considered as a source of information at all.
Stepan Stepanenko
Dr., Research Fellow
Henry Jackson Society
London, United Kingdom
Axl Voisey
Research Assistant
Henry Jackson Society
London, United Kingdom
Anna Nasivyan
Research Assistant
Henry Jackson Society
London, United Kingdom
