Some Russian policy makers and media influencers believe that Russia’s revanchism should not stop with Ukraine but should include the Baltic States. From that perspective, this is a logical step as the Baltic States were once part of the Russian and Soviet Empires. However, whereas the Baltic States of the 19th and 20th centuries had no strong allies to protect them from Russian aggression, they are currently members of NATO and the EU, allied with some of the globe’s strongest militaries and economies. The United States (US) was a key catalyst in Baltic membership of both organizations and, as a historical and current rival to Russia, many hope that the US would protect the Baltic States in the event of Russian aggression.
However, others worry that the US cannot be entirely trusted to fulfil NATO’s Article 5 guarantees. Increasing US domestic opposition to NATO, or any US involvement in European conflicts (including the current war in Ukraine), means that US protection from possible Russian aggression is by no means guaranteed. This threat puts the Baltic States at a distinct risk as there is also no guarantee that European member of NATO would unite sufficiently to protect from an aggressive Russia. Such a series of events, even if not imminent, suggests that the Baltic States ought to be doing all in their power to strengthen the Transatlantic relationship.
The Baltic States have been doing much through NATO, EU and bilateral diplomatic channels to strengthen that relationship. Yet, there is more they can do. Fortunately, their own history provides something of a road map, based on the premise that governments change and, when they do, new faces and ideas can fill a void. Specifically, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Baltic expatriates returned from Western countries with the knowledge, and the desire, to build the Baltic States into the democratic, free-market states they are today.
Now the script has shifted. Currently, the Baltic States (especially Estonia and Latvia) have a significant minority whose primary language is Russian. This Russian minority is currently experiencing democracy and free market economics, and many of them would return to Russia in the event a change in the Kremlin. However, this is where the situation differs. Whereas the Baltic expatriates were largely welcomed in Western countries (even if not unconditionally, at least they were not widely ostracized), the Russian minority in the Baltic States (whether recent expatriates or soviet-era non-citizens) is experiencing governmental and societal messaging that they are not welcome, including restrictive citizenship, language and education laws.
However, the Baltic governments can make policy changes that could influence their own, Russia’s, and Transatlantic security going forward. I suggest two measures. First, the Baltic States (governments and civil society) should actively welcome the Russophone minority. This should include Estonia and Latvia following Lithuania’s lead and granting citizenship to anyone who lived in the countries at the time of the Soviet collapse, regardless of country of origin, or primary language. The governments should also be even more proactive in welcoming people whose first language is Russia by recognizing Russian as an official, though secondary, language, while also making a more concerted effort to provide Estonian/Latvian language acquisition. They should also liberalize Russian-language educational. Indeed, the Estonian and Latvian governments ought to offer Russian-language education, thereby ensuring the dissemination of pro-Western messaging to Russian-speaking students.
Second, the Baltic States ought to include the United States in this effort. The United States diplomatic missions in the Baltic capitals, in conjunction with Baltic governmental and civil society representatives, ought to pro-actively engage Russian-speaking political and civil society entities. Let the US do its part to win the hearts and minds of the Russian expatriates. Furthermore, the Baltic governments ought to petition the United States (and other NATO/EU governments) for resources for these changes. The Baltic governments may not have a sufficiently large purse for these changes, but with relatively small contributions from the US and other allies, these changes become much more practical.
Eventually, Russia’s current regime will change. When it does, the Baltic States are ideally placed to influence the direction the Kremlin takes if they are willing to reverse the script from the past 30 years and welcome and nurture the Russian speaking minority. This could help ensure long-term security for the Baltic States and the entire Transatlantic system, and even a promising future for Russia.
Jeremy W. Lamoreaux
Professor of Political Science
Brigham Young University – Idaho
United States of America
lamoreauxj@byui.edu
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