

# Changes in Russian Investments Abroad Since the Start of the Full Scale War in Ukraine

*By Sergei Gladkov*

# Changes in Russian Investments Abroad Since the Start of the Full Scale War in Ukraine

By Sergei Gladkov

Sergei Gladkov, M.A. (General History), is a project researcher at the Pan-European Institute, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Finland. Previously, he served as a consultant at the Maxwell Centre, University of Cambridge, UK, where he contributed to interdisciplinary ecological impact assessments and carbon-emissions studies. His expertise encompasses Russian foreign economic policy, Arctic governance and security, and the economic ramifications of the war in Ukraine for regional economies.



## Abstract

This study analyses the transformation of Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2022 under conditions of sanctions-induced isolation, currency restrictions, and shifts in the global financial architecture. Drawing on data from UNCTAD, the OECD, and the Bank of Russia, it examines the dynamics, geography, and structure of Russian investments abroad, the adaptation mechanisms employed in the new environment, and the challenges of statistical accounting of Russia's outward FDI. Particular attention is paid to monetary and tax regulatory measures affecting cross-border capital flows. The analysis highlights a sharp decline in outward FDI volumes, the termination of investment in unfriendly jurisdictions, and a reorientation towards the Global South and CIS markets. The report argues that Russia's outward FDI is gradually shifting from a tool of global expansion to a mechanism of adaptation to external shocks and risk management amid growing geoeconomic fragmentation.

**Key words:** Russia, Russia's outward FDI foreign direct investment, transnational corporations, war in Ukraine, sanctions, Russian economy.

## Acknowledgement

This report is funded by the Foundation of Niilo Helander.

*Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this report represent those of the authors and do not represent the opinion of the Centrum Balticum Foundation, and thus, the Centrum Balticum Foundation does not bear any responsibility for the opinions expressed in the report.*

## Contents

<b>1.</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>Structural Shifts in Russia’s Outward FDI after 2022</b>	<b>5</b>
	2.1. Global Trends in Outward FDI after 2022	5
	2.2. The Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Outward FDI	8
	2.3. Regulation of Russia’s Outward FDI after 2022	10
	2.4. Statistical Challenges and Data on Russia’s Outward FDI	12
<b>3.</b>	<b>Temporal Dynamics of Russia’s Outward FDI, 2022–2025</b>	<b>21</b>
	3.1. 2022 — Initial Shock and Investment Contraction	21
	3.2. 2023 — Adaptive Strategies and Diversion of Capital Flows	23
	3.3. 2024 — From Evasion to Optimization: Capital Management Abroad	24
	3.4. 2025 — Continued Reallocation to Friendly Jurisdictions (Q1 Trends)	26
<b>4.</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>27</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>29</b>

## 1. Introduction

In recent decades, foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly Russia's outward FDI, has become a key force shaping the modern global economic architecture. It enables technology transfer, productivity growth, integration into global value chains, and economic diversification. Since the early 2000s, Russia has steadily consolidated its position as a source of outward FDI, driven by the strategic ambition of Russian companies to expand internationally and manage cross-border assets. By 2013, Russian outward FDI peaked at USD 79 billion (3.8% of GDP), underscoring its importance in national economic policy (UNCTAD, 2014).

However, this upward trajectory was soon challenged by geopolitical disruptions. Since 2014, sanctions in response to the annexation of Crimea have profoundly influenced the volume and geographical structure of Russian outward FDI. While investment in the energy and resource sectors continued, activity in developed markets declined, alongside rising engagement with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. These shifts were reinforced by tighter currency regulations and a strategic push towards capital deoffshorisation.

Throughout the second half of the 2010s, these patterns remained largely intact, albeit with some fluctuations linked to external economic conditions. By 2021, during the post-COVID recovery, outward FDI reached USD 64.1 billion (3.6% of GDP) (UNCTAD, 2022b), highlighting the sustained relevance of cross-border investment for the export capacity and global operations of Russian firms. However, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered unprecedented sanctions—including disconnection from SWIFT, asset freezes, and investment bans—that severely disrupted the management of foreign assets and redirected investment flows. These measures were accompanied by forced divestments and enhanced capital controls.

According to UNCTAD (2024c), Russian outward FDI declined by over 50% in 2022 and remained at just 10–30% of pre-crisis levels throughout 2023. Investment in Europe and the United States effectively ceased, with only limited asset management operations ongoing. In contrast, sustained activity continued in the CIS, Asia, and Africa, especially in the energy, transport, and extractive sectors. This suggests a strategic reorientation towards Global South markets and growing reliance on national currencies in cross-border settlements.

This shift in geographical focus and investment strategy invites a more systematic examination of recent trends. An analysis of Russia's outward investment strategy under sanctions and capital controls post-2022—considering changes in volumes, directions, adaptation strategies, and regulatory evolution—reveals profound structural transformations. Among them is the declining share of investment in jurisdictions designated as unfriendly to Russia.

To assess these transformations accurately, however, researchers face a persistent challenge. Due to the limited availability of official Russian statistics, outward FDI estimates increasingly rely on mirror statistics from partner countries and data from UNCTAD. However, the extent of statistical inconsistencies and the reliability of reconstructed indicators remain contentious, despite proposed adjustment methodologies.

Against this methodological backdrop, it is instructive to trace the academic evolution of FDI studies related to Russia. The late 2000s marked the beginning of a research agenda focused on the drivers of Russian outward FDI, including investment motivations, jurisdictional preferences, institutional constraints, and capital retention abroad (Liuhto and Majuri, 2014; Andreff, 2016). Key early contributions came from Liuhto and Vahtra (2007), along with comparative work on BRIC investment models (Gammeltoft and Kokko, 2013).

More recently, following the escalation of geopolitical tensions in 2022, the academic focus has shifted significantly. Academic inquiry has turned to the effects of sanctions and capital controls on the scale and geography of outward FDI (Nelson, 2017; Drapkin et al., 2023), the mismatch between reported data and actual flows (Kuznetsov, 2023; Tcyrempilova et al., 2024), and the structural erosion of Russia's international investment position.

These concerns are also reflected in broader studies of global FDI transformation. Recent literature examines global FDI realignments, including the role of “connector economies” amid increasing

fragmentation (Cheng et al., 2025), capital reallocation under geoeconomic confrontation (Gopinath et al., 2024; Leino and Gavrilovic, 2025), and the transformation of financial linkages. Methodological challenges in FDI statistics are discussed in Zaytsev (2022), Bulatov et al. (2024), and Gerdo (2024), while regulatory dimensions and national security implications are analysed in Kvashnina (2020) and Kazantseva (2024). International FDI regulatory frameworks and their relevance to Russia are addressed in Klochko (2023).

In parallel, domestic factors such as financial resilience and corporate adaptation strategies are increasingly being explored. Financial resilience and corporate strategies under pressure are examined in Golovnin (2023). A discernible pivot towards the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and other alternative jurisdictions has been observed (Arutyunyan et al., 2024; Irwin-Hunt, 2024; Yukhtanova et al., 2024). Key determinants of outward FDI from emerging economies are also identified in Mohanty et al. (2024).

## **2. Structural Shifts in Russia's Outward FDI after 2022**

### **2.1. Global Trends in Outward FDI after 2022**

Foreign direct investment (FDI), defined as investment by a foreign entity aimed at securing long-term control and participation in the management of a company abroad (typically through a foreign affiliate), remains a major component of international economic relations, despite increasingly stringent regulatory frameworks. FDI continues to be a key driver of economic development, bringing both benefits and risks to host and investing countries alike. In response to shifting global conditions—particularly heightened geopolitical tensions and sanctions—leading economies are actively reforming their FDI regulatory regimes.

Over the past several decades, global FDI flows have exhibited marked fluctuations, driven in part by the rising investment activity of emerging economies (Gammeltoft and Kokko, 2013). By the mid-2010s, FDI had largely recovered from the 2008 financial crisis; however, the COVID-19 pandemic caused a sharp decline, with global flows falling to USD 961.98 billion in 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020). In 2021, volumes rebounded by 53.6%, reaching USD 1.478 trillion (UNCTAD, 2022b), nearly matching the 2015 level of USD 1.73 trillion (UNCTAD, 2016). This recovery was short-lived, as the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022 once again disrupted global investment patterns.

These investment shifts have occurred in parallel with a broader trend toward increasing state control over cross-border capital movements—a trend that has become integral to the emerging global economic order. Initially, capital outflow controls were primarily employed by developing countries to shield their balance of payments from external shocks. Since the mid-2010s, however, such controls have taken on new significance amid intensifying geopolitical conflict—most notably following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014—and have contributed to efforts to construct a new architecture of economic security.

A pivotal moment came in 2018, when the United States enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which significantly expanded the powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Although originally designed to review inbound investment, the enhanced framework also introduced mechanisms targeting outbound capital flows, including those via reinvested earnings and sensitive technology transfers (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2018). In a parallel development, the European Union adopted in 2019 a Regulation establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the EU (The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2019). This framework introduced mandatory information-sharing between Member States and the European Commission regarding strategic-sector investments, facilitating greater coordination and reducing the scope for regulatory circumvention (CELIS, 2025).

Thus, the outward movement of foreign direct investment (FDI) from various jurisdictions is increasingly understood not only as an economic phenomenon but also as a tool for advancing political and strategic objectives. This reflects intensifying geoeconomic fragmentation and the expanding role of states in regulating capital flows within a nascent architecture of economic security.

These global shifts have had a direct impact on Russia's outward FDI, particularly in the aftermath of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The war has further accelerated broader trends toward fragmentation,

protectionism, and tightened controls over cross-border capital. However, it has not been the sole driver of the structural transformations currently reshaping the direction and nature of international investment.

Over the past three years, foreign policy considerations have increasingly influenced global economic relations, marking the onset of a fragmentation process in which national strategic priorities are being reoriented toward ensuring both political and economic security. This has led to a 20% reduction in investment flows between the broadly Western and Russia–China geopolitical blocs, while intra-bloc capital exchanges have demonstrated relative resilience (Cheng et al., 2025; Gopinath et al., 2024). As a result, a bloc-based model of the global economy is emerging, characterised by politically selective rules governing the flow of capital, trade, technology, and information (Aiyar et al., 2023; Arutyunyan et al., 2024).

This realignment has also been reflected in the regional distribution of FDI flows. In 2022–2023, developing regions—including Africa, Latin America, and Asia—faced substantial declines in inbound investment, underscoring their vulnerability to external shocks and deepening geoeconomic turbulence (UNCTAD, 2023; UNCTAD, 2025b). Advanced economies, by contrast, experienced increased FDI activity in 2023, but this was offset by significant capital outflows and a continued reliance on volatile intra-group transactions (OECD, 2023; OECD, 2024b).

This trend persisted into 2024: investment continued to decline in parts of Asia and South America, while modest growth was recorded in several African and Asian economies (UNCTAD, 2025a). Investment activity remained concentrated in developed countries, though the increases were often driven by valuation effects and intra-firm transfers rather than actual new capital formation (OECD, 2024b).

In Russia, this period prompted intensified reflection on the evolving geoeconomic landscape, with increased sensitivity of cross-border investment to global political and economic shifts, and efforts to redirect capital flows into alternative jurisdictions (Bank of Russia, 2024b).

The global tendency toward tighter control of investment flows as a mechanism of economic security has increasingly extended to outward investment regulation. This has involved the growing authority of national regulators, the introduction of strategic limitations, and the emergence of politically motivated investment decisions (UNCTAD, 2024a). In 2023, the United States implemented direct controls on outward investment in strategic technologies deemed essential to national security (The President of the United States, 2023). By 2024, G20 countries had further expanded their screening regimes, highlighting the strategic role of capital controls in an era of elevated political risk (UNCTAD, 2024b).

Within the European Union, multiple steps were taken to reinforce investment governance. The *Joint Communication on a European Economic Security Strategy* outlined plans to develop stricter regulatory frameworks, including those concerning cross-border investment (European Commission, 2023). A revision of this strategy was subsequently launched, potentially extending restrictions in areas such as export controls and outbound investment screening (European Commission, 2024a). The 2024 *White Paper on Outbound Investments* emphasised the need to limit investments by EU-based firms in jurisdictions supporting the military or intelligence capacities of countries deemed a security threat (European Commission, 2024b). In early 2025, the European Commission established the Commissioners' Project Group on EU Economic Security to coordinate measures aimed at safeguarding and monitoring outbound investment flows (European Commission, 2025).

These shifts in the structure of international capital flows have been mirrored in the overall dynamics of global investment activity, which remain fragile and highly sensitive to external shocks. Geoeconomic fragmentation, tightened investment controls, and growing regional divergence have developed in parallel with a sluggish and uneven recovery in global foreign direct investment (FDI) volumes, still constrained by persistent macroeconomic and political headwinds. Rising inflation, restrictive monetary policy, escalating geopolitical tensions, and the emergence of a new architecture of economic security have all contributed to heightened uncertainty, limiting both new investment and reinvested earnings across the global economy.

In 2022, following a temporary rebound in 2021, global FDI declined to approximately USD 1.3 trillion—12% below the 2021 level but still above the pandemic-induced low of 2020 (UNCTAD, 2022b). This contraction reflected a confluence of adverse factors, including high inflation, tighter monetary conditions, energy and food crises, and the war in Ukraine (Aiyar et al., 2023; UNCTAD, 2023).

In 2023, investment activity remained below pre-pandemic benchmarks, amid persistent global volatility (World Bank, 2024). According to various estimates, global FDI flows ranged between 1.3 and USD 1.364 trillion, indicating a moderate decline of 2–7% compared to the previous year (OECD, 2024a; UNCTAD, 2025b). Despite this contraction, the total stock of global FDI reached a record high of around USD 41 trillion, largely due to the revaluation of existing capital holdings rather than new inflows (OECD, 2023; Leino and Gavrilovic, 2025).


By the end of 2024, outward FDI flows showed nominal signs of recovery, growing by 9–11% depending on the methodological approach (UNCTAD, 2025a; OECD, 2025b). However, this apparent rebound was driven primarily by accounting effects and intra-firm transactions by large multinational enterprises, while real investment—measured in terms of non-financial capital formation—declined by 8–11%, highlighting persistent structural weakness in underlying investment activity (UNCTAD, 2025a; UNCTAD, 2025d).

The fragility of the investment environment was also evident in the performance of the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) segment. Despite modest annual growth of around 2%, 2024 was marked by high volatility: FDI volumes surged by nearly 80% in Q1 compared to Q4 2023, only to decline by 36% in Q2 (World Bank, 2024). This turbulence illustrates how, behind the statistical signs of recovery, global FDI remains uneven and unstable, with investment flows increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions and regional politics. The result is a structurally fragile investment cycle marked by growing regional fragmentation.

As of early 2025, leading international organisations projected a moderate recovery in global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (OECD, 2024b). However, by the end of Q1 2025, signs of renewed weakness had emerged amid persistent external risks. The total value of completed cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) fell by 27% compared to Q4 2024, while the number of transactions declined by 18% (UNCTAD, 2025a). Year-on-year, deal values remained broadly in line with Q1 2024, but the number of transactions continued to fall—suggesting a trend toward concentration in a smaller number of large-scale investments amid an overall decline in activity.

Thus, despite sustained interest in selected areas of cross-border investment, early 2025 reaffirmed the fragility of the global investment cycle and its heightened responsiveness to shifts in geopolitical and macroeconomic conditions.

**Figure 1. Global FDI Flows 2020–2025 (USD Trillion)**



Sources: UNCTAD World Investment Reports 2022–2025 (UNCTAD, 2022b; UNCTAD, 2023; UNCTAD, 2024c; UNCTAD, 2025c), World Bank Foreign Direct Investment 2024 (World Bank, 2024), and OECD FDI in Figures, April 2025 (OECD, 2025b).

Figure 1 illustrates the volatility and structural fragility of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, both in nominal and real terms, emphasising the impact of major global shocks—most notably the COVID-19 pandemic, monetary tightening in the United States and the European Union, and heightened market instability in 2024. The widening gap between nominal and real FDI volumes during this period

highlights the largely statistical character of the apparent recovery in 2024–2025, often fuelled by intra-firm financial transactions rather than genuine capital formation. The brief surge in investment observed in early 2024, followed by a rapid decline, reflects the acute sensitivity of cross-border investment to global uncertainty and geopolitical disruptions—including the ongoing war in Ukraine. This instability has been accompanied by a continuing reconfiguration of Russia’s outward FDI profile, which remains heavily constrained by evolving capital control regimes and the broader fragmentation of the global investment environment.

## 2.2. The Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Outward FDI

The imposition of sanctions in 2014 had a prolonged and transformative impact on the structure of Russia’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI), laying the groundwork for deeper structural changes that intensified after 2022. The initial restrictions led to a decline in investment in the European Union, the United States, and other developed economies aligned with the sanctions, while relative growth was observed in investment flows to Asia, the Middle East, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Drapkin et al., 2023). As the confrontation deepened, Russian companies increasingly recognised the long-term nature of the sanctions regime and began reducing their exposure to unfriendly jurisdictions, even in sectors where efforts had previously been made to maintain access to Western markets.

In parallel with these sanctions-related pressures, Russia’s cross-border capital movements during 2018–2019 were influenced by opposing global trends, including declining commodity prices, a temporary rebound in oil markets, and a general slowdown in global economic growth. These dynamics were soon compounded by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which intensified investor caution and constrained the capacity for international expansion. In response, both the Russian government and private sector accelerated localisation efforts, reducing reliance on foreign technologies and components. This amounted to a form of economic reshoring, though its impact remained limited to select sectors.

Another defining characteristic of Russia’s outward FDI at the time was the prevalence of offshore schemes, with a significant share of capital returning as reinvested earnings. This circular pattern created a statistical illusion of financial openness, diverging from actual access to foreign assets and credit.

Together, the period from 2014 to early 2022 prepared the ground for a more drastic shift in Russia’s external investment model, as the events of 24 February 2022 catalysed adaptation to a new geoeconomic reality.

Following 24 February 2022, the Russian economy faced an unprecedented degree of international isolation, which fundamentally reshaped the conditions for outward investment. **Core elements** of the new sanctions regime included the disconnection of major Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the freezing of assets held by state-owned entities, corporations, and individuals abroad, bans on new investment in Russian assets, and restrictions on access to international financial infrastructure, including transactions in foreign securities via Euroclear and Clearstream.

In this context, Russia accelerated its deoffshorisation efforts and revised its regulatory approach to cross-border transactions. Both the government and the Bank of Russia intensified capital controls and redirected settlement mechanisms—a shift already identified by researchers such as Kheyfets (2022) in 2022 as a new priority of Russian economic policy aimed at repatriating corporate structures. This direction was further reinforced in subsequent years; however, Russia’s formal level of financial openness remained artificially high, sustained by the inertia of past capital flows and methodological features that obscured the actual constraints on access to international markets (Golovnin, 2023).

As noted earlier, the impact of sanctions on Russia’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) unfolded within a broader global context of investment realignment and increased security-driven capital controls. These external constraints severely limited the capacity of Russian firms to maintain or expand their international asset portfolios. The compulsory sale of foreign assets by major Russian corporations—including Lukoil, Rosneft, and Gazprom—led to the loss of control over several oil refining facilities in Europe. Proceeds from these divestments were frequently frozen or placed under third-party jurisdictional control, thus precluding reinvestment. For example, in 2023, Lukoil was compelled to sell its refinery in

Sicily, and in Q1 2024 the number of similar transactions increased severalfold compared to the previous year (RBC, 2023a).

These involuntary asset disposals reinforced a broader pattern of isolating Russian capital abroad. The value of frozen Russian assets held in international clearing systems amounted to billions of USD, while total sanctioned holdings of Russian individuals abroad reached significant levels, including USD 22 billion in the European Union (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2023). At the same time, some efforts were made to repatriate frozen funds: in 2024, approximately 570 billion RUB were unfrozen, affecting around 1.5 million individuals (Frank Media, 2025).


In institutional terms, special administrative regions (SARs), established in 2018 on Oktyabrsky Island in Kaliningrad and Russky Island in Primorsky Krai, were designed to facilitate the repatriation of control over corporate entities previously registered in offshore jurisdictions. While only 22 companies had joined SARs in 2019, this number rose to nearly 500 by 2025, with the vast majority (78%) based in Kaliningrad. In 2024 alone, the number of registered entities increased by 1.5 times (Grachev and Anaseva, 2025).

Simultaneously, a steady trend of relocation to tax-friendly jurisdictions persisted, with Russian firms increasingly registering in the United Arab Emirates and Singapore. Additional interest was observed in Indonesia, Thailand, and Middle Eastern countries, particularly in connection with residential real estate acquisitions used for geographical diversification and asset protection (Commercial Real Estate, 2024a).

These regulatory and institutional shifts occurred against a backdrop of growing international pressure on Russia's financial infrastructure. In 2022, the European Union added Russia to its grey list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, and in 2023 reclassified it to the blacklist, effectively restricting Russian companies' access to tax benefits across the EU. Another important development was the suspension of Russia's membership in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in February 2023, followed by EU sanctions against Rosfinmonitoring, the national financial intelligence agency, in December of the same year. Additional restrictions targeted Russian financial platforms: the St. Petersburg Exchange was sanctioned by the United States in 2023 and by the United Kingdom in 2025, while the Moscow Exchange was added to the U.S. sanctions list in 2024.

Taken together, the measures introduced between 2022 and 2024 brought about a fundamental reconfiguration of Russia's outward investment model. Key components of this transformation included: the compelled divestment of foreign assets, the freezing of cross-border capital, the institutionalisation of control mechanisms for external transactions, the acceleration of deoffshorisation, and the establishment of substitute corporate structures in tax-friendly jurisdictions. These trends reflect not only Russia's adaptation to sanctions-induced isolation, but also its broader strategic shift in investment policy in response to intensified global financial rivalry.

**Figure 2. Change in Russia’s Investment and Financial Openness (Before 2022 vs After 2024 Sanctions)**



Sources: UNCTAD *World Investment Reports* (UNCTAD, 2023; UNCTAD, 2024c; UNCTAD, 2025c), *OECD FDI in Figures* (OECD, 2024a; OECD, 2025b).

Figure 2 illustrates the sharp deterioration in Russia’s investment and financial integration with global markets between 2022 and 2024, following the imposition of comprehensive sanctions. Key measures included the disconnection from the SWIFT system, freezing of sovereign and corporate assets abroad, and restrictions targeting major financial platforms such as the St. Petersburg Exchange (2023, 2025) and the Moscow Exchange (2024). Although deoffshorisation initiatives intensified in response to these constraints, Russia’s access to international capital and financial infrastructure narrowed significantly, leading to a fundamental restructuring of the country’s outward investment strategy under conditions of sustained financial isolation.

### 2.3. Regulation of Russia’s Outward FDI after 2022

Prior to 2022, the legal framework regulating Russia’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) focused on increasing the transparency of international transactions, strengthening capital controls, and safeguarding national economic interests. In 2011, a federal law on transfer pricing was adopted, serving as a key tool for countering capital flight via intra-group pricing manipulation and ensuring clearer conditions for cross-border dealings (Russian Federation, 2011). The regulatory system was further reinforced by Russia’s accession to the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) in 2017, which introduced automatic financial account information exchange and significantly improved the monitoring of outbound capital flows (Russian Federation, 2017).

One of the core priorities in this period was combating capital offshorisation and encouraging the repatriation of Russian-owned assets. In 2018, legislation was enacted to establish special administrative regions (SARs), which offered tax benefits and simplified procedures for companies relocating their holdings from foreign jurisdictions (Russian Federation, 2018). These efforts were supported by currency regulation instruments, including the mandatory conversion of export earnings into roubles. While this mechanism had limited success in preventing illegal outflows, it was employed primarily to curb excess liquidity and stabilise the national currency (Zhukov, 2023).

The institutional consolidation of FDI regulation was accompanied by strategic policy planning. *The Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030*, adopted in 2017, underscored the

importance of protecting national interests abroad and diversifying investment geography. This strategic document reflected the broader intent to strengthen the global presence of Russian investors while maintaining effective oversight of outbound capital (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2017).

Thus, prior to 2022, Russia's regulatory approach to outward investment combined efforts to enhance transparency and reduce offshorisation with currency sterilisation policies and strengthened capital controls. These institutional elements provided the foundation for the rapid escalation of regulatory measures in response to the sanctions imposed from early 2022.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2022 sanctions, Russian authorities introduced sweeping restrictions on cross-border financial activity. In late February, a presidential decree required residents to sell 80% of their foreign currency earnings within three days and imposed bans on unrestricted capital transfers and the issuance of foreign currency loans to non-residents (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2022a). Shortly thereafter, a licensing regime was introduced for transactions involving counterparties from so-called "unfriendly" countries, covering operations in rouble-denominated loans, securities, and real estate (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2022b).

Further restrictions prohibited Russian residents—including individuals and firms—from crediting foreign currency to overseas accounts or providing foreign currency loans to non-residents. Non-residents, in turn, were barred from trading freely on the Russian financial market; proceeds from their existing assets were redirected to special "C-type" accounts with limited functionality. In parallel, a federal law required Russian companies to terminate listings of depositary receipts on foreign exchanges and convert them into domestic securities (Russian Federation, 2022). Taken together, these measures significantly curtailed capital outflows and severely limited the scope for new outward investment, particularly via foreign holding structures.

Initially, the list of "unfriendly countries" included 49 states—comprising most developed economies—and was later expanded to include the British Overseas Territories (Russian Government, 2022). As of 2025, the list encompasses 62 jurisdictions, with Norway added in 2023. A dedicated sub-commission under the Government Commission on Foreign Investment—chaired by the Minister of Finance—was established to oversee and approve all transactions between Russian residents and entities from these jurisdictions. This framework institutionalised state control over cross-border capital movements and introduced a case-by-case approval process for acquiring foreign assets or engaging in outward investment.

However, by mid-2022, Russian authorities initiated a gradual easing of previously imposed foreign exchange controls. The first step was a reduction in the mandatory foreign currency conversion requirement. In June 2022, the Government Commission on Foreign Investment established a zero threshold for conversion, effectively abolishing the rule (TASS, 2022). This allowed companies to resume crediting export proceeds to foreign accounts, while residents and individuals from "friendly" countries were permitted to transfer up to USD 1 million abroad per month without additional approval. This process culminated in Presidential Decree No. 72 of 6 February 2023, which formalised the transition to a more flexible regulatory framework (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2023a). Within less than a year, Russia shifted from stringent foreign exchange controls to a more adaptive regime—while maintaining state oversight over strategically sensitive transactions and preserving limits on large-scale capital outflows in the form of direct investment.

The 2022–early 2023 easing was driven by the need to address growing economic risks. Excessively tight restrictions had led to rouble appreciation, which threatened export competitiveness and reduced fiscal revenues. At the same time, sanctions hindered international settlements—particularly for critical imports—while strict domestic regulation risked further trade disruptions. There were also growing concerns over the expansion of a shadow currency market, which undermined formal regulatory effectiveness (Bulatov et al., 2024).

Nevertheless, the regulatory trajectory remained cyclical and reactive rather than linear. In April 2023, a presidential decree introduced temporary asset management for investors from "unfriendly" jurisdictions, limiting their ability to exit the Russian market (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2023b). Subsequent legislative measures—Federal Laws No. 422-FZ and No. 470-FZ, adopted in August and September—further restricted the rights of foreign holding companies and formalised asset freezes (Russian Federation, 2023b; Russian Federation, 2023a). These steps curtailed the ability of non-residents

to repatriate capital and constrained Russian companies with cross-border ownership structures by limiting profit reinvestment, asset acquisition, and external financing. As a result, firms faced reduced flexibility in managing overseas operations and capital flows.

In autumn 2023, amid growing currency instability and sharp rouble depreciation, Russian authorities reinstated strict foreign exchange measures. The Bank of Russia raised the key interest rate to 15% and reintroduced mandatory conversion of export proceeds. A classified presidential directive required 43 major exporting groups—from the energy, metals, chemicals, forestry, and grain sectors—to deposit 80% of their foreign currency earnings into Russian banks within 60 days and sell 90% of the proceeds on the domestic market within 14 days. According to the Bank of Russia, these measures were intended to stabilise exchange rate fluctuations and improve market liquidity. However, economists highlighted that the rouble's valuation remained fundamentally tied to broader market dynamics (RBC, 2023d). These measures also affected outward investment by limiting access to foreign currency liquidity required for cross-border ventures, prompting firms to reconsider and scale down international engagements.

Simultaneously, the government introduced measures to curb income outflows by suspending double taxation agreements with 32 “unfriendly” countries (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2023c). As a result, the tax rate on dividends and interest payments increased to 15–20%, significantly raising the fiscal burden on companies engaged in outward investment via foreign entities and cross-border financial flows. The net effect was a fragmented and cyclical capital control regime—oscillating between macroeconomic stabilisation and tightening constraints on Russia's international investment activity.

Further tightening occurred in November 2023, when all Russian companies and individual entrepreneurs were required to submit quarterly reports on cash flows and other assets held in foreign accounts if total transactions exceeded 600,000 RUB—equivalent to less than USD 7,000 at the prevailing exchange rate (Russian Government, 2023).

Despite intensified domestic controls and rising regulatory risks, Russia continued to uphold the international legal framework governing its investment relations. As of 2024, the country maintained 81 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), including 39 with developing countries and 34 with advanced economies. Most of these treaties provide for dispute resolution through ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules; 37 permit recourse to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and 22 to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. However, the effectiveness of international institutions such as ICSID and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) remains constrained in practice. Russia has signed but not ratified the ICSID Convention, thereby depriving Russian investors of access to associated insurance mechanisms and legal protection tools in the context of cross-border operations (The International and Comparative Law Research Center, 2024).

Taken together, the post-2022 legislative trajectory demonstrates an evolution in Russia's approach to regulating foreign investment: from emergency control measures toward a more flexible model that combines stringent domestic oversight with continued formal adherence to international investment obligations.

## **2.4. Statistical Challenges and Data on Russia's Outward FDI**

Prior to 2022, the principal sources of data on Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) were the publications of the Bank of Russia, which provided official statistics on cross-border capital flows, the structure of the balance of payments, and the international investment position (IIP). Supplementary information was published by the Federal State Statistics Service and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, including data on corporate investment activities and the international operations of Russian companies.

A significant empirical source consisted of the annual and financial reports of major Russian corporations—such as Gazprom, Sberbank, and VTB—which disclosed information on foreign subsidiaries, overseas assets, and participation in cross-border projects. However, following the escalation of sanctions in 2022, access to corporate disclosures and official data became substantially limited, impeding efforts to analyse Russia's outward investment.

In this context, the role of international data sources based on “mirror statistics”—that is, records of Russian investment compiled by host countries—has become increasingly important. These include the International Monetary Fund’s *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey* (IMF CDIS) and the World Bank. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also continue to publish analytical reviews of global FDI trends, with detailed breakdowns by country and sector, including data related to Russia (*OECD International Direct Investment Statistics*; *UNCTAD World Investment Report*). At the regional level, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) remains an important source of statistics on Russia’s investment within the Eurasian Economic Union.

Assessments of Russia’s investment position in the global economy are based on internationally recognised standards. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) accounting practices rely on the International Monetary Fund’s *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual*, sixth edition (BPM6), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s *Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment*, fourth edition (BMD4), both of which define direct investment as involving a minimum 10% equity share participation (IMF, 2009; OECD, 2025a). The IMF methodology requires the comprehensive recording of transactions to ensure comparability across countries, employing two complementary methods: the asset/liability principle and the directional principle (inward and outward). This dual approach is adopted by Eurostat, UNCTAD, and the OECD and serves as the basis for the *Direct Investment Positions by Counterpart Economy* survey (formerly CDIS) (IMF, 2025a).

In 2025, the IMF released a draft of the revised manual—BPM7—introducing several important clarifications in the statistical treatment of outward FDI (IMF, 2025b). Notably, the definition of residency has been tightened, especially in relation to holding companies and special purpose entities (SPEs), allowing for more accurate identification of the true country of origin of investment. The revised manual also formalises the use of the ultimate investing country (UIC) concept, designed to identify the actual controlling investor rather than the immediate counterpart. It further proposes distinguishing between active and passive forms of FDI based on the degree of managerial involvement, refines the extended directional principle, and strengthens requirements for detailed geographical and sectoral classifications. In addition, it reinforces the consistency between balance of payments data and the international investment position (IIP), facilitating more robust analysis of the long-term effects of outward FDI.

In March 2025, the United Nations Statistical Commission adopted the updated *System of National Accounts* (SNA 2025) (United Nations Statistical Commission, 2025). Further revisions to the *Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014* (GFSM 2014) and the *Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide 2016* (MFSMCG 2016) are also planned to enhance harmonisation among core macroeconomic statistical frameworks. The IMF recommends that BPM7 and SNA 2025 be implemented by all member countries by 2029–2030, including a forthcoming Russian-language edition.

To assess the volume and dynamics of Russia’s investment presence abroad, a set of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) indicators is used. These indicators reflect both quantitative and structural aspects of investment and allow for the evaluation of the degree of integration of the national economy into the global system (Mohanty et al., 2024). The key metrics include OFDI flows over a given period, the total stock of retained foreign assets (OFDI stock), and the FDI intensity index, calculated as the ratio of investment flows to GDP (UNCTAD, 2024a).

Russia’s OFDI can be broadly classified into three categories: (1) corporate capital investments in foreign production sectors; (2) financial flows routed through offshore and intermediary jurisdictions; and (3) private real estate investments by individuals (Kuznetsov, 2022). For systematic analysis, the international investment position (IIP) compiled by the Bank of Russia under the sixth edition of the *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual* is applied (Valdivia-Velarde and Razin, 2014). This statistical tool records all cross-border assets and liabilities, enabling assessment of the scale and composition of foreign investment.

Even before 2022, analysis of Russian OFDI was challenged by limited data availability, methodological inconsistencies, and the opacity of many transactions routed through offshore jurisdictions (Tcyrempilova et al., 2024). While the Bank of Russia and the OECD remain primary sources of OFDI statistics, their datasets often diverge. Moreover, official Russian data do not consistently account for derivative instruments or non-cash transactions via foreign accounts, particularly those involving individuals—creating statistical gaps and misrepresentation of actual investment flows.

A distinctive feature of the Russian context is the extensive use of complex corporate structures and Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), which formally generate large outward flows without corresponding real economic activity. While some countries exclude SPEs from official FDI statistics, this practice is not applied in Russia or other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) members, complicating international comparisons (Zaytsev, 2022).

Cross-checking statistics from the Bank of Russia, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the OECD helps to partially bridge these gaps, though inconsistencies remain. Efforts to improve the analytical framework include the dataset by Broner et al. (2023), covering Russian capital outflows, loans, portfolio investment, and reserves from 2001–2018. This dataset enables a more accurate reconstruction of global flows than official Russian sources allow. Nonetheless, research on Russia’s OFDI before 2022 remains constrained by data fragmentation, inconsistent international standards, and a high degree of investment opacity.

Since 2022, the situation regarding the assessment of Russia’s investment flows—both inward and outward—has changed significantly. Prior to this point, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) published over twenty regular statistical reports on foreign direct investment (FDI), including seven forms for outward FDI, fourteen for inward FDI, and four consolidated overviews. This comprehensive dataset enabled detailed analysis of destinations, sectors, and capital structure.

However, following the introduction of sanctions and a shift in official policy, the CBR substantially reduced the scope of publicly available information on foreign economic operations. Data disaggregated by partner countries, sectors, and capital types were withdrawn from the public domain, severely limiting the ability to analyse outward investment flows. A similar reduction in transparency occurred in the publications of the Federal Customs Service, which had previously allowed for cross-verification of trade and investment statistics. As a result, official Russian sources currently provide only aggregated data on the stock of foreign investment, which no longer support an accurate assessment of annual FDI flows (Gerdo, 2024).


In parallel with the reduction in official statistical disclosure, the transparency of the Russian corporate sector also deteriorated. Beginning in 2022, an increasing number of companies discontinued the publication of detailed information on their foreign operations, making it considerably more difficult to evaluate the geographical distribution and sectoral structure of Russian outward investment (Kuznetsov, 2022). At the same time, traditional analytical methods—such as tracking investment flows via offshore jurisdictions—have become less effective, as firms have shifted toward more opaque and anonymised models of managing foreign direct investment assets.

**Table 1. Comparison of Openness of FDI Statistics in Russia Before and After 2022**

Category	Before 2022	After 2022
CBR Statistical Reporting Forms	25 quarterly forms with breakdowns by country, sector, and capital type	Only 2 aggregated forms remain; detailed tables largely discontinued
Publication of Annual FDI Flows	Fully accessible data on inward and outward flows	Direct data unavailable; estimations possible only via balance of payments data
Geographical Structure of Investments	Regularly published data on recipient and source countries	No longer available; partially reconstructed from mirror statistics of partner countries
Sectoral Structure of FDI	Partially disclosed in reports, including Form 4	No longer published
Corporate Reporting on Foreign Assets	Many companies disclosed detailed data on foreign operations	Significant reduction in disclosure in corporate reports and official databases
Access to International Tax Information (CRS)	Russia received data from approximately 67% of CRS participating countries	Data exchange limited; list of 22 jurisdictions recognized as non-compliant
Use of Balance of Payments (BPM6)	Used for calculations but detailed statistical forms were the primary source	Became the main aggregated tool for estimating annual FDI flows using the asset-liability method

Sources: Bank of Russia 2022-2025, UNCTAD 2022-2025, OECD 2023-2025, Gerdo (2024), Bulatov et al. (2024), Kuznetsov et al. (2022).

**Figure 3. Openness of FDI Statistics in Russia Before and After 2022**



Sources: Bank of Russia, Federal Customs Service of Russia, UNCTAD, OECD, World Bank, and Gerdo (2024).

Following 2022, the degradation of official statistics and the decline in corporate reporting transparency have significantly constrained traditional approaches to analysing Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI). In the absence of disaggregated data by country and sector, researchers rely on the methodological framework of the sixth edition of the *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual* (BPM6, IMF), complemented by international datasets and mirror statistics, to fill statistical gaps. This approach allows for the identification of both quantitative and qualitative shifts in the structure of Russia's foreign investment and supports the analysis of the resilience of the Russian economy and corporate adaptation strategies in response to sanctions and currency controls in the evolving geoeconomic environment.

At present, the calculation of Russia's outward FDI flows is primarily based on indirect estimation methods using balance of payments data compiled by the Bank of Russia in accordance with the BPM6 asset/liability principle. These data are subsequently transformed into directional figures to reflect net outward positions. This approach enables the estimation of annual investment volumes, including Russian participation in foreign enterprises, profit reinvestment, and intra-corporate lending. However, it does not provide a breakdown by country or sector, thereby limiting analytical precision. Moreover, these calculations are subject to methodological complexities and may differ from stock-based estimates by as much as 15–20%, due to factors such as exchange rate revaluations, reclassifications, and intra-group adjustments, as noted by Gerdo (2024).

One of the main advantages of applying the BPM6 framework is its ability to capture investment routed through offshore and intermediary jurisdictions—an essential feature for analysing outward FDI under sanctions pressure, currency restrictions, and the use of hybrid structures such as special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and trusts by Russian firms to manage foreign assets. The use of aggregate balance of payments data allows for the assessment of not only quantitative shifts but also structural and compositional changes in outward FDI. These include the growing share of reinvested earnings, the use of repatriation schemes involving “friendly” jurisdictions, and shifts in the currency composition of foreign assets—all of which are critical for studying the restructuring of Russian corporate strategies under external constraints.

At the same time, it is important to distinguish between the BPM6-based approach and the data published by commercial aggregators such as CEIC (Centre for Economics and Information of China), which provide quarterly net outward FDI flow statistics. Unlike the macro-level figures reported by the Bank of Russia, CEIC data reflect the net movement of foreign exchange liquidity, where negative values indicate net capital outflows and positive values point to inflows. This enables the analysis of short-term fluctuations and the responsiveness of Russian outward FDI to exchange rate volatility, changes in repatriation regimes, new rounds of sanctions, and intensified capital controls.


The differences between the BPM6 methodology and CEIC data stem from both methodological aspects—such as the use of flow versus stock indicators—and discrepancies in the treatment of reinvested earnings, capital repatriation, and intra-group transfers. While data from the Bank of Russia enable macroeconomic comparisons and the analysis of long-term outward FDI trends in relation to key indicators of the national economy (such as foreign exchange reserves, the rouble exchange rate, and the balance of payments), CEIC data allow researchers to capture short-term dynamics, including phases of accelerated capital outflows and temporary inflow cycles driven by external political and economic shocks.

The use of international databases—such as those provided by UNCTAD, the OECD, and the World Bank—remains a key instrument for verifying calculations and identifying aggregate trends. However, their application requires careful reconciliation with Russia’s balance of payments and stock data, as these databases are often based on indirect or secondary sources and may contain methodological inconsistencies. Partner-country mirror statistics help to partially compensate for the gaps that emerged after Russia ceased publishing detailed information on its major foreign investors, such as the Republic of Cyprus. For instance, the Central Bank of Cyprus continues to disclose data on accumulated investments, reporting Russian outward FDI at €69.2 billion as of 2023. However, these figures are not fully comparable with retrospective data from the Bank of Russia and statistics from international institutions, as noted by Gerdo (2024).

Thus, the combination of BPM6-based data from the Bank of Russia, high-frequency liquidity indicators from CEIC, international databases, and mirror statistics forms the basis for a layered analysis of Russia’s outward FDI. This integrated approach makes it possible to monitor structural trends and macroeconomic effects of cross-border investments while also tracking short-term volatility in capital flows. Moreover, it facilitates the identification of mechanisms for circumventing sanctions and the analysis of evolving capital movement models adopted by Russian companies under restricted access to global capital markets and amid the degradation of official reporting.

As a result, this framework helps preserve analytical capacity to assess how the Russian economy and its corporate sector are adapting to the new global reality—through the restructuring of investment channels, changes in the currency composition of foreign assets, and the increasing reliance on profit reinvestment under external economic constraints.

**Figure 4. Integrated Data Pathways for Outward FDI Assessment in Russia after 2022**



Sources: Bank of Russia, UNCTAD, OECD and World Bank reports.

In the post-2022 period, the analysis of Russia’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has increasingly relied on cross-comparison of data sources and reconciliation of methodological inconsistencies, following the Bank of Russia’s decision to suspend the publication of detailed FDI statistics disaggregated by country and sector. As a result, only aggregate balance of payments data remain available, covering a broad spectrum of external assets, including direct, portfolio, and other investments. In contrast, UNCTAD continues to publish outward FDI estimates based on mixed methodologies and partner-country mirror

statistics. These discrepancies necessitate cautious interpretation, as UNCTAD figures reflect only direct investment, while the Bank of Russia's indicators aggregate all types of cross-border capital movements.

Before 2022, UNCTAD's outward FDI estimates for Russia were based on detailed data provided by the Bank of Russia, compiled according to the BPM6 methodology and published in full. This ensured a high level of accuracy and international comparability for both FDI flows and stock positions. Between 2019 and 2021, the availability of disaggregated statistics enabled comprehensive analysis of the geographic, sectoral, and capital-type structure of investments, as well as more precise assessments of the dynamics of Russia's cross-border direct investment activity.

A clear example of this consistent reporting period is the dynamics of Russia's outward FDI from 2001 to 2021, presented in the table below. It reflects both absolute flows and their share of GDP, making it possible to trace the gradual expansion of outward FDI, periods of contraction and recovery, and the role of direct investment in the Russian economy relative to key macroeconomic indicators.

**Table 2. Russian Federation FDI Outflows, 2001–2021 and FDI Outflows (% of GDP)**

Year	FDI Outflow (USD Million)	FDI Outflows (% of GDP)
2001	2502.06	0.83
2002	3483.84	1.02
2003	9550.09	2.26
2004	13662.79	2.33
2005	16746.64	2.34
2006	29839.96	3.03
2007	43849.38	3.45
2008	56735.4	3.35
2009	34449.68	3.54
2010	41116.46	3.45
2011	48634.93	3.27
2012	28422.53	2.21
2013	70684.77	3.77
2014	64202.54	2.77
2015	27089.94	1.62
2016	26951.19	1.75
2017	34153.10	2.33
2018	35819.67	1.89
2019	22023.98	1.29
2020	6777.73	0.39
2021	64071.57	3.57

Sources: UNCTAD (2024 and 2025), World Bank (2024).

As shown in the table, the highest volumes of Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) were recorded in 2007–2008 and 2013–2014, while sharp declines occurred in 2015–2016 and in 2020, primarily due to external economic shocks and sanctions. These data provide a baseline for assessing subsequent shifts in the structure of cross-border investment after 2022, when both Russia's reporting system and the methodologies used by international organisations were forced to adapt to the evolving context of sanctions and currency restrictions.

Following the introduction of sanctions and foreign exchange controls in early 2022, the Bank of Russia suspended the publication of disaggregated statistics, leaving only aggregate balance of payments indicators—such as Net Acquisition of Assets—that cover the full range of cross-border capital flows but do not isolate net FDI. In response, UNCTAD adopted a composite estimation approach, combining the remaining aggregate data from the Bank of Russia with partner-country mirror statistics, IMF and

World Bank data, and expert-based adjustments. This enabled continuity in time-series tracking of Russia’s outward FDI, although figures for 2022–2024 are classified as partially estimated, with a potential margin of error of approximately  $\pm 10\text{--}30\%$ , depending on the composition of flows and methodological constraints.

This is supported by UNCTAD’s methodological commentary (UNCTAD, 2022a) and by data cross-comparisons: after 2022, UNCTAD’s outward FDI estimates accounted for between 10% and 70% of the total increase in Net Acquisition of Assets reported in Russia’s balance of payments. This variation across quarters and asset classes reflects the growing role of deposits, loans, and other capital movements that fall outside UNCTAD’s narrower FDI definition. It is important to stress that these discrepancies in absolute values do not indicate inconsistencies in UNCTAD’s methodology. Rather, they stem from definitional differences: outward FDI includes only equity participation, reinvested earnings, and intra-group lending, while excluding other forms of cross-border capital outflows—which have increased significantly under sanctions. Nonetheless, UNCTAD’s data continue to capture major structural and quantitative trends in the foreign operations of Russian companies, enabling researchers to track corporate adaptation strategies and compare them internationally using the harmonised BPM6 methodology.

Since 2022, UNCTAD’s estimates of Russia’s outward FDI have remained a key analytical tool in the context of limited official reporting. While these estimates allow for the monitoring of direct investment trends, they must be interpreted alongside broader balance of payments indicators to assess the full scale of capital outflows. The increasing role of indirect and hybrid financial channels reduces the representativeness of UNCTAD data for capturing the total volume of outflows; however, the dataset remains valuable for identifying structural transformations within the direct investment segment.

To contextualise these trends, it is useful to examine the pre- and post-2022 dynamics of outward FDI as recorded in UNCTAD’s database—particularly during the period when official Russian statistics were still fully disclosed and internationally harmonised. The following table presents key indicators for 2020–2024, including net outward FDI flows, the stock of Russian FDI abroad, and their shares relative to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and gross domestic product (GDP). For 2020 and 2021, the investment flow and stock values in UNCTAD’s database fully match those published by the Bank of Russia (e.g. Bank of Russia, 2025), reflecting the continued use of official national statistics as UNCTAD’s primary source prior to the shift in reporting practices. This consistency confirms that UNCTAD’s estimates for 2020–2021 were based directly on official Russian reporting and did not require additional modelling or methodological adjustment.

**Table 3. Russia’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Cross-Border M&A Activity, 2020–2024**

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Outward (USD billions)	22.9	6.8	64.1	11.5	29.7	11.7
As a percentage of gross fixed capital formation	6.8	2.1	18.1	2.4	6.6	2.3
Outward FDI Stock (USD billions)	383.6	381.1	374.6	299.1	259.9	230.0
As a percentage of gross domestic product	22.8	25.6	20.5	13.0	12.6	10.6

Sources: Bank of Russia, UNCTAD World Investment Report 2025

In turn, the statistics on Russia’s outward investment provided by the Bank of Russia are published as aggregate balance of payments data, compiled in accordance with the BPM6 methodology and released on a quarterly basis. The main relevant indicator—Net Acquisition of Assets (excluding reserve assets)—reflects increases in the external financial holdings of Russian residents, including foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, deposits, loans, and other cross-border financial instruments. Additional indicators include Net Incurrence of Liabilities, which captures changes in Russia’s external obligations to non-residents, as well as other components of the financial account.

A key feature of the Net Acquisition of Assets indicator is its broad coverage of all forms of cross-border capital movement, including transactions routed through offshore and intermediary jurisdictions. This makes the Bank of Russia’s reporting more comprehensive than narrowly defined FDI statistics, which include only equity investment, reinvested earnings, and intra-group lending.

The table below, based on official data from the Bank of Russia, presents the quarterly dynamics of Net Acquisition of Assets, Net Incurrence of Liabilities, and related components for the period 2022–2024 and Q1 2025. These figures illustrate the evolution of Russia’s cross-border investment position in the context of sanctions, financial restrictions, and increased reliance on indirect channels.

**Table 4. Russia’s External Investment Metrics According to the Bank of Russia (2022–2025)**

Period	Trade Balance (USD billion)	Financial Account Balance (excl. reserves) (USD billion)	Net Acquisition of Assets (excl. reserves) (USD billion)	Net Incurrence of Liabilities (USD billion)
2019 Q1	47.0	12.6	5.2	-7.4
2019 Q2	40.9	-5.1	-7.2	-2.1
2019 Q3	39.5	-7.2	-5.6	1.6
2019 Q4	37.6	-2.1	-5.3	-3.2
<b>2019 Year</b>	<b>165.0</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>-12.9</b>	<b>-11.1</b>
2020 Q1	34.3	-3.7	5.8	9.5
2020 Q2	18.7	-21.0	17.6	38.6
2020 Q3	24.8	-2.0	13.2	15.2
2020 Q4	31.4	-6.5	7.4	13.9
<b>2021 Year</b>	<b>109.2</b>	<b>-33.2</b>	<b>44.0</b>	<b>77.2</b>
2021 Q1	30.4	20.2	18.3	-1.9
2021 Q2	39.2	9.9	15.4	5.5
2021 Q3	54.5	3.9	41.9	38.0
2021 Q4	69.1	26.5	28.8	2.3
2021 Year	193.1	60.5	104.4	43.9
2022 Q1	84.8	79.0	47.1	-31.8
2022 Q2	95.1	73.8	22.4	-51.4
2022 Q3	72.8	42.7	27.4	-15.2
2022 Q4	62.8	38.9	13.4	-25.5
<b>2022 Year</b>	<b>315.6</b>	<b>234.3</b>	<b>110.4</b>	<b>-123.9</b>
2023 Q1	30.5	18.2	6.4	-11.7
2023 Q2	26.3	6.1	10.9	4.7
2023 Q3	33.4	14.3	22.5	8.2
2023 Q4	31.4	12.9	4.2	-8.7
<b>2023 Year</b>	<b>121.6</b>	<b>51.6</b>	<b>44.0</b>	<b>-7.5</b>
2024 Q1	34.7	29.2	24.9	-4.3
2024 Q2	35.6	11.6	14.1	2.5
2024 Q3	31.9	9.7	11.8	2.1
2024 Q4	20.4	-2.7	5.7	8.4
<b>2024 Year</b>	<b>122.6</b>	<b>47.8</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>8.6</b>
2025 Q1	32.5	13.3	18.4	5.1

Sources: Bank of Russia (2024, 2025).

**Note:** The indicator Net Acquisition of Assets (excl. reserves) covers a broader set of external financial assets than UNCTAD’s FDI flows, and is not methodologically equivalent to direct investment statistics.

The structure and dynamics of Russia’s external financial flows have undergone substantial transformation, reflecting the economy’s response to a more complex external environment, escalating sanctions, and the tightening of foreign exchange controls. The trade balance rose sharply in 2022, reaching USD 315.6 billion, driven by favourable energy prices and a contraction in imports. This surplus supported a strong current account, generating sustained foreign currency inflows into the domestic economy.

At the same time, the financial account (excluding reserves) also expanded significantly, reaching USD 234.3 billion. This was underpinned by the reallocation of currency flows and a sharp increase in the

accumulation of external assets. In particular, Net Acquisition of Assets amounted to USD 110.4 billion, while Net Incurrence of Liabilities fell by USD 123.9 billion—indicating large-scale capital repatriation, a reduction in external liabilities, and a strategic shift towards foreign asset accumulation amid restricted access to Western capital markets.

In 2023, the trade surplus declined to USD 121.6 billion, reflecting an adjustment of export–import flows to new sanctions regimes and evolving geopolitical conditions. Net Acquisition of Assets decreased to USD 44.0 billion, and Net Incurrence of Liabilities remained negative at – USD 7.5 billion, suggesting a continued—though more cautious—approach to outward asset movement and liability management.

In 2024, the indicators point to relative stabilisation. The trade balance was USD 122.6 billion, Net Acquisition of Assets increased to USD 56.4 billion, and, notably, Net Incurrence of Liabilities turned positive for the first time since 2021, reaching USD 8.6 billion. This development may indicate a partial reopening of external financing channels and a reconfiguration of financial flows in a somewhat more stable monetary and financial environment.

Overall, the post-2022 period has been characterised by a consistent trend towards reducing external liabilities and building up foreign assets—albeit at a slower pace over time. This reflects the adjustment strategies adopted by Russian corporations and financial institutions under the constraints of sanctions and capital controls. Capital outflows were driven primarily by deposits, loans, and other financial instruments, while direct investment remained modest. Although FDI continues to be part of the broader structure of capital outflows, it has been surpassed in scale by portfolio and other types of transactions.


These developments underscore the analytical value of Net Acquisition of Assets and Net Incurrence of Liabilities as macro-financial indicators of Russia's adaptation to the shifting global financial architecture and the constraints of the new geoeconomic reality.

It is important to emphasise that the outward FDI indicator published by UNCTAD and the Net Acquisition of Assets figure reported in Russia's balance of payments are based on different methodological frameworks and are not directly comparable. The UNCTAD measure captures only net flows of foreign direct investment—namely equity participation, reinvested earnings, and intra-company lending—whereas the Net Acquisition of Assets indicator reflects the total increase in external financial assets, including not only FDI but also portfolio investment, deposits, loans, and other instruments.

These differences in scope and accounting standards mean that changes in one indicator do not necessarily correspond to movements in the other. Nevertheless, they can be analysed jointly to understand the composition and relative weight of FDI within the broader structure of Russia's cross-border capital flows.

The figure below illustrates key aspects of Russia's external economic activity based on balance of payments data, including the trade balance, the structure of the financial account (excluding reserve assets), and the dynamics of outward FDI in both flow and stock terms. Following the onset of sanctions in 2022, several marked shifts have occurred. The net acquisition of assets and net incurrence of liabilities have shown increasing volatility, the financial account has turned strongly positive under capital control constraints, and outward FDI volumes have gradually declined. These developments reflect a restructuring of cross-border investment strategies by Russian firms in response to sanctions and tightening foreign exchange regulation.

**Figure 5. Russia's External Investment Indicators (2022–2025)**



Source: Compiled from Russia's Balance of Payments 2024 [[@bankofrussiaRussiaBalancePayments2024](https://bankofrussia.ru/vfs/statistics/credit_statistics/bop/57-bop_20.xlsx)] and author's calculations. [https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/statistics/credit\\_statistics/bop/57-bop\\_20.xlsx](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/statistics/credit_statistics/bop/57-bop_20.xlsx) [https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/statistics/credit\\_statistics/bop/57-bop\\_19.xlsx](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/statistics/credit_statistics/bop/57-bop_19.xlsx)

Source: Bank of Russia (2024, 2025).

The convergence of the lines in the Figure 5 highlights a gradual normalisation of external financial flows following the severe imbalances observed in 2022. Initially, the dynamics were dominated by capital flight by non-residents and rapid asset accumulation by residents. Over time, however, a more stable pattern of capital movement has emerged, suggesting a partial adjustment of financial strategies to the evolving external environment.

### 3. Temporal Dynamics of Russia's Outward FDI, 2022–2025

#### 3.1. 2022 — Initial Shock and Investment Contraction

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) underwent profound structural changes under the combined impact of international sanctions, economic isolation, and domestic capital controls. In that year, these factors resulted in a sharp decline in outward FDI volumes, a reconfiguration of its geographical and currency composition, and a weakening of the institutional foundation of Russia's global investment footprint.

The contraction in FDI was particularly marked during 2022. According to UNCTAD (2025c), Russia's outward FDI amounted to USD 11.5 billion—an 82% decline from 2021 and equivalent to 2.4% of GDP. Alternative assessments offer a less pronounced figure of USD 27.6 billion (Kheyfets, 2022), reflecting methodological differences, particularly in the treatment of reinvested earnings, intra-group transfers, and valuation adjustments (Lloyds Bank, 2025).

Throughout the same period, the downturn was accompanied by a significant reduction in corporate control over foreign assets and a sharp decline in new international ventures. For example, the number of Russian greenfield investment projects in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe dropped by 91% in 2022 (Intelligence fDi, 2023).

In parallel, in 2022, the structure of international settlement currencies shifted substantially due to Russia's disconnection from SWIFT and constraints on US dollar (USD) and euro (EUR) transactions. The share of the USD and EUR in Russia's export settlements fell from 87% to 48%, and from 65% to 48% in imports. In contrast, the Russian rouble (RUB) accounted for 34% of exports (up from 12%), while the Chinese yuan (CNY) rose from 0.5% to 16% in exports and from 4% to 23% in imports (Bank of Russia, 2023). These developments illustrate Russia's strategic effort to reduce reliance on Western financial infrastructure and expand the use of alternative currency frameworks.

During the same year, the capital outflow occurred alongside a record current account surplus of USD 236.1 billion and a significant expansion of the trade balance. However, these external surpluses did not lead to an accumulation of international reserves due to asset freezes and sanctions. According to the Bank of Russia, net private capital outflows reached USD 151 billion in 2022, with projections indicating a decline to USD 69 billion in 2023 and USD 24 billion in 2024 (Bank of Russia, 2024a). Alternative estimates place capital flight in 2022 at USD 232.2 billion, or 13.5% of GDP (Zhukov, 2023). The main channels included transfers to foreign accounts, emigration, changes in external trade financing, and investor withdrawal in response to political risk (RBC, 2023b). While portfolio and other passive outflows are typical during periods of financial instability, 2022 marked the first instance of a net outflow in direct investment—signalling a structural shift in Russia’s cross-border capital flows (Golovnin, 2023).

Analysis of mirror statistics from the IMF by Bulatov et al. (2024) shows that, by the end of 2022, Russia’s accumulated outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stood at USD 108 billion, a substantial share of which was associated with the overseas holdings of high-net-worth individuals.

In this context, the geographical reorientation of Russia’s outward FDI became particularly evident. Russian transnational corporations began adopting a selective strategy in 2022, focusing on countries with close political and geographic ties, including Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, and parts of Ukraine (Intelligence fDi, 2023). The global distribution of Russia’s outward investment underwent significant shifts as a result of growing geopolitical constraints.

Investment in developed economies declined sharply. In 2022, Russian FDI in the United States dropped to USD 420.8 million, compared to an average of USD 3.02 billion during 2010–2014—just 10.5% of its estimated potential. A similar trend was observed in Canada (2.3% of potential), the United Kingdom, Germany, and Finland, where Russian investment largely ceased. In several EU countries—such as Slovakia, Belgium, and Luxembourg—negative accumulated FDI values were recorded due to deoffshorisation measures and forced divestment.

Meanwhile, during the same period, investment activity remained elevated in jurisdictions with favourable corporate regimes. In Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Netherlands, actual Russian FDI volumes significantly exceeded estimated levels: 722% in Luxembourg, 411% in Ireland, and 255% in the Netherlands (Drapkin et al., 2023; Bulatov et al., 2024). These jurisdictions appear to serve as key intermediaries in the restructured outward FDI architecture.

Facing Western market restrictions in 2022, Russia increasingly redirected its outward FDI eastward. Investments in Asia tripled, and doubled in the Middle East, although these increases were insufficient to fully offset the sharp decline in Europe and North America. FDI in Africa and Latin America remained marginal, accounting for no more than 1% of estimated potential. Within Asia, relatively stable destinations included Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. A notable example is Iran, where Russia became the largest foreign investor in 2022, directing USD 2.8 billion primarily into oil and gas projects (Vedomosti, 2023).

In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries—particularly Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia—Russia’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2022 remained positive, though below potential levels. For instance, FDI in Kazakhstan reached only 15.7% of its estimated potential, according to Drapkin et al. (2023). In Belarus, Russian investment amounted to approximately USD 4 billion, while Belarusian investment in Russia totalled USD 5.5 billion. Despite the termination of 30 projects—mainly in Ukraine and other CIS states—the total volume of mutual investment between Russia and CIS countries rose by USD 300 million in the first half of 2022, reaching USD 44.6 billion (Kuznetsov et al., 2022).

In parallel with direct investment, capital outflows through other channels increased substantially throughout 2022. These included the mass opening of foreign accounts and restructuring of trade financing mechanisms—reflecting a combination of capital flight and business adaptation to sanctions and new transactional realities. Key destinations for these flows were Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Türkiye (Golovnin, 2023).

In response to the evolving geopolitical landscape in 2022, the sanctions regime prompted a structural realignment of Russia’s outward FDI. Investment in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries declined markedly, while flows toward the CIS, the UAE, and China increased, supporting the preservation and development of economic ties in less restricted regions (Kuznetsov, 2023).

Despite a contraction in new activity, by the end of 2022 Russia remained among the world's top thirty countries by accumulated outward FDI, with an estimated stock of USD 200–300 billion. It continued to maintain a significant presence in offshore jurisdictions—including Cyprus, the Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland—despite mounting regulatory risks and reputational exposure (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2025).

Taken together, these developments in 2022 marked a turning point in Russia's global investment trajectory. The contraction of investment in developed markets was accompanied by an eastward reallocation of capital, a growing reliance on regional partners, and heightened fragmentation of financial infrastructure. While new destinations such as the CIS, the Middle East, and select Asian markets gained importance, the overall level of realised investment potential remained low. FDI in Africa and Latin America accounted for no more than 1% of estimated capacity, while investment in the United States and the European Union fell to 10–35% of potential levels. In parallel, the currency structure of international settlements continued to shift in favor of the Russian rouble and the Chinese yuan.

Thus, the year 2022 can be viewed as the beginning of a long-term restructuring of Russia's outward FDI landscape, driven by sanctions-induced isolation and the search for alternative international partnerships and capital mobility formats.

### **3.2. 2023 — Adaptive Strategies and Diversion of Capital Flows**

In 2023, Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) demonstrated signs of limited recovery following the collapse of 2022, yet remained significantly below pre-2022 levels, reflecting the sustained impact of sanctions, geopolitical isolation, and structural disruption. According to UNCTAD (2025c), outward FDI reached USD 29.1 billion, equivalent to 0.5% of GDP, while alternative estimates suggest a slightly higher value of USD 29.7 billion (6.6% of GDP). These discrepancies stem from methodological variations, particularly in the treatment of reinvested earnings and the valuation of cross-border assets.

This modest upturn was partly driven by renewed transaction activity. During the first half of 2023, Russian companies' overseas acquisitions totalled USD 3.3 billion, exceeding annual figures recorded since 2018 (RBC, 2023c). This upward shift signalled tentative capital expansion, despite continued restrictions, including the suspension of cooperation with Euroclear and Clearstream, which limited settlement operations for Russian investors (Forbes, 2024).

Meanwhile, the currency reorientation of settlements—initiated in 2022—continued to deepen. According to Golovnin (2023), the share of transactions conducted in national currencies rose to 65%, an increase of nearly one-quarter year-on-year, and reached 70% in trade with key partner countries.

Macroeconomic indicators also reflected the ongoing restructuring of external flows. In 2023, the financial account surplus stood at approximately USD 51 billion, foreign asset accumulation continued (USD 44 billion), while the pace of liability reduction slowed (Bank of Russia, 2024a). Nonetheless, the overall trend remained one of net capital outflow, accompanied by a gradual adaptation of Russian businesses to new geoeconomic conditions. Investment activity was increasingly oriented toward countries that refrained from supporting sanctions, such as Kazakhstan, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Astrov, 2024). By the end of 2023, total capital outflows were estimated at USD 80 billion, reinforcing the picture of continued capital flight under geopolitical and macroeconomic pressures (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2025).

Despite modest improvements, Russia's international investment position remained under pressure. From early 2022 to mid-2023, external assets (excluding reserves) declined by USD 52 billion, driven by reductions in direct and portfolio investment, even as other investments—such as overseas deposits—grew, amounting to around USD 8 billion in just the first four months of 2023. At the same time, capital outflows declined nearly threefold compared to 2022, reflecting both administrative controls and changing balance of payments structures. Trade conditions deteriorated notably: the goods trade surplus contracted almost threefold, and the current account surplus fell nearly fivefold (Zhukov, 2023).

In this context, 2023 was marked by a further transformation of Russia's FDI geography. Adjustments in geographic allocation partially offset negative trends and revealed new points of expansion. Russian companies continued to reconfigure investment strategies, shifting from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),

“neutral” jurisdictions, and the Global South. Key destinations included China, the UAE, and several MENA states (Irwin-Hunt, 2024).

In the CIS and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia maintained its position as the dominant investor, accounting for over 80% of total mutual FDI within the bloc. These investments were primarily concentrated in extractive industries, logistics infrastructure, finance, and manufacturing. In 2023, 11 of 16 new EAEU investment projects, totalling USD 0.9 billion, were implemented by Russian entities (Eurasian Development Bank, 2023).

Kazakhstan emerged as a particularly active recipient of Russian investment. The number of companies with Russian capital rose by 70%, reaching 18,000. Major projects included hydrocarbon exploration and the construction of three thermal power plants with a combined capacity of 1 GW (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2024b). Along with Türkiye and the UAE, Kazakhstan became a key node in the redirected outward investment flows, following the effective cessation of activity in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Finland.

Further diversification occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Russia’s share of total FDI rose from 5% in 2020 to 12% in 2023, with a shift towards infrastructure and energy services projects offering high return predictability (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2025). In Egypt, accumulated Russian FDI exceeded USD 2 billion, driven by Rosneft and Lukoil’s participation in major energy ventures (Eurasian Development Bank, 2023).

In Latin America, Russian investment activity remained largely mediated through offshore and international structures. One high-profile case was the acquisition of a sulphide nickel mine in Santa Rita and a copper mine in Serrote, Brazil, by ACG Acquisition (a London-based firm linked to Russian investors) in a deal valued at approximately USD 1 billion. These assets were later consolidated into the portfolio of Appian Capital (Alipova, 2023).

Nevertheless, the overall level of realised investment potential in these regions remained low. Outward FDI to Africa and Latin America accounted for less than 1% of estimated potential, underscoring structural and geopolitical barriers to expansion (Drapkin et al., 2023).

In summary, 2023 was characterised by partial recovery in outward FDI, driven by isolated transactions and targeted expansion in specific jurisdictions. However, overall investment activity remained well below its former scale and structurally constrained. The geographic distribution reflected a continued pivot away from developed markets in favor of CIS countries, Asia, the MENA region, and the Global South. These reconfigurations occurred under sustained sanction pressure and a fragmented financial environment, limiting Russia’s integration in the global FDI system.

At the same time, this transition opened new avenues for engagement. Russian businesses pursued alternative transaction channels, de-dollarisation strategies, and greater reliance on rouble- and yuan-denominated settlements. As a result, 2023 laid the groundwork for a broader restructuring of Russia’s external investment strategy.

### **3.3. 2024 — From Evasion to Optimization: Capital Management Abroad**

In 2024, Russia’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) continued to follow a downward, structurally transformed trajectory, shaped by the cumulative effects of international sanctions, geopolitical tensions, and the progressive reconfiguration of external economic relations. Despite the persistence of a positive financial account balance of 48 billion USD, the stock of external assets increased by USD 56 billion, indicating a continued strategy of capital risk diversification and preservation of foreign buffers through asset placement abroad. At the same time, external liabilities rose by USD 8.6 billion for the first time since the onset of the crisis, surpassing asset growth in Q4 2024 and resulting in a negative financial account balance in that quarter (Bank of Russia, 2024a).

According to official international investment data, this year confirmed the weakening of the FDI segment. By the end of 2024, the volume of Russian outward FDI had declined to USD 11.7 billion (2.3% of GDP) (UNCTAD, 2025c). According to CEIC Data (2024), net FDI outflows showed a downward quarterly trend, with USD 1.2 billion in Q3 2024 (down from USD 2.2 billion in Q2), demonstrating the erosion of external investment momentum. Cumulative capital outflows for the first three quarters of 2024 amounted to approximately USD 44 billion, adding to USD 80 billion in 2023 and USD 138 billion in 2022. This

continued pressure on foreign investment flows reflects a broader environment of isolation and financial fragmentation.

Geographically, the structure of Russian FDI remained reoriented: investors increasingly avoided OECD jurisdictions and redirected flows toward countries not participating in sanctions—such as China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—pursuing both strategic continuity and tactical circumvention of external restrictions (Interfax, 2025).

This reconfiguration is also reflected in quarterly investment behaviour. According to the Bank of Russia (2024b), the distribution of investments by quarter was: – USD 2.23 billion (Q1), – USD 2.15 billion (Q2), – USD 2.01 billion (Q3), and + USD 1.83 billion (Q4), resulting in an annual net outflow of – USD 4.55 billion. This indicates an overall contraction in direct investment assets abroad, despite the partial recovery in the final quarter of the year. Russia's international investment position under the category "Direct Investment – Assets" fell from USD 279.9 billion (as of 1 October 2024) to USD 272.3 billion (as of 1 January 2025), reflecting a net decline of USD 7.6 billion, and signalling investor withdrawal and asset repositioning.

In parallel, the erosion of traditional channels led to further disengagement from Western economies. Between April 2022 and March 2024, only 18 new FDI projects were announced in OECD countries—less than half the figure recorded at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and merely 20% of the pre-pandemic average (Irwin-Hunt, 2024). Russia's exit from these markets was not absolute, however, as new forms of engagement began to emerge. For instance, in December 2024, Nornickel and China's Xiamen C&D initiated talks on a joint venture in Shandong Province, focusing on copper concentrate processing and the potential expansion to nickel and platinum group metals (PGMs) (Devitt and Lv, 2024).

Alongside conventional FDI, some investment niches demonstrated resilience. The venture capital segment, for example, showed moderate growth: in the first half of 2024, Russian venture investments reached USD 46 million, exceeding the same period in 2023 by 31%. Private investors accounted for 45% of deals and 48% of investment volume (B1 Group, 2024). Commercial real estate investments abroad also persisted, serving both diversification and immigration goals, with yields ranging from 5% to 9% annually. Spain, Türkiye, and Thailand emerged as the most popular destinations (Commercial Real Estate, 2024b).

In monetary terms, further de-dollarisation of settlements occurred. The share of the US dollar and euro in export settlements dropped to 18.6%, while the rouble and currencies of "friendly" states gained dominance. Notably, rouble settlements in trade with Europe reached 60.3% (up 11 percentage points from 2023), while the share of the rouble in import settlements increased to 46.1% (up 15.9 percentage points year-on-year) (RBC, 2024; RBC, 2025).

Thus, by the end of 2024, Russia's outward FDI had entered a stage of selective adaptation and partial stabilisation, albeit at a reduced scale. Investment activity in OECD countries remained subdued, while new deals in China and BRICS nations gained momentum. Venture capital, real estate, and joint ventures emerged as new formats of cross-border engagement, supported by growing use of rouble-based transactions and a shift away from traditional Western financial infrastructure. However, the overall volume of international investment activity remained significantly below pre-crisis levels, pointing to a narrowing of Russia's geographical scope and weakening institutional capacity to project capital globally.

Cumulatively, over the three-year period, the accumulated stock of outward FDI declined from USD 299.1 billion to USD 230.0 billion, with an 11.5% drop registered in 2024 alone. These reductions in flow and stock reflect not only persistent macroeconomic and geopolitical pressures, but also a strategic reorientation of Russian businesses under elevated uncertainty (UNCTAD, 2025c).

In terms of regional breakdown, Russian companies in 2024 pursued targeted capital reallocations, concentrating on the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), China, and selected countries of the Global South. Outward FDI increasingly took the form of equity participation in firms and funds located in jurisdictions less affected by restrictions.

Within the EAEU, Russia retained a dominant investment position. In the first half of 2024, Russian investments in partner countries reached USD 1.712 billion, accounting for 86.2% of all mutual investment within the bloc (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2024a). Kazakhstan remained the principal recipient, attracting USD 1.028 billion (52.1% of the total), followed by Belarus (USD 561.7 million), Kyrgyzstan (USD 87.3 million), and Armenia (USD 35.9 million). These flows were largely directed to oil and gas, logistics

infrastructure, and financial services, reflecting Russia's broader strategy of strengthening Eurasian integration.

Beyond the EAEU, Russian outward investment activity remained limited. New project announcements in OECD countries in 2024 amounted to only 45.7% of their 2023 volume (Cheng et al., 2025; Eurasian Economic Commission, 2024a), reflecting a continued decline in greenfield activity. In the first half of 2024, Russia recorded a net outward FDI flow of – USD 1.411 billion, contrasting with a positive balance in the same period of 2023 (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2024a).

Asia continued to emerge as a priority. In December 2024, Norilsk Nickel deepened cooperation with Xiamen C&D to launch a joint venture in Shandong Province for copper processing—part of a broader trend of supply chain relocation amid technological restrictions and the exit of Western equipment suppliers (Devitt and Lv, 2024). Despite limited presence in African and Latin American markets, Russian capital maintained some exposure via offshore and partnership mechanisms, though large-scale expansion in these regions remained elusive due to ongoing sanctions and high risk levels.

In conclusion, outward FDI from Russia in 2024 remained modest in scale but demonstrated a clear qualitative shift. Capital was increasingly allocated to the CIS, EAEU, China, and select Global South countries. In the context of sanctions, financial fragmentation, and geopolitical tension, Russian companies adopted more flexible and regionally embedded investment strategies, relying on new financial channels and rouble-based transactions. The decline in institutional resilience was offset in part by growing engagement with alternative markets, particularly in Asia, and stronger reliance on regional integration mechanisms. These developments point to Russia's gradual transition toward a new architecture of international investment—one built on cautious diversification, strategic adaptation, and the formation of alternative channels of global economic engagement under protracted isolation.

### **3.4. 2025 — Continued Reallocation to Friendly Jurisdictions (Q1 Trends)**


In the first quarter of 2025, Russia's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) remained modest in volume but demonstrated a structurally adaptive trajectory, shaped by persistent geopolitical tensions and the further tightening of sanctions targeting financial institutions, logistics chains, and cross-border settlement systems. The financial account registered a moderate surplus of USD 13.3 billion—a significant decrease compared to the same period in 2024—indicating a decline in overall foreign economic activity, even as transaction balances remained in positive territory (Bank of Russia, 2024a).

Foreign asset accumulation continued to dominate the capital flow structure, with Russian residents increasing their external holdings by USD 18.4 billion. At the same time, external liabilities grew by USD 5.1 billion, marking a departure from the previously dominant pattern of net deleveraging. This transition toward a more balanced external position—combining cautious liability growth with sustained asset accumulation—suggests the emergence of a dual-track investment strategy (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2025).

In response to intensified sanctions and institutional constraints, Russian FDI flows continued to reallocate geographically. Investment was increasingly channelled into Asian and African destinations, consistent with the broader strategic shift toward diversification and financial risk mitigation. This reorientation reflects efforts to develop new partnerships and circumvent vulnerabilities in the global payment architecture. The depreciation of the rouble during this period further contributed to the nominal increase in the value of foreign assets when measured in rouble terms, thereby supporting the outward investment volume despite exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic pressures.

Taken together, these trends suggest that as of early 2025, Russia continues to recalibrate its outward FDI strategy in response to evolving external constraints. The emerging profile of international investment is more balanced and regionally reoriented, with a sustained emphasis on Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. At the same time, Russia's disengagement from traditional Western markets persists, reflecting the long-term impact of sanctions and international isolation. While overall investment activity remains below pre-crisis benchmarks, the structure of outward FDI is increasingly shaped by selective adaptation, institutional resilience in alternative markets, and gradual alignment with new geopolitical realities.

**Figure 6. Shifts in the Geography of Russian Outward FDI Before and After 2022**



Sources: UNCTAD (2024, 2025), Eurasian Economic Commission (2025); fDi Intelligence (2024).

*Note: This visualization is approximate and intended to illustrate general trends in the redirection of Russian outward foreign direct investment after 2022.*

Since 2022, Russian outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has shifted from a model of large-scale global expansion to a more adaptive and regionally focused strategy, centred on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), China, and selected jurisdictions of the Global South. This transformation occurred in the context of sanctions-driven isolation, financial fragmentation, and restricted access to Western financial and investment infrastructure. As a result, capital outflows declined by more than half compared to pre-crisis levels, accompanied by a persistent downward trend in investment activity across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union (EU) countries.

In parallel, Russia underwent a pronounced currency reorientation in its international transactions, marked by a growing share of rouble- and yuan-denominated operations and the progressive development of cooperation through alternative financial channels. This trend was reinforced by long-term geopolitical tensions, which led to the relocation and localisation of assets in friendly jurisdictions. At the same time, Russia continued to support mutual investment flows within the EAEU, where it accounted for over 80% of total cross-border investment volumes.

Taken together, these developments indicate that Russian outward FDI has evolved into a tool of constrained adaptation to the fragmented global economic environment. While it continues to serve as a mechanism for diversifying currency, legal, and logistical risks, its overall geographical footprint has narrowed, and institutional resilience has weakened amid prolonged sanctions-induced isolation and declining access to international capital markets.

## 4. Conclusions

Following the onset of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russian outward foreign direct investment (FDI) underwent a profound transformation amid unprecedented international isolation, currency restrictions, and the reshaping of the global economic architecture. These conditions prompted a re-evaluation of the role of cross-border investment in national strategy, turning outward FDI from an instrument of global expansion into a mechanism of adaptation to external shocks and sanctions pressure.

According to data from UNCTAD, OECD, and the Bank of Russia, the volume of Russian outward FDI declined by more than half compared to pre-war levels. This contraction was accompanied by rising transaction costs, reduced liquidity, and increasing complexity in the management of foreign assets, which collectively heightened the sensitivity of investment activity to geopolitical risks.

A radical geographical reconfiguration took place: operations in unfriendly jurisdictions largely ceased—except for the management of residual assets—while priority shifted to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. In these regions, relatively

stable partnerships persisted, often supported by settlements in national currencies and the use of alternative financial channels. The most active sectors included energy, logistics, and metallurgy, primarily implemented through joint ventures and localisation of production chains.

The structural composition of FDI also changed. The share of reinvested earnings and intra-group financing increased, while new mergers, acquisitions, and greenfield investments in high-risk jurisdictions declined sharply. Companies prioritised the consolidation of existing assets and the construction of sanctions-resilient supply chains, increasingly relying on rouble-based transactions, swap arrangements, and barter mechanisms.

At the institutional level, Russia tightened its capital regulation regime. A series of measures—ranging from mandatory sale of foreign currency earnings to restrictions on cross-border payments and dividend transfers—were introduced to stabilise the domestic currency market and reduce illicit capital flight. While these measures contributed to short-term macroeconomic stability, they also fragmented financial flows and increased the costs associated with outward investment.

At the same time, the suspension of detailed official reporting—especially by the Bank of Russia—has complicated the statistical assessment of FDI dynamics. Analysts are now forced to rely on balance of payments aggregates, mirror statistics from partner countries, and international databases. This demands heightened caution in interpretation and a careful consideration of methodological divergences.

The fragmentation of the global sanctions regime and the rise of protectionism have contributed to the emergence of a new investment architecture, in which FDI increasingly serves geopolitical functions. Russian companies have intensified cooperation with partners in the Global South, created new logistical corridors, and localised value chains in jurisdictions with favourable regulatory environments. This shift reflects a broader departure from liberal investment models towards nationally driven geoeconomic strategies.

Despite the overall decline in volumes, efforts to retain control over strategic foreign assets—especially in the energy and raw materials sectors—remain a key priority. Investment strategies are being recalibrated through targeted partnerships with China, India, the UAE, and other countries, supported by institutional mechanisms such as bilateral investment protection agreements and new risk mitigation instruments. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms remains limited in the context of ongoing sanctions and geopolitical uncertainty.

Going forward, comprehensive research is required to evaluate the long-term consequences of this structural shift. Areas of particular interest include the impact of sanctions on corporate competitiveness, the resilience of retained foreign assets, and the ability of Russian firms to integrate into the reconfigured global financial system. Further study is also needed to assess the role of national currencies in cross-border investment and the emergence of alternative partnership formats.

In summary, since 2022, Russian outward FDI has transitioned from a model of global expansion to one of selective adaptation under external constraint. This transformation has involved a narrowing of geographical focus, a reorganisation of financial structures, and a growing role for state regulation. Taken together, these shifts mark a long-term repositioning of Russia in the global investment system, shaped not by market opportunities, but by the imperatives of resilience, risk avoidance, and strategic alignment with a new set of international partners.

## References

- Aiyar, S., Chen, J., Ebeke, C.H., Garcia-Saltos, R., Gudmundsson, T., ... and Trevino, J.P. (2023) 'Goeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism', International Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Notes, 15 January. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400229046.006>
- Alipova, E. (2023) 'ACG Acquisition Artema Volynetsa kupit dva brazíl'skikh rudnika za \$1 mlrd' [ACG Acquisition of Artem Volynets to buy two Brazilian mines for \$1 billion]. Rusbeis, 12 June. Available at: <https://rb.ru/news/acg-acquisition/> (Accessed: 17 July 2025)
- Andreff, W. (2016) 'Outward Foreign Direct Investment from BRIC countries: Comparing strategies of Brazilian, Russian, Indian and Chinese multinational companies', The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 12(2), p. 79. Available at: <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01342391> (Accessed: 17 July 2025)
- Arutyunyan, S.A., Solovyeva, N.V., Galyaev, E.R. and Vasilieva, O.V. (2024) 'Issledovanie dvizheniya kapitala v stranakh EAES' [Study of capital flows in the EAEU countries], Journal of Economics, Entrepreneurship and Law, 14(10), pp.5867–5886. doi:<https://doi.org/10.18334/epp.14.10.121862>
- Astrov, V. (2024) 'Foreign Capital in Russia: Taking Stock after Two Years of War', The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw), Russia Monitor, 5. Available at: <https://wiiw.ac.at/p-6898.html> (Accessed: 17 July 2025)
- B1 Group (2024) 'Venchurnaya Evraziya: Itogi pervogo polugodiya 2024 goda' [Venture Eurasia: Results of the First Half of 2024]. Available at: <https://b1.ru/analytics/b1-dsight-venture-eurasia-results-1h-2024-review/> (Accessed: 17 July 2025)
- Bank of Russia (2023) 'Obzor riskov finansovykh rynkov' [Review of Financial Market Risks]. Information and Analytical Material. Available at: [https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43828/ORFR\\_2023-02.pdf](https://www.cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43828/ORFR_2023-02.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025)
- Bank of Russia (2024a) 'Platezhnyj balans Rossiyskoy Federatsii, IV kvartal 2024 goda' [Russia's Balance of Payments 2024 Q4]. Available at: [https://www.cbr.ru/collection/collection/file/55058/balance\\_of\\_payments\\_2024-4\\_21.pdf](https://www.cbr.ru/collection/collection/file/55058/balance_of_payments_2024-4_21.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025)
- Bank of Russia (2024b) 'Platezhnyj balans, mezhdunarodnaya investitsionnaya pozitsiya i vneshnij dolg Rossiyskoy Federatsii v IV kvartale 2024 goda' [Balance of Payments, International Investment Position, and External Debt of the Russian Federation in Q4 2024]. Available at: [https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/macro\\_itm/external\\_sector/pb/p\\_balance/](https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/macro_itm/external_sector/pb/p_balance/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Bank of Russia (2025) 'Nakoplennye ostatki po pryamym investitsiyam Rossiyskoy Federatsii po instrumentam pryamykh investitsiy' [Cumulative positions on Russia's direct investment instruments] [Data set]. Available at: [https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/statistics/credit\\_statistics/direct\\_investment/22-dir\\_inv.xlsx](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/statistics/credit_statistics/direct_investment/22-dir_inv.xlsx) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Broner, F., Didier, T., Schmukler, S.L. and Von Peter, G. (2023) 'Bilateral international investments: The big sur?' Journal of International Economics, 145, 103795. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103795>
- Bulatov, A.S., Galishcheva, N.V., Kuznecov, A.V., Kalashnikov, D.B., Petrov, M.V., Perceva, S.Y. and Rebrey, S.M. (2024) 'Rossiya v mezhdunarodnom dvizhenii kapitala v 2021 – nachale 2023 goda. Analiticheskij doklad' [Russia in international capital flows in 2021—Early 2023: Analytical report]. MGIMO University Press. Available at: <https://is.gd/GOjQRN> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Burmester, B. and Scott-Kennel, J. (2019) 'Hide and seek: Evasion and search as FDI motivation', Critical Perspectives on International Business, 15(4), pp. 273–295. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1108/cpoib-07-2018-0064>
- CEIC Data (2024) 'Russia Direct Investment Abroad, 1994–2025'. 1 September. Available at: <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/russia/direct-investment-abroad> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- CELIS (2025) 'Geopolitical challenges beyond the European Union: The evolution of FDI screening mechanisms and the quest for European security'. CELIS Institute, 7 April. Available at: <https://www.celis.institute/celis-blog/geopolitical-challenges-beyond-the-european-union/> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Cheng, C.H., Konovalov, O. and Plekhanov, A. (2025) 'Connector economies in a fragmenting world'. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Available at: <https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/publications/economics/working-papers/connector-economies-fragmenting-world.html> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Commercial Real Estate (2024a) 'V nashu gavan' zakhodili: Kak izmenyayutsya starye i novye "tikhiye gavani" dlya rossiyskikh investorov' [Old and new "safe havens" for Russian investors: What is changing]. [CRE.ru](https://cre.ru), 25 June. Available at: <https://cre.ru/news/95335> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Commercial Real Estate (2024b) 'Investory potyanulis' za rubezh' [Investors are heading abroad]. [CRE.ru](https://cre.ru), 28 June. Available at: <https://cre.ru/analytics/95367> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Devitt, P. and Lv, A. (2024) 'Exclusive: Nornickel in talks with Xiamen C&D to shift copper smelting to China'. Reuters, 19 December. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/nornickel-talks-with-xiamen-cd-shift-copper-smelting-china-2024-12-19/> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Drapkin, I.M., Fedyunina, A.A. and Simachev, Y.V. (2023) 'Unrealized opportunities: Exploring Russia's untapped OFDI potentials amidst economic sanctions'. Russian Journal of Economics, 9(2), pp.134–157. doi: <https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.9.104661>
- Eurasian Development Bank (2023) 'Monitoring vzaimnykh investitsij EABR' [Monitoring of mutual investments of the EDB]. Available at: [https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/82b/EDB\\_2023\\_Report-5\\_Monitoring-of-Mutual-Investments\\_rus.pdf](https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/82b/EDB_2023_Report-5_Monitoring-of-Mutual-Investments_rus.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Eurasian Economic Commission (2024a) 'Vzaimnye investitsii' [Mutual investments]. Available at: [https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dep\\_stat/union\\_stat/current\\_stat/payment\\_balance/express/express\\_mut\\_investments.php](https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dep_stat/union_stat/current_stat/payment_balance/express/express_mut_investments.php) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Eurasian Economic Commission (2024b) 'Godovoj doklad za 2023 god' [Annual report for 2023]. Available at: [https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dep\\_makroec\\_pol/makroekonomicheskie-doklady/](https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dep_makroec_pol/makroekonomicheskie-doklady/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Eurasian Economic Commission (2025) 'Godovoj doklad za 2024 god' [Annual report for 2024]. Available at: [https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dep\\_makroec\\_pol/makroekonomicheskie-doklady/](https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dep_makroec_pol/makroekonomicheskie-doklady/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- European Commission (2023) 'European economic security strategy'. Available at: <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/european-economic-security-strategy> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- European Commission (2024a) 'New initiatives to strengthen economic security'. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_24\\_363](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_363) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- European Commission (2024b) 'White Paper on Outbound Investments'. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0024> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- European Commission (2025) 'Decision by the President of the Commission on the establishment of a Commissioners' Project Group on Startups and Scaleups'. Available at: <https://polit-x.de/en/documents/20165023/europa/english/european-commission/directorate-general/decision-by-the-president-of-the-commission-2025-02-18-decision-of-the-president-of-the-european-commission-of-712025-on-the-establishment-of-a-commissioners-project-group-on-startups-and-scaleups> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Forbes (2024) 'Nespravedlivo zamorozheny: Zachem rossijskie investory pishut peticii v ES' ['Unfairly frozen': Why Russian investors are petitioning the EU]. [Forbes.ru](https://forbes.ru), 26 November. Available at: <https://www.forbes.ru/investicii/525823-nespravedlivo-zamorozeny-zacem-rossijskie-investory-pisut-peticii-v-es> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- Frank Media (2025) 'TsB raskryl dannye o razmorozhennykh v 2024 godu aktivakh rossijskikh investorov' [The Bank of Russia disclosed data on unfrozen Russian investors' assets in 2024]. Frank Media, 20 February. Available at: <https://frankmedia.ru/192962> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Gammeltoft, P. and Kokko, A. (2013) 'Introduction: Outward foreign direct investment from emerging economies and national development strategies: three regimes', *International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development*, 6(1/2), pp. 1–16. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJTLID.2013.051695>
- Gerdo, A.E. (2024) 'Problemy vyyavleniya aktual'noj statisticheskoy informatsii o pryamykh inostrannykh investitsiyakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 2024 godu' [Problems of acquisition the actual statistical data on Russian foreign direct investment in 2024]. [Bulletin of the Altai Academy of Economics and Law], 3(12), pp. 382–388. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.17513/vaael.3931>
- Golovnin, M. Yu. (2023) 'Rossiyskiy finansovyy sektor v menyayushcheyseya mirovoy finansovoy sisteme' [Russian financial sector in changing international financial system]. *Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia*, 241, 1, pp. 129–138. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.38197/2072-2060-2023-241-3-129-138>
- Gopinath, G., Gourinchas, P.-O., Presbitero, A. F. and Topalova, P. (2024) 'Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?', *IMF Working Paper*, 5 April. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/04/05/Changing-Global-Linkages-A-New-Cold-War-547357> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Grachev, E. and Anaseva, O. (2025) 'Rezidentskiy polk: Chislo firm v "rossijskikh ofshorakh" vyroslo v 1.5 raza' [Resident regiment: Number of firms in "Russian offshore zones" increased 1.5 times]. *Izvestiya*, 16 January. Available at: <https://iz.ru/1822844/evgenii-grachev-olga-anaseva/rezidentskiy-polk-chislo-firm-v-rossijskih-ofshorah-vyroslo-v-15-raza> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- IMF (2009) 'Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6)'. International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/bpm6.pdf> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- IMF (2025a) 'Direct Investment Positions by Counterpart Economy (formerly CDIS)'. International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA:DIP> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- IMF (2025b) 'Integrated Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM7)'. International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Data/Statistics/BPM6/draft-bpm7-wcv.ashx> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Intelligence fDi (2023) 'The world's top FDI source countries'. *fDi Intelligence*, 16 August. Available at: <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/48ab9035-663e-55fe-8d14-15015eff00f6> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Interfax (2025) 'Nakoplennye ostatki vkhodyashchikh pryamyh investitsiy v ekonomiku Rossii snizilis' na \$29.8 mlrd' [Accumulated inflows of FDI into Russia's economy dropped by \$29.8 billion]. *Interfax.ru*, 11 April. Available at: <https://www.interfax.ru/business/1020440> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Irwin-Hunt, A. (2024) 'Russian outward FDI goes sanctions-jumping into non-OECD countries'. *fDi Intelligence*, 22 May. Available at: <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/f52bf4c5-3ef0-5774-965a-06174f445ef0> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Kazantseva, E. G. (2024) 'Obespechenie natsional'noj bezopasnosti pri vvoze i vyvoze pryamyh inostrannykh investitsij' [Ensuring national security in the import and export of foreign direct investments]. *Economic Security*, 7(6), 1589–1608. <https://doi.org/10.18334/ecsec.7.6.121214>
- Kheyfets, B. A. (2022) 'Vyvoz kapitala i deofshorizatsiya rossiyskoy ekonomiki v usloviyakh novoy real'nosti' [Capital outflow and deoffshorization of the Russian economy in the new reality]. *Economic Security*, 5(3), 835–852. <https://doi.org/10.18334/ecsec.5.3.114878>
- Klochko, O. (2023) 'New Approaches to FDI Policy: Initiatives of the World's Largest Countries and Lessons for Russia'. *The Contemporary World Economy Journal*. Available at: <https://cwejournal.hse.ru/index.php/cwejournal/oklochko-3-2023> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- Kuznetsov, A. V. (2022) 'Pryamye investitsii iz Rossii v strany Latinskoj Ameriki' [Russian direct investment in countries of Latin America]. Urgent Problems of Europe, 3, pp. 254–269. <https://doi.org/10.31249/ape/2022.03.11>
- Kuznetsov, A. V. (2023) 'Eksport i import pryamykh investitsiy: Istoriya krupnykh rossiyskikh poter' s nachala XX veka' [Export and import of direct investments: A history of major Russian losses since the early 20th century]. Problemy prognozirovaniya, 4, pp. 32–41. <https://doi.org/10.47711/0868-6351-199-32-41>
- Kuznetsov, A.V., Vinokurov, E., Malakhov, A. and Zabojev, A. (2022) 'EDB Monitoring of Mutual Investments 2022'. Social Science Research Network, Scholarly Paper No. 4351707. Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4351707> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Kvashnina, I. (2020) 'Osobennosti regulirovaniya v Rossii pryamykh inostrannykh investitsiy' [The specific features of foreign direct investment regulation in Russia]. Society and Economy, 10, 85. <https://doi.org/10.31857/S020736760012167-2>
- Leino, T. and Gavrilovic, M. (2025,) 'Foreign direct investment increased to a record \$41 trillion'. IMF Blog, 20 February. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/02/20/foreign-direct-investment-increased-to-a-record-41-trillion> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Liuhto, K. and Majuri, S.S. (2014) 'Outward foreign direct investment from Russia: A literature review'. Journal of East-West Business, 20(4), pp. 198–224. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10669868.2014.967434>
- Liuhto, K. and Vahtra, P. (2007) 'Foreign operations of Russia's largest industrial corporations—Building a typology'. Transnational Corporations, 16(1), pp.117–144. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228339005\\_Foreign\\_operations\\_of\\_Russia's\\_largest\\_industrial\\_corporations\\_-\\_Building\\_a\\_typology](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228339005_Foreign_operations_of_Russia's_largest_industrial_corporations_-_Building_a_typology) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Lloyds Bank (2025) 'Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia'. Available at: <https://www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market-potential/russia/investment> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Mohanty, S., Sethi, N. and Dash, D.P. (2024) 'What determines outward FDI in developing blocs? A new empirical comparative macroeconomic perspective of post 1990s', Heliyon, 10(23), e40320. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e40320>
- Nelson, R.M. (2017) 'U.S. Sanctions and Russia's Economy', Congressional Research Service, 17 February. Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43895> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- OECD (2023) 'FDI in Figures, April 2023'. Policy brief. Available at: [https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figure-april-2023\\_c9e79ec4-en.html](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figure-april-2023_c9e79ec4-en.html) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- OECD (2024a) 'FDI in Figures, October 2024'. Policy brief. Available at: [https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figures-october-2024\\_fc9c2fb2-en.html](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figures-october-2024_fc9c2fb2-en.html) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- OECD (2024b) 'New OECD FDI data: Trends, impacts and regulations'. Blog, 6 November. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/blogs/2024/11/oecd-fdi-data-impacts-regulation.html> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- OECD (2025a) 'FDI Main Aggregates, BMD4'. Available at: [https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&df\[ds\]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df\[id\]=DSD\\_FDI%40DF\\_FDI\\_AGGR\\_SUMM&df\[ag\]=OECD.DAF.INV&dq=.T\\_FA\\_F.USD\\_EXC%2BRC.....Q.&lom=LASTNPERIODS&lo=5&to\[TIME\\_PERIOD\]=false](https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_FDI%40DF_FDI_AGGR_SUMM&df[ag]=OECD.DAF.INV&dq=.T_FA_F.USD_EXC%2BRC.....Q.&lom=LASTNPERIODS&lo=5&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- OECD (2025b) 'FDI in Figures'. Available at: [https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figures-april-2025\\_d5a76fd0-en.html](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figures-april-2025_d5a76fd0-en.html) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- RBC (2023a) 'Chto proiskhodit s zamorozhennymi aktivami rossiyskikh investorov' [What is happening with frozen assets of Russian investors]. RBC, 1 April. Available at: <https://pro.rbc.ru/demo/6422e93b9a794768e618b2b3> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- RBC (2023b) 'Eksperty nazvali chetyre osnovnykh kanala rekordnogo ottoka kapitala' [Experts named four main channels of record capital outflow]. RBC, 9 August. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/economics/09/08/2023/64d2189a9a794772654b1a2a> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- RBC (2023c) 'Kak rossiyskie kompanii rekordno kupili aktivov za rubezhom' [How Russian companies made record foreign acquisitions]. RBC, 19 August. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/finances/19/08/2023/64db88259a794739d2934480> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- RBC (2023d) 'Kreml' reshil ne raskryvat' kompanii, kotorye obyazali prodavat' valyutu' [The Kremlin decided not to disclose companies obliged to sell foreign currency]. RBC, 12 October. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/economics/12/10/2023/6527fe199a79471733daa981> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- RBC (2024) 'Dolya rublya pri raschetakh za import s Aziey podnyalas' vyshe 40%' [The share of the ruble in imports from Asia rose above 40%]. RBC, 16 November. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/finances/16/11/2024/673768959a7947856b961c93> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- RBC (2025) 'Raschety v dollarakh i evro za eksport iz Rossii sokratilis' do antirekorda' [Payments in dollars and euros for Russian exports dropped to a record low]. RBC, 18 February. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/finances/18/02/2025/67b359bd9a79475c9577fc52> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Federation (2011) 'Federal'nyj zakon ot 18.07.2011 No 227-FZ 'O vnesenii izmenenij v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v svyazi s sovershenstvovaniem printsipov opredeleniya tsen dlya tselej nalogooblozheniya' [Federal Law No. 227-FZ of 18 July 2011 "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Improvement of the Principles of Price Determination for Tax Purposes"]. Available at: <https://base.garant.ru/12188087/> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Federation (2017) 'Federal'nyj zakon ot 27.11.2017 No 340-FZ 'O vnesenii izmenenij v chast' pervuyu Nalogovogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii v svyazi s realizatsiej mezhdunarodnogo avtomaticheskogo obmena informatsiej i dokumentatsiej po mezhdunarodnym gruppam kompaniy' [Federal Law No. 340-FZ of 27 November 2017 "On Amendments to Part One of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Implementation of International Automatic Exchange of Information and Documentation on Multinational Enterprises"]. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_283498/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_283498/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Federation (2018) 'Federal'nyj zakon ot 03.08.2018 No 291-FZ 'O spetsial'nykh administrativnykh rajonakh na territoriyakh Kaliningradskoj oblasti i Primorskogo kraja' [Federal Law No. 291-FZ of 3 August 2018 "On Special Administrative Regions in the Territories of the Kaliningrad Region and the Primorsky Territory"]. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_304082/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_304082/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Federation (2022) 'Federal'nyj zakon ot 16.04.2022 No 114-FZ 'O vnesenii izmenenij v Federal'nyj zakon "Ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh" i otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii' [Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 16 April 2022 "On Amendments to the Federal Law 'On Joint Stock Companies' and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation"]. Available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202204160023> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Federation (2023a) 'Federal'nyj zakon ot 04.08.2023 'Ob osobennostyakh regulirovaniya korporativnykh otnoshenij v khozyajstvennykh obshchestvakh, yavlyayushchikhsya ekonomicheski znachimymi organizatsiyami' [Federal Law of 4 August 2023 "On the Specifics of Regulating Corporate Relations in Business Companies that are Economically Significant Organisations"]. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_454043/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_454043/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Federation (2023b) 'Federal'nyj zakon ot 04.08.2023 No 422-FZ "O vnesenii izmenenij v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Federal Law No. 422-FZ of 4 August 2023 "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation"]. Available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202308040014> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- Russian Government (2022) 'Perechen' inostrannykh gosudarstv i territorij, sovershayushchikh v otnoshenii Rossiyskoy Federatsii, rossiyskikh yuridicheskikh lits i fizicheskikh lits nedruzhestvennyye dejstviya [List of Foreign States and Territories Taking Unfriendly Actions Against the Russian Federation, Russian Legal Entities and Individuals]. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_411064/e8730c96430f0f246299a0cb7e5b27193f98fdaa/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_411064/e8730c96430f0f246299a0cb7e5b27193f98fdaa/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Russian Government (2023) 'Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii "O vnesenii izmenenij v nekotorye akty Pravitel'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii" ot 14.11.2023 No 1911 [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On Amendments to Certain Acts of the Government of the Russian Federation" No. 1911 of 14 November 2023]. Available at: <http://government.ru/docs/all/150587/> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- TASS (2022) 'Pravkomissiya s 10 iyunya otmenila trebovanie o prodazhe 50% valyutnoy vyruchki' [From 10 June, the Government Commission abolished the requirement to sell 50% of foreign exchange earnings]. TASS, 10 June. Available at: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14879299> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Tcyrempilova, S., Ertugrul, C., Hegedűs, M., Ali, M. D., Dávid, L. D. and Magda, R. (2024) 'Evaluation of Russian OFDI based on balance of payments and OECD data (before COVID-19)', Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development, 8(6), p. 3717. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i6.3717>
- The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2019) 'Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union'. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj/eng> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- The International and Comparative Law Research Center (2024) 'Mezhdunarodnye investitsionnye soglasheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii: Kratkiy obzor' [International Investment Agreements of the Russian Federation: A Brief Overview]. Available at: <https://iclr.ru/ru/publications/100> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- The President of the United States (2023) 'Addressing United States investments in certain national security technologies and products in countries of concern'. Federal Register, 11 August. Available at: <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/11/2023-17449/addressing-united-states-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2017) 'Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 13.05.2017 g. № 208 "O Strategii ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2030 goda" [Presidential Decree No. 208 of 13 May 2017 'On the Economic Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2030']. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41921> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2022a) 'Ukaz Prezidenta RF "O primenenii spetsial'nykh ekonomicheskikh mer v svyazi s nedruzhestvennymi deystviyami Soedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki i primknvshikh k nim inostrannykh gosudarstv i mezhdunarodnykh organizatsiy" [Presidential Decree 'On the Application of Special Economic Measures in Connection with Unfriendly Actions of the United States of America and Allied Foreign States and International Organizations']. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_410417/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410417/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2022b) 'Ukaz Prezidenta RF "O dopolnitel'nykh vremennykh merakh ekonomicheskogo kharaktera po obespecheniyu finansovoy stabil'nosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Presidential Decree 'On Additional Temporary Economic Measures to Ensure Financial Stability of the Russian Federation']. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_410578/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410578/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2023a) 'Ukaz Prezidenta RF "Ob osobom poryadke provedeniya raschetov mezhdru nekotorymi yuridicheskimi litsami—Rezidentami pri osushchestvlenii vneshneekonomicheskoy deyatelnosti"' [Presidential Decree 'On the Special Procedure for Settlements Between Certain Resident Legal Entities in the Conduct of Foreign Economic Activity']. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_439214/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_439214/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2023b) 'Ukaz "O vremennom upravlenii nekotorym imushchestvom"' [Presidential Decree 'On the Temporary Administration of Certain Property']. Available at: [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_445530/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_445530/) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2023c) 'Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 08.08.2023 № 585 "O priostanovlenii Rossiyskoy Federatsiyei deystviya otdel'nykh polozhenii mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov Rossiyskoy Federatsii po voprosam nalogooblozheniya"' [Presidential Decree No. 585 of 8 August 2023 'On the Suspension by the Russian Federation of Certain Provisions of International Tax Treaties']. Available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202308080005?index=6> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2014) 'FDI into and out of transition economies reached record levels in 2013, according to UNCTAD report'. 24 June. Available at: <https://unctad.org/press-material/fdi-and-out-transition-economies-reached-record-levels-2013-according-unctad-report> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2016) 'Global foreign direct investment hit \$1.76 trillion in 2015 – highest level since pre-crisis peak'. 21 June. Available at: <https://unctad.org/press-material/global-foreign-direct-investment-hit-176-trillion-2015-highest-level-pre-crisis-peak> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2020) 'World Investment Report 2020: International production beyond the pandemic'. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4041672> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2022a) 'Methodological note: World Investment Report 2022'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2022\\_chMethodNote\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2022_chMethodNote_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2022b) 'World Investment Report 2022: International Tax Reforms and Sustainable Investment'. Available at: <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1263/world-investment-report-2022-international-tax-reforms-and-sustainable-investment> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2023) 'World Investment Report: Investing in sustainable energy for all'. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4014821> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2024a) 'Outward FDI policies: Promotion and facilitation – regulation and screening'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2024d1\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2024d1_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2024b) 'UNCTAD-OECD Report on G20 Investment Measures (31st Report)'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unctad\\_oecd2023d31\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/unctad_oecd2023d31_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2024c) 'World Investment Report 2024'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2024\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2024_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2025a) 'Global Investment Trends Monitor, No. 48'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeiainf2025d1\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeiainf2025d1_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2025b) 'Handbook of Statistics 2024'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdstat49\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdstat49_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2025c) 'World Investment Report 2025. Country Fact Sheet: Russian Federation'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/wir\\_fs\\_ru\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/wir_fs_ru_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- UNCTAD (2025d) 'World Investment Report 2025: International investment in the digital economy'. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2025\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2025_en.pdf) (Accessed: 17 July 2025).

- United Nations Statistical Commission (2025) 'System of National Accounts 2025'. New York, NY: United Nations. Available at: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna2025.asp> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- U.S. Department of the Treasury (2018) 'The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018'. Available at: <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/3290/united-states-of-america-the-foreign-investment-risk-review-modernization-act-of-2018> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- U.S. Department of the Treasury (2023) 'Joint Statement from the REPO Task Force'. Available at: <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1329> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Valdivia-Velarde, E. and Razin, T. (2014) 'Balance of Payments Manual, Sixth Edition: Compilation Guide'. International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781484312759/9781484312759.xml> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Vedomosti (2023) 'Rossiya stala stranoy nomer odin po investitsiyam v Iran [Russia became the number one country in terms of investment in Iran]. Vedomosti, 24 March. Available at: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2023/03/24/967929-rossiya-stala-stranoi-nomer-odin-po-investitsiyam-v-iran> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- World Bank (2024) 'Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP)—Russian Federation'. World Bank Open Data. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org> (Accessed: 17 July 2025).
- Yukhtanova, Y.A., Belyaeva, S.E. and Bogdanenko, A.A. (2024) 'Foreign direct investment between Russia and CIS countries amidst uncertainty', Tyumen State University Herald. Social, Economic, and Law Research, 10(4), pp. 165–188. <https://doi.org/10.21684/2411-7897-2024-10-4-165-188>
- Zaytsev, Yu.K. (2022) 'Problemy ucheta pryamykh inostrannykh investitsiy v mezhdunarodnoy i rossiyskoy statistike' [Problems of accounting for foreign direct investment in international and Russian statistics], Journal of the New Economic Association, 54(2), pp. 39–55.
- Zhukov, P.E. (2023) 'Capital flight from Russia and possible sources of financing budget expenditures', Financial Journal, 15(6), pp. 27–42. <https://doi.org/10.31107/2075-1990-2023-6-27-42>

# Earlier publications in the BSR Policy Briefing series by Centrum Balticum Foundation

- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2025:](#) "Economies of St Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast by 2025: Present-day Picture" by Nikita Lisitsyn
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2025:](#) "Kaliningrad's Economy: Vulnerabilities and Performance" by Artur Usanov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2025:](#) "Scenarios for Ukraine. A Theory of Victory and Peace" by Andrés Pastrana, Greg Mills and Juan-Carlos Pinzon
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2025:](#) "Solutions for media to achieve financially sustainable journalism online and in print" by Kimmo Lundén
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2025:](#) "Changes in economic cooperation between Russia and China since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine" by Sergei Gladkov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2025:](#) "Recent trends in international trade and investments of the Baltic states" by Alari Purju
- [BSR Policy Briefing 9/2024:](#) "Russia's War in Ukraine: What should this conflict teach us?" by Greg Mills and David Kilcullen
- [BSR Policy Briefing 8/2024:](#) "Impact of the war in Ukraine on nuclear waste management in arctic Russia" by Sergei Gladkov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 7/2024:](#) "Belarus and its future development: What does it mean for the Baltic Sea region?" by Andrei Sannikov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2024:](#) "Demographic challenges of the Kaliningrad region in the new geopolitical reality: Trends, risks and prospects" by Salavat Abylkalikov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2024:](#) "The competitiveness of Finnish firms in the changing business landscape" by Anna Karhu, Eini Haaja & Hanna Mäkinen
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2024:](#) "Economy of St. Petersburg two years after the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine" by Nikita Lisitsyn
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2024:](#) "Arctic Europe and its Future" by Markku Heikkilä
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2024:](#) "Germany's economic structure in times of multiple shocks" by Michael Grömling
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2024:](#) "China's influence in Northern Europe" by Oscar Shao
- [BSR Policy Briefing 8/2023:](#) "The wicked problem of eutrophication - next steps in the process towards sustainable agriculture in Finland" by Anna Törnroos-Remes
- [BSR Policy Briefing 7/2023:](#) "A literature review on the main environmental challenges in the Baltic Sea region in the 21st century" by Sergei Gladkov and Léo Pignol
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2023:](#) "Developing the economic competence in Åland: Recommendations and key learning points for policymakers" by Anna Lundgren and Jukka Teräs
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2023:](#) "The green transformation of the European maritime sector: Six tricks to support sustainable cruise shipbuilding" by Elisa Aro and Eini Haaja
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2023:](#) "Iron curtain on Belarus' western border: Does the crisis in Minsk's relations with its Baltic neighbors threaten Belarusian independence?" by Kamil Kłysiński
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2023:](#) "The economic interaction between the USA and the littoral states of the Baltic Sea" by Alari Purju
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2023:](#) "The Resource Balanced Economy to meet the twin challenges of phasing out fossil fuel energy and self-sufficient supply of raw materials" by Simon P. Michaux
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2023:](#) "Baltic Sea region security of supply after Russia's invasion on Ukraine: The past is just a prologue" by Anna Mikulska and Luke Min
- [BSR Policy Briefing 11/2022:](#) "Sanctions against Russia, their effectiveness and impacts on Finland" by Hanna Mäkinen
- [BSR Policy Briefing 10/2022:](#) "The Baltic Sea islands and their impact on the regional security" by Zdzislaw Sliwa, Hans Helseth and Viljar Veebel

- [BSR Policy Briefing 9/2022](#): “Willingness to fight for Ukraine: Lessons to the Baltic States” by Jānis Bērziņš and Victoria Vdovychenko
- [BSR Policy Briefing 8/2022](#): “Chinese investment in the Baltic Sea region: Main characteristics and policy challenges” by Kálmán Kalotay and Ágnes Szunomár
- [BSR Policy Briefing 7/2022](#): “NATO and security in the Baltic Sea region” by Klaus Wittmann
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2022](#): “The Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant: Energy independence on paper – isolation in practice” by Justinas Juozaitis
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2022](#): “Aspects of blue economy in the Baltic Sea region” by Riitta Pöntynen
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2022](#): “Leveraging bioeconomy development for climate change mitigation and adaptation in the Baltic Sea Region” by Alisher Mirzabaev
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2022](#): “Russia’s renewable energy sector: Policy recommendations” by Liliana Proskuryakova
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2022](#): “The circular economy in St. Petersburg” by Yury Nurulin, Olga Kalchenko and Inga Skvortsova
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2022](#): “Energy dimension of green growth in Kaliningrad” by Artur Usanov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 11/2021](#): “Mortality in Russia during the pandemic in 2020 and in the first half of 2021” by Marina Lifshits
- [BSR Policy Briefing 10/2021](#): “Building security in the Baltic Sea region: Military perspective and NATO approach” by Andrzej Fałkowski
- [BSR Policy Briefing 9/2021](#): “The “Swedish model” in the COVID-19 pandemic” by Torbjörn Becker, Jesper Roine, and Svante Strömberg
- [BSR Policy Briefing 8/2021](#): “Lithuania’s response to the COVID-19: Two stages, mixed results” by Linas Kojala
- [BSR Policy Briefing 7/2021](#): “The Kaliningrad Region and COVID-19” by Vitaly Petrovich Zhdanov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2021](#): “Polish struggle against COVID-19” by Bartosz Arłukowicz
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2021](#): “COVID-19 and Finland: Not good news for fiscal sustainability” by Jouko Vilmunen
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2021](#): “Latvia and COVID-19: Preliminary impressions” by Dzintars Mozgis and Normunds Vaivads
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2021](#): “The German economy and the Corona shock – An acceleration of structural changes?” by Michael Grömling
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2021](#): “Contemporary trends and future scenarios for the Greater St. Petersburg region” by Nikita Lisitsyn
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2021](#): “The COVID-19 in Estonia: Governance of the Health Care System, spread of the disease, regulations and impact on economy” by Alari Purju
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2020](#): “Leadership in Turbulent Times: Germany and the Future of Europe” by Kimmo Elo
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2020](#): “Denmark and COVID-19” by Marin A. Marinov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2020](#): “Lithuania and Belarus: Will Lithuania become Belarus “Iceland”?” by Ruslanas Iržiukevičius
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2020](#): “The corona pandemic and its impact on the economic development of the Baltic Sea region in 2020” by Kari Liuhto
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2020](#): “Increasing Eco-efficiency via Digitalisation in Maritime Industry in The Baltic Sea Region: Policy Support through Carrots or Sticks?” by Milla Harju
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2020](#): “The forest industry around the Baltic Sea region: Future challenges and opportunities” edited by Kari Liuhto
- [BSR Policy Briefing 9/2019](#): “The Baltic states and security in the Baltic Sea region: Dark clouds in blue sky” by Kristi Raik
- [BSR Policy Briefing 8/2019](#): “Creation of regional gas market in the Baltic States and Finland: Challenges and opportunities” by Tadas Jakstas
- [BSR Policy Briefing 7/2019](#): “US FDI in the Baltic Sea region: The state of American investment and selected challenges” by Kalman Kalotay
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2019](#): “Germany and the Baltic Sea region: political and security interests” by Tobias Etzold
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2019](#): “Government support for the Russian shipbuilding industry: Policy priorities and budgetary allocations” by Elena Efimova and Sergei Sutyryn

- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2019](#): "Finnish tonnage as the implementer for security of seaborne supply in maritime transport" by Bo Österlund
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2019](#): "The Estonian-Finnish economic cooperation" by Alari Purju
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2019](#): "Bioeconomy Policies in the BSR" by Torfi Jóhannesson
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2019](#): "Cooperation between Saint-Petersburg and Finland" by Stanislav Tkachenko
- [BSR Policy Briefing 10/2018](#): "The sanctions against Russia. Are there winners and losers around the Baltic Sea?" by Susanne Oxenstierna
- [BSR Policy Briefing 9/2018](#): "Future of Public Sector Governance and Digitalization" by Meelis Kitsing
- [BSR Policy Briefing 8/2018](#): "American Policy Towards the Baltic States" by Stephen Blank
- [BSR Policy Briefing 7/2018](#): "Russian direct and indirect investment in the Baltic Sea region" by Alexey Kuznetsov
- [BSR Policy Briefing 6/2018](#): "Foreign economic relations of the Kaliningrad region" by Vitaliy Zhdanov, Vladimir Kuzin and Mikhail Pliukhin
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2018](#): "Why is Russia seeking to ignite a civil war in the European Union and how to stop it?" by Ruslanas Iržiškevičius
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2018](#): "On the paradoxes of foreign expansion: the experience of Polish firms" by Piotr Trąpczyński and Krystian Barłożewski
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2018](#): "The bioeconomy in the Baltic Sea region" by Anna Berlina
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2018](#): "Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine: On Some Economic Costs" by Sergey Kulik
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2018](#): "Chinese Direct Investment in the Baltic Sea Region" by Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2017](#): "The economic impact of China on the Baltic Sea region" by Jean-Paul Larçon
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2017](#): "National innovation and smart specialisation governance in the Baltic Sea region" edited by Zane Šime
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2017](#): "The economic state of the Baltic Sea region" edited by Kari Liuhto
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2017](#): "Russia's foreign relations and the Baltic Sea region" by Sergey Kulik
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2017](#): "Russia and the security in the Baltic Sea region" by Justyna Gotkowska & Piotr Szymański
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2016](#): "The EU-Russia relations and their reflections in the Baltic Sea region" Stanislav L. Tkachenko
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2016](#): "The maritime cluster in the Baltic Sea region and beyond" edited by Kari Liuhto
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2015](#): "Natural gas revolution and the Baltic Sea region" edited by Kari Liuhto
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2014](#): "A Russian Sudden Stop or Just a Slippery Oil Slope to Stagnation?" by Torbjörn Becker
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2014](#): "Poland and Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: doomed for the confrontation?" by Adam Balcer
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2014](#): "Energy security in Kaliningrad and geopolitics" by Artur Usanov and Alexander Kharin
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2014](#): "The Baltic Sea region 2014: Ten policy-oriented articles from scholars of the university of Turku" edited by Kari Liuhto
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2013](#): "The Kaliningrad nuclear power plant project and its regional ramifications" by Leszek Jesien and Łukasz Tolak
- [BSR Policy Briefing 3/2013](#): "Renewable Energy Sources in Finland and Russia - a review" by Irina Kirpichnikova and Pekka Sulamaa
- [BSR Policy Briefing 2/2013](#): "Russia's accession to the WTO: possible impact on competitiveness of domestic companies" by Sergey Sutyryn and Olga Trofimenko
- [BSR Policy Briefing 1/2013](#): "Mare Nostrum from Mare Clausum via Mare Sovieticum to Mare Liberum - The process of security policy in the Baltic" by Bo Österlund



[www.centrumbalticum.org/en](http://www.centrumbalticum.org/en)