On 4 April 2024, NATO will commemorate its 75th anniversary. It will not be a happy celebration. Times are tough. Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Putin’s revisionist objectives have smashed the European security order. Ukraine is fighting for its existence. Russia is ”the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO Strategic Concept). NATO Allies therefore face two concurrent major challenges: maintaining substantial military support for Ukraine so that she can hold out and eventually prevail; and significantly strengthening NATO’s own deterrence and defence posture against Russia.
NATO embodies the unique security partnership between North America and Europe. Over 75 years, it has experienced several strategic eras: the Cold War; after its end, focusing on international crisis management; opening to new members from Central Eastern Europe and partnership with Russia and Ukraine; and since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, rebuilding deterrence and defence.
Deterrence happens in the mind of the adversary. If considering an attack, the Russian leadership in its risk analysis must always come to the conclusion that it either cannot win, that military success would at least be doubtful and the likely costs would be higher than the desired gains and, in extremis, i.e., in the event nuclear weapons are used, an attack could result in an unacceptably high damage for Russia itself. If NATO’s deterrence succeeds, war will be prevented, thus, attempts at coercion in a crisis be thwarted and Allies’ freedom of action preserved.
To this end, NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture must provide a broad spectrum of conventional forces and nuclear capabilities that offer NATO a variety of options for deterring Russia from aggression. In doing so, NATO leaves it uncertain, which option would be selected in which scenario. Russia should not be able to calculate and possibly control the risk associated with a threat of force. Yet, it should conclude at any time that an attack, wherever and however launched, would immediately be encountered by NATO as a whole, including the U.S. – for Russia cannot prevail against the American potential, and confrontation with the U.S. carries the risk of nuclear escalation and thus, in the worst case, Russia’s self-destruction. For this reason, the U.S. is present in Europe with strong armed forces and nuclear weapons, and all European Allies enjoy the protection of America’s extended nuclear deterrence.
NATO’s focus would obviously be on the ability and will to repel a possible aggression through collective defence with conventional forces and to end any war as quickly as possible. One example: NATO’s ”enhanced Forward Presence” of multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland, i.e., the most exposed region, reinforcing the national defence forces, signals to Moscow that even a limited incursion would immediately lead to war with NATO in its entirety, as 20 nations are providing troops, including the U.S. However, given Putin’s imperialist goals, his brutal war against a neighbour and the war crimes committed by his army, ”enhanced Forward Presence” is no longer sufficient. It must evolve into “enhanced Forward Defence”. The battlegroups must therefore be able to grow into armoured brigades, divisions and army corps within a short period of time. For example, Germany will permanently station a combat brigade of some 5,000 troops in Lithuania, once the required infrastructure has been built.
Also, NATO must gain the ability rapidly to reinforce Allies located along NATO’s entire eastern flank. To this end, it is building up 300,000 forces at high or very high readiness. Yet, there is still a long way to go, as many Allies have significantly reduced their armed forces over the past 25 years, constantly underfunded and restructured them for crisis management missions with light, multinational contingents. Today, they once again need large, mechanised units with state-of-the-art equipment and technology for large-scale defence operations. All Allies spending at least two percent of their GDP on defence and meeting NATO’s capability targets as quickly as possible will also strengthen the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture.
In this context, Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO is a strategic win-win. During the Cold War, NATO consisted of 12 nations, today there are 32. The Alliance is getting bigger and stronger. Both new Allies contribute significantly to the Alliance’s deterrence and defence with modern forces and military capabilities. The entire Nordic-Baltic area, including the Baltic Sea, is now a coherent major region virtually under NATO control. Finland’s and Sweden’s accession is further proof of NATO’s credibility, value, and trustworthiness as the world’s largest and strongest politico-military alliance.
Heinrich Brauss
Lieutenant General (retd), NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning (2013-2018), Senior Associate Fellow
German Council on Foreign Relations
Berlin, Germany
