The Baltic Sea region is one of Europe’s most strategically important areas. It connects Northern and Central Europe through dense networks of maritime transport, energy routes and digital infrastructure. States around the Baltic Sea are closely integrated into EU and transatlantic structures, and their economies depend heavily on open trade, stable logistics and reliable critical infrastructures. In this context, civil resilience, understood as the ability of societies to withstand, adapt to and recover from shocks, has become a central element of both security and economic stability.
The security environment of the region has changed profoundly in recent years. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, increased military activity, cyber operations and pressure on information space have all contributed to a more contested strategic landscape. At the same time, countries around the Baltic Sea are deeply interconnected through energy systems, ports, shipping lanes and data networks. Disruptions in one part of the region can quickly translate into economic and social consequences elsewhere. Civil resilience is therefore not just a supporting function of defence, but a core condition for the continuity of everyday life, public services and business operations.
The risk landscape facing the Baltic Sea region is multifaceted. Geopolitical tensions and hybrid activities can target critical infrastructures directly or indirectly. Energy systems, including electricity grids and gas infrastructure, are exposed to physical incidents, technical failures and deliberate interference. Maritime transport and ports are vulnerable to accidents, extreme weather and intentional disruptions. Digital networks and data centres face cyber threats that can affect financial services, public administration or logistics chains. These risks do not exist in isolation: a failure in one system can cascade into others, amplifying the impact on societies and economies.
In response, states in the region have been reinforcing their frameworks for civil emergency preparedness and resilience. They draw on European and transatlantic approaches that emphasise the protection of critical infrastructure, continuity of government and essential services, and the ability to manage complex emergencies. National strategies increasingly frame resilience as a whole-of-society task, where central government, local authorities, private operators and citizens share responsibilities. Exercises and scenario-based planning are used to test coordination, communication and the ability to cope with simultaneous or prolonged disruptions.
Cross-border cooperation is a key feature of civil resilience around the Baltic Sea. Many infrastructures, from undersea cables to shipping routes, are inherently regional. As a result, information sharing, joint assessments and compatible procedures matter as much as national capabilities. Regional and subregional platforms provide opportunities to exchange lessons, compare approaches and coordinate responses. In practice, this can mean aligning contingency plans for ports and transport corridors, coordinating emergency support across borders, or sharing good practice on risk communication with the public.
At the operational level, several typical developments can be observed across the wider Baltic and Central European area. Public authorities and businesses are devoting more attention to business continuity planning, recognising that supply chains and service delivery must be able to function under stress. Emergency exercises increasingly include scenarios affecting energy systems, transport hubs or digital infrastructure, rather than focusing only on single-sector incidents. Cooperation between public and private actors is gradually becoming more structured, as governments depend on private operators for the functioning of many essential services, while companies rely on clear guidance and predictable regulatory environments.
Civil resilience in the Baltic Sea region also has a strong societal dimension. Populations need to be prepared for disruptions that may affect electricity, communications or mobility, sometimes for longer periods than people have been used to in recent decades. This includes basic household preparedness, trust in public institutions and a realistic understanding of what authorities can and cannot guarantee in a crisis. Risk and crisis communication therefore play a central role: they connect technical measures on critical infrastructure with the behaviour, expectations and support of citizens.
Looking ahead, several policy directions appear particularly important for strengthening civil resilience around the Baltic Sea. First, civil and military planning should be further aligned, so that defence efforts and resilience measures reinforce each other rather than operating in parallel. Shared situational awareness, compatible procedures and regular joint exercises can help bridge institutional boundaries. Second, states in the region would benefit from deepening their cooperation on risk scenarios, data and early warning. Common understandings of priority risks and potential cascading effects can make national measures more coherent and efficient.
Third, long-term investment in the resilience of critical infrastructure should remain a priority, even when short-term pressures compete for resources. This includes not only physical protection and redundancy, but also modernisation, maintenance and cybersecurity. Fourth, engaging the private sector as an active partner in resilience, instead of treating it as a purely regulated actor, can unlock expertise and innovation that public institutions alone may not possess. Finally, sustained efforts to inform and educate the public about preparedness can build a culture of resilience that supports authorities in times of stress and reduces the impact of disruptions on everyday life.
In a region where security, economy and environment are closely intertwined, civil resilience is not a separate agenda for emergency specialists. It is an essential framework for ensuring that societies around the Baltic Sea can continue to function, adapt and recover in an era of heightened uncertainty and interconnected risks.
Irena Tušer
Associate Professor, Head of the Centre for Security Research
AMBIS University
Prague
Czech Republic
irena.tuser@ambis.cz
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