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# Centrum Balticum

## Sitemaps
- [XML Sitemap](https://centrumbalticum.org/sitemap_index.xml): Includes all crawlable and indexable pages.

## Posts
- [Jo rantautuneet Pullopostit 24.9.](https://centrumbalticum.org/pullopostilista/): Avaa PDF uuteen välilehteen
- [Meri on kansallisomaisuuttamme – rannikkomaakunnissa tunnetaan kuitenkin parhaiten merialueet](https://centrumbalticum.org/meri-on-kansallisomaisuuttamme-rannikkomaakunnissa-tunnetaan-kuitenkin-parhaiten-merialueet): Pulloposti 72 Kristiina Salonen, maakuntajohtaja, Satakuntaliitto
- [Osaajat kasvun takeena – innovaatiot syntyvät ihmisten kohdatessa](https://centrumbalticum.org/osaajat-kasvun-takeena-innovaatiot-syntyvat-ihmisten-kohdatessa): Pulloposti 71 Maija S. Peltola, vararehtori, Turun yliopisto
- [Onko Suomen pakko olla saari?](https://centrumbalticum.org/onko-suomen-pakko-olla-saari): Pulloposti 70 Karoliina Hidén, yhteysjohtaja, Turun kaupunki
- [Mietteitä Itämeren rannalta](https://centrumbalticum.org/mietteita-itameren-rannalta): Pulloposti 69 Seppo Sirkemaa, johtaja, Turun yliopiston kauppakorkeakoulun Porin yksikkö
- [Europe Forum 2026: Ports are an excellent testbed for circular economy](https://centrumbalticum.org/europe-forum-2026-ports-are-an-excellent-testbed-for-circular-economy): Baltic Sea ports have the potential to become a hub for circular economy. There was a clear consensus on this issue at the event “Harbours of Change: Circular Economy in Baltic Sea Ports”, organized by Centrum Balticum and the Circular Ports project as part of the Europe Forum in Turku. The session explored both the strategic framework for circularity and concrete solutions already being tested and implemented around the Baltic Sea Region. The discussion was moderated by Kirsi Ahlman from Centrum Balticum.
- [Satakunta on Suomen ja koko Itämeren turvallisuusrannikko](https://centrumbalticum.org/satakunta-on-suomen-ja-koko-itameren-turvallisuusrannikko): Pulloposti 68 Mari Kaunistola, kokoomuksen kansanedustaja, Satakunnan hyvinvointialueen aluevaltuuston 1. vpj., Porin kaupunginvaltuuston 1. vpj.
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2026: New intelligence legislation could also enhance Finland’s national security](https://centrumbalticum.org/new-intelligence-legislation-could-also-enhance-finlands-national-security): In BSR Policy Briefing 5/2026 Police Lawyer Markus Laine examines Finland’s proposed new legislation on police criminal intelligence and asks how it would affect both crime prevention and national security.
- [Kansallisen turvallisuuden strategia ja häilyvät turvallisuusrajat](https://centrumbalticum.org/kansallisen-turvallisuuden-strategia-ja-hailyvat-turvallisuusrajat): Pulloposti 67 Kari Laitinen, Tampereen yliopiston ja Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun dosentti, työskentelee tällä hetkellä suojelupoliisissa
- [BSR Policy Briefing 5/2026](https://centrumbalticum.org/bsr-policy-briefing-5-2026): The Evolution of Finnish Intelligence Legislation: Does Criminal Intelligence Legislation Enhance also National Security? By Markus Laine
- [Suomen huoltovarmuus rakentuu myös indopasifisen alueen merireiteillä](https://centrumbalticum.org/suomen-huoltovarmuus-rakentuu-myos-indopasifisen-alueen-merireiteilla): Pulloposti 66 Jari Vilén, ulkoministeriön indopasifisen alueen erityisedustaja (Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific)
- [Puolitoista %](https://centrumbalticum.org/puolitoista): Pulloposti 65 Juha Ratinen, everstiluutnantti, sotilasprofessori, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
- [Luonnonvarat uuden ajan turvallisuuspolitiikan keskiöön? – Kriittiset resurssit, terramekaniikka ja ruokajärjestelmän tuotantopanokset strategisen tiedustelun kysymyksinä](https://centrumbalticum.org/luonnonvarat-uuden-ajan-turvallisuuspolitiikan-keskioon-kriittiset-resurssit-terramekaniikka-ja-ruokajarjestelman-tuotantopanokset-strategisen-tiedustelun-kysymyksina): Pulloposti 64 Mikko Weckroth, tutkimuspäällikkö, Luonnonvarakeskus (LUKE)
- [Centrum Balticum organises Circular Ports session at Europe Forum 2026](https://centrumbalticum.org/centrum-balticum-organises-circular-ports-session-at-europe-forum-2026): Centrum Balticum Foundation will organise a discussion on circular economy in Baltic Sea ports at Europe Forum 2026 in Turku, Finland, on 27 August 2026. The session, Harbours of Change: Circular Economy in Baltic Sea Ports, brings together experts from across the Baltic Sea Region to discuss how ports can drive the transition towards more circular and sustainable operations.
- [Ahvenanmaa on käsittämätön sotilaallinen tyhjiö](https://centrumbalticum.org/ahvenanmaa-on-kasittamaton-sotilaallinen-tyhjio): Pulloposti 63 Satu Schauman, politiikan toimittaja, Verkkouutiset ja Nykypäivä
- [Turku Itämeren keskelle](https://centrumbalticum.org/turku-itameren-keskelle): Pulloposti 62 Ville Valkonen, kansanedustaja, eduskuntaryhmän varapuheenjohtaja (kok), Varsinais-Suomen liiton hallituksen puheenjohtaja
- [John Morton – syntynyt amerikkalaiseksi](https://centrumbalticum.org/john-morton-syntynyt-amerikkalaiseksi): Pulloposti 61 Auvo Kostiainen, prof. emer., yleinen historia, Turun yliopisto
- [Suomen sivistysala on kansainvälinen – kokemukset kansainvälisestä työvoimasta ovat myönteisiä](https://centrumbalticum.org/suomen-sivistysala-on-kansainvalinen-kokemukset-kansainvalisesta-tyovoimasta-ovat-myonteisia): Pulloposti 60 Piia Alvesalo, viestintäpäällikkö, Sivistysala ry (Sivista)
- [Vetytalouden ihme – yksi aine voi turvata Suomen ruoantuotannon ja korvata merenkulun fossiiliset polttoaineet](https://centrumbalticum.org/vetytalouden-ihme-yksi-aine-voi-turvata-suomen-ruoantuotannon-ja-korvata-merenkulun-fossiiliset-polttoaineet): Pulloposti 59 Jussi Ylinen, toimitusjohtaja, Green North Energy
- [Satamat Suomen tulevaisuuden perustana](https://centrumbalticum.org/satamat-suomen-tulevaisuuden-perustana): Pulloposti 58 Iida-Maria Seppä, logistiikkakonsultoinnin tiiminvetäjä, Sitowise Oy
- [Critical raw materials and circular economy meet in the Baltic Sea Region – How the CiNURGi project and nutrient recycling can help solve the fertilizer crisis in Europe](https://centrumbalticum.org/critical-raw-materials-and-circular-economy-meet-in-the-baltic-sea-region-how-the-cinurgi-project-and-nutrient-recycling-can-help-solve-the-fertilizer-crisis-in-europe): Centrum Balticum
- [Mitä vain voi tapahtua – ja usein tapahtuukin](https://centrumbalticum.org/mita-vain-voi-tapahtua-ja-usein-tapahtuukin): Pulloposti 57 Petri Tapio, tulevaisuudentutkimuksen professori, Tulevaisuuden tutkimuskeskus, Turun yliopisto
- [Baltic Rim Economies 2/2026: China’s growing influence from Arctic governance to global trade](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-2-2026-chinas-growing-influence-from-arctic-governance-to-global-trade): China's growing influence extends far beyond its borders. As climate change reshapes the Arctic, new shipping routes emerge and global power competition intensifies, China's role in the Arctic and Northern Europe has become one of the defining geopolitical questions of our time.
- [Unohdettu diplomatia – Kun ilmiselvä on epäselvää](https://centrumbalticum.org/unohdettu-diplomatia-kun-ilmiselva-on-epaselvaa): Pulloposti 56 Petteri Seppälä Senior Vice President, Proverse Interactive Oy, väitöskirjatutkija, Tampereen yliopisto, CEO, Can Do Spirit C2 Oy
- [BSR Policy Briefing 4/2026](https://centrumbalticum.org/bsr-policy-briefing-4-2026): Three-Dimensional Chess: China’s Space, Surface and Subsurface Activities in the Arctic By Sasu Katajamäki & Matti Puranen
- [Deng Beixi: China in the Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/deng-beixi-china-in-the-arctic): In recent years, major power competition in the Arctic has intensified. Spillover from the Russia-Ukraine conflict has paralyzed the governance architecture centered on the Arctic Council, leading to institutional stagnation and diminished governance effectiveness. Climate change and environmental protection once formed the strongest common ground for Arctic cooperation, positioning the region as a testing ground for global governance and multilateral collaboration. However, lacking a cooperative foundation, Arctic governance has become fragmented, with adverse implications for global ecological security and the shared interests of humanity.
- [Camilla T. N. Sørensen: China’s strategic approach to the Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/camilla-t-n-sorensen-chinas-strategic-approach-to-the-arctic): It is a long-term strategic priority for China to secure its presence and influence in the Arctic. It is, however, not correct when US President Trump warns about Chinese ships circling Greenland. The Chinese already consider the island part of the American sphere of influence, and therefore no longer give it much strategic attention. For China, the Russian Arctic is in focus.
- [Njord Wegge: Strategic competition in the Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/njord-wegge-strategic-competition-in-the-arctic): Despite internal tensions among western democracies, the Arctic can today be described as an arena for strategic competition where authoritarian states like China and Russia compete against western states, and where both “blocks” seek to protect their interests and values. This strategic competition might not necessarily be a struggle that will be “won” or “lost”, but rather a lasting feature that characterizes the 21st century. In this world order, competition between states, and groups of states, is likely to remain high, where states’ gaining the upper hand in the power struggle are poised to have a greater influence on the rules of the game. In this permanent situation of international competition, the degree of dominance and influence over outcomes in world politics, of the various states, is likely to change over time.
- [Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen: Northern Europe and the US-China-Russia Strategic Triangle](https://centrumbalticum.org/rasmus-gjedsso-bertelsen-northern-europe-and-the-us-china-russia-strategic-triangle): Northern Europe and the Arctic are always shaped by world order. This essay will discuss how US-China-Russia struggle over world order shapes our reality and how we can seek agency. China as one of the largest populations, states, economies, science and technology actors in the world is at the heart of the shaping of world order, and present in Northern Europe and the Arctic.
- [Matti Puranen: China Aims to Control the Deep Sea](https://centrumbalticum.org/matti-puranen-china-aims-to-control-the-deep-sea): China’s four-decade economic growth has been paralleled by maritime expansion, as its commercial and security-related “overseas interests” have expanded far beyond China’s borders. Today, China’s earlier objective of becoming a “maritime great power” has, in many respects, become a reality. China now boasts one of the world’s largest commercial and merchant maritime fleets, while Chinese companies hold considerable stakes in port infrastructure all around the world. China’s shipbuilding industry is unmatched in scale; its capacity is estimated to be 200 times that of the United States. Finally, China’s naval forces – the People’s Liberation Army Navy – have emerged as one of the world’s most powerful navies, with over 140 large surface combatants and three aircraft carriers. The PLA Navy also maintains an increasingly global presence, with operations and joint exercises in distant waters, including the Baltic Sea.
- [Xu Qingchao: China’s Arctic Predicament: A Transparent Threat in the Drawer?](https://centrumbalticum.org/xu-qingchao-chinas-arctic-predicament-a-transparent-threat-in-the-drawer): In “China’s Arctic Policy” white paper published in January 2018, the word “cooperation” was remarkably mentioned 45 times. According to this policy document, “‘cooperation’ is an effective means for China’s participation in Arctic affairs” as well as one of the four basic principles in terms of China’s Arctic engagement. However, since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in February 2022, an increasing number of examples have proved that China’s Arctic-focused cooperation with Arctic states including Russia has already come to a standstill internationally and regionally, multilaterally and bilaterally, economically and scientifically. This situation can be named as “China’s Arctic predicament”, which has seriously hindered the realization of China’s Arctic policy goals stated in the white paper—“to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the Arctic.”
- [Jesper Willaing Zeuthen: Will Transatlantic Distrust Bring China Back to Greenland?](https://centrumbalticum.org/jesper-willaing-zeuthen-will-transatlantic-distrust-bring-china-back-to-greenland): China has played a central role in Donald Trump’s claim over Greenland. Trump has said that the US needed Greenland for security and claimed that Chinese ships were all around Greenland. When Trump during his first presidency first proposed to buy Greenland, it was allegedly after having met with an Australian mining developer who argued that his project unlike competing projects would create a non-Chinese controlled supply of rare earth elements (REE).
- [Yue Wang: China’s northern energy politics](https://centrumbalticum.org/yue-wang-chinas-northern-energy-politics): Europe’s decoupling from Russian energy has reconfigured the geopolitics of Russian fossil fuels, changing how they are produced, financed, transported, and marketed. Russian Arctic liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects have become increasingly dependent on non-Western partners, markets, and technologies, with China playing an especially important role. Within China’s northern energy politics, the Arctic and Northern Europe matter in different but connected ways. In the Arctic, China’s energy engagement is closely linked to Russian LNG and the Polar Silk Road (PSR), China’s extension of the Belt and Road Initiative into the Arctic. In Northern Europe, the more important story is knowledge and technology: wind power, geothermal energy, clean technologies, and broader low-carbon transition.
- [Elizabeth Wishnick: China and the Arctic in the Shadow of the Iran War](https://centrumbalticum.org/elizabeth-wishnick-china-and-the-arctic-in-the-shadow-of-the-iran-war): Will the interruption of Persian Gulf shipping reinforce the priority of the Arctic for China? Since achieving observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, China has sought to expand its presence in the Arctic, even referring to itself as a “near-Arctic state”. While clearly not a part of the region geographically, China has been eagerly exploring investment and shipping opportunities. These ventures have largely been unsuccessful with the exception of the Russian Arctic.
- [Matti Nojonen: Chinese Debate on the Iran War and the Fate of the Petrodollar](https://centrumbalticum.org/matti-nojonen-chinese-debate-on-the-iran-war-and-the-fate-of-the-petrodollar): The protracted illegal Israeli and U.S. war on Iran has instigated a heated debate within China on the fate of the petrodollar. The participants are prominent scholars from influential Chinese research institutions.
- [Sybille Reinke de Buitrago: China as Risk for Arctic Security and Regional Order?](https://centrumbalticum.org/sybille-reinke-de-buitrago-china-as-risk-for-arctic-security-and-regional-order): In times of renewed geopolitical competition and spheres-of-influence thinking, it is worth to (re-)assess the risk China may represent to Arctic security and regional order. The PRC has approached the Arctic as space to expand influence, pursuing growing activities of economic, research and development (R&D), political, and military nature. As non-coastal state, China holds no sovereign rights, yet applies its self-declaration of near-Arctic state to shape the region. Climate change is also enabling new access to the Arctic, its resources and shorter transport routes. Despite significant navigation challenges, and resources mostly being within Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) territories, the Arctic’s physical changes feed expectations for economic gain and political influence, which in turn contribute to tension. Key Arctic coastal states1 have reacted in various ways to safeguard their interests. Thus, China-related and geopolitical developments are increasingly putting pressure on the region.
- [Reinhard Biedermann: China in a Fractured Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/reinhard-biedermann-china-in-a-fractured-arctic): For years, the High North was often imagined as a region where science, environmental protection and practical cooperation could remain insulated from great-power rivalry. Arctic exceptionalism is over — if it ever fully existed. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine broke this assumption. Arctic Council cooperation is weakened; Finland and Sweden have joined NATO; Western-Russian research ties have largely collapsed; and areas such as Greenland, the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, and the Barents region are again discussed as strategic spaces. Rather than a protected zone of cooperation, the Arctic now reveals how climate change, military geography, and geopolitical rivalry reinforce one another. This matters especially for China, whose 2018 Arctic policy was written for a much more cooperative Arctic.
- [Nicolas Jouan: China’s Arctic Push and the Search for Regional Stability](https://centrumbalticum.org/nicolas-jouan-chinas-arctic-push-and-the-search-for-regional-stability): The Arctic has become one of the world’s most contested strategic frontiers over the past decade as melting ice opens new shipping lanes and exposes vast untapped reserves of energy and critical minerals. Relations between Russia and its seven Arctic counterparts have deteriorated over the conflict in Ukraine, destabilising a region once defined more by cooperation than confrontation. In this increasingly crowded and contested environment, China’s growing presence has emerged as one the most consequential factors shaping the Arctic’s future. What is driving China’s interest in the region, and should other regional stakeholders be cautious of it?
- [Julie Yu-Wen Chen: Securitization of China-Nordic Relations](https://centrumbalticum.org/julie-yu-wen-chen-securitization-of-china-nordic-relations): When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the Nordic countries recognized the new government relatively quickly compared with other Western states, such as the United States of America (USA). Although each Nordic country maintains its own distinct relationship with China, Nordic–PRC relations can generally be characterized as relatively functional and marked by fewer frictions than China’s relations with major powers such as the USA.
- [Frédéric Lasserre: Is China rising in the Arctic?](https://centrumbalticum.org/frederic-lasserre-is-china-rising-in-the-arctic): Western States and public opinions increasingly fear China’s growing Arctic influence, viewing its "near-Arctic state" discourse as a pretext for securing strategic, military, and resource advantages. Concerns center on China's alleged collection of military intelligence, critical mineral investments, development of a dominant position in Arctic shipping and deepening alignment with Russia, which reportedly would threaten NATO security and regional sovereignty.
- [Jo Inge Bekkevold: China Is a Minor Player in the European Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/jo-inge-bekkevold-china-is-a-minor-player-in-the-european-arctic): China in the Arctic is arguably one of the stories in international politics with the largest discrepancy between the narrative and the reality of a rising power’s influence in a region. For almost two decades now, international media, observers and various government reports have continuously portrayed China as a major player in Arctic affairs. While some have predicted that China’s entry into the Arctic will lead to a shipping bonanza along the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic Ocean, others have voiced their concerns about how a growing Chinese footprint creates instability, great power rivalry, and a scramble for resources in the region. The reality, however, is that China has a peripheral role in the Arctic.
- [Piotr Mickiewicz: China’s policy towards Baltic Europe](https://centrumbalticum.org/piotr-mickiewicz-chinas-policy-towards-baltic-europe): China’s maritime activity is subordinated to the country’s strategic objectives. This stems from the adopted economic policy assumptions, and secondarily from political ones. In this concept, the Baltic Sea is treated as an important sea body, but currently it is not considered strategically significant. This is primarily a consequence of the suspension of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) project, which has resulted in this basin being treated solely as a shipping route. A route with maritime transshipment hubs ensuring uninterrupted trade in goods. This situation should be considered a temporary solution, and the factors that will reshape the Baltic Sea in Beijing’s policy will be the situation in the Arctic region and the level of implementation of the Russian concept of the Trans-Siberian Transport Corridor and Great Nord Sea Route (GNSR). It is, in fact, an investment that contributes to the economic development of the Russian Arctic and Far East and expands transit opportunities through the Arctic-Indian Ocean connection. The Polar Silk Road concept and China’s Arctic policy itself should be viewed as a potential for deepening the economic dependence of the Russian Federation and making Siberian investments dependent on the scope of economic cooperation with Beijing. Less prominent, but equally important, strategic goals include potentially gaining access to the exploitation of inanimate resources and economic and political influence in the Arctic, as well as influencing Russia’s energy export policy through the Indo-Pacific. The operation of the Trans-Siberian connections, and in particular the Saint Petersburg-Arkhangelsk section, limits the possibility of controlling Russian economic processes, as it is a project connecting the country with European transport systems via the Baltic Sea Motorways. These conditions mean that the Baltic Sea will continue to be perceived by the Chinese authorities in a strictly geopolitical, rather than regional, context. The importance of individual countries in the transport system ensuring exports to the European Union will play a key role in Baltic policy. The Federal Republic of Germany will establish its status as the most important partner, utilizing elements of the Motorways of the Sea system (the Rostock and Sasnitz terminals) and the transport system connecting them to the Duisburg AG Logistics Centre. Poland’s role as a transit country (Stryków Logistics Centre and container terminals in Gdańsk and Gdynia) will increase due to its connections with continental Europe, the Nordic countries, and the United Kingdom. However, the scale of the use of Russian ports in the eastern Baltic Sea, in particular, will be a political game. The Chinese authorities will emphasize their alternative role, thus limiting Russian plans to use Russian transport systems and ports as transshipment and distribution points for Chinese exports. The issue of the rules for Chinese shippers’ use of the Northern Sea Route and GNSR will likely also be addressed, which will sanction the Polar Silk Road’s status.
- [Richard Fraser: China in Northern Europe and the Arctic: Infrastructure, Mobility, and Emerging Futures](https://centrumbalticum.org/richard-fraser-china-in-northern-europe-and-the-arctic-infrastructure-mobility-and-emerging-futures): Over the past two decades, China has emerged as an increasingly significant actor in Northern Europe and the Arctic. Once considered geographically distant from the High North, China now presents itself as a legitimate stakeholder in Arctic affairs, specifically through scientific research, infrastructure development, shipping, and regional governance. The publication of China’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, which described the country as a “near-Arctic state,” marked a major turning point in projecting Beijing’s northern ambitions. Through initiatives linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the “Polar Silk Road”, China has sought to expand infrastructure across the Arctic and Northern Europe while positioning itself within an emerging northern future.
- [Ágnes Szunomár: China in Northern Europe and the Arctic: Economic cooperation and strategic concerns](https://centrumbalticum.org/agnes-szunomar-china-in-northern-europe-and-the-arctic-economic-cooperation-and-strategic-concerns): China’s economic presence in Europe has changed considerably over the past decade. Earlier Chinese activities were often linked to infrastructure projects, acquisitions, and the broader ambitions of the Belt and Road Initiative. Today, however, Chinese engagement is increasingly connected to Europe’s green transition, especially electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, renewable energy technologies, and critical raw materials. This transformation has also altered the geography of Chinese investments in Europe: while Southern and Central and Eastern Europe initially attracted attention because of transport infrastructure and manufacturing projects, Northern Europe has become important for different reasons, including technological capabilities, innovation ecosystems, stable regulatory environments, and access to the Arctic region.
- [Jean-Paul Larçon: China in Northern Europe and the Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/liselotte-odgaard-china-in-northern-europe-and-the-arctic): In the 1990s, the Nordic companies Ericsson, Nokia, Statoil, and Wärtsilä were among the first to invest in China and participate in the transformation of the Chinese economy. For some 30 years, trade between the regions also developed in a relatively balanced way. In 2010, Chinese companies started investing in Northern Europe with Geely's acquisition of Volvo Cars in Sweden, followed by China Bluestar's acquisition of the Norwegian silicone group Elkem in 2011. Then came the era of China’s new "wolf warrior diplomacy”. Tensions arose about human rights, and five years of diplomatic crisis and economic sanctions against Norway followed the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize selection.
- [Liselotte Odgaard: China in Northern Europe and the Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/liselotte-odgaard-china-in-northern-europe-and-the-arctic-2): The Arctic region is not high on China’s strategic agenda. China has a long-standing record of engagement in Arctic scientific research, institutional cooperation, resource extraction and navigation. As a global power, China establishes an economic, political and security-driven strategic foothold in all the world’s regions. This approach allows China to influence regional agendas to further its interests and acquire the knowledge and network to swiftly increase or decrease its engagement in future should its interests change.
- [Harri Mikkola: China in Northern Europe and the Arctic](https://centrumbalticum.org/harri-mikkola-china-in-northern-europe-and-the-arctic): Northern Europe has re-emerged as a key geopolitical focal point in the rivalry between the West and Russia, with the Arctic forming a central sub-region. During the Cold War, the Arctic played a major role in nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the region lost much of its strategic significance and was viewed as an exceptional “area of peace and dialogue” between Russia and the West. This changed as great-power competition intensified, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Arctic’s military and economic importance to Russia, together with the NATO accessions of Finland and Sweden, has further increased the strategic significance of Northern Europe and the Arctic.
- [Martin Kossa: China in the Arctic and Northern Europe](https://centrumbalticum.org/martin-kossa-china-in-the-arctic-and-northern-europe): Over the past decade, the Arctic has emerged as a growing dimension of China’s international affairs. This development reflects two broader trends in global politics. First, the warming of the Arctic, defined here as the land and maritime areas located above the Arctic Circle at approximately 66°33′ north latitude, have created perceptions that the region is becoming more accessible, including for the exploitation of natural resources and the use of shorter maritime routes. Second, the international system has witnessed the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a major global power driven by its extraordinary accumulation of wealth. The Chinese Communist Party, which governs the PRC, has used this economic strength to expand China’s influence well beyond its neighborhood, including into the Arctic, while also signaling its ambition to transform the country into a Polar Great Power. These aspirations were articulated in 2018 when the PRC released its official Arctic White Paper. In this document, China describes itself as a near Arctic state and an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs, while outlining four policy objectives: understanding the Arctic, protecting the Arctic, developing the Arctic, and participating in Arctic governance.
- [David Scott: China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’: Mixed fortunes](https://centrumbalticum.org/david-scott-chinas-polar-silk-road-mixed-fortunes): The Chinese state media started 2026 asserting that “the ‘Polar Silk Road’ which China advocates building jointly with all parties, is becoming a widely welcomed international public good” (Global Times, January 12, 2026). In reality, China’s Polar Silk Road scheme, launched in 2014, has progressed yet also fallen back. Indeed, at the annual China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre conference, held at Tromso in February 2026, Chinese participants did not mention the ‘Polar Silk Road’, and suggested that the Arctic was not among China’s foreign-policy priorities.
- [Nengye Liu: China’s reviving Polar Silk Road, with Russia](https://centrumbalticum.org/nengye-liu-chinas-reviving-polar-silk-road-with-russia): In October 2025, using the northern sea route (NSR), the containership Istanbul Bridge sailed from Ningbo-Zhoushan Port to the UK port of Felixstowe in just 20 days.1 Although the Istanbul Bridge flies the flag of Liberian,2 a flag of convenience, it is lauded by China State media as “the first ship on China-Europe Arctic route”.3 This symbolic voyage marks a return of China’s Polar Silk Road (PSR), which has evolved to focus on using shipping route and energy cooperation with the Russian Federation.

## Pages
- [Accessibility Statement](https://centrumbalticum.org/accessibility-statement): This is the accessibility statement of the Centrum Balticum Foundation.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 2/2026](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-2-2026): Baltic Rim Economies 2/2026 focuses on China.
- [Cookie Policy (EU)](https://centrumbalticum.org/cookie-policy-eu): This Cookie Policy was last updated on 14.4.2026 and applies to citizens and legal permanent residents of the European Economic Area and Switzerland.
- [Privacy Statement](https://centrumbalticum.org/privacy-statement): This Privacy Statement explains how we collect, process and protect your personal data
- [Baltic Rim Economies 1/2023](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-1-2023): The Baltic Rim Economies 1/2023 special issue focuses on geopolitics.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 2/2023](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-2-2023): The Baltic Rim Economies 2/2023 focuses on Safety and Security issues in the Baltic Sea Region.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 3/2023](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-3-2023): The Baltic Rim Economies 3/2023 is a special issue on the relations between the two Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 4/2023](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-4-2023): The Baltic Rim Economies 4/2023 is a special issue on transatlantic cooperation.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 1/2024](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-1-2024): The Baltic Rim Economies 1/2024 focused on Ukraine’s integration to west.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 2/2024](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-2-2024): The Baltic Rim Economies 2/2024 focuses on NATO: Present status and forthcoming developments.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 3/2024](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-3-2024): The Baltic Rim Economies 4/2024 focuses on sustainable maritime industry. The issue was edited by Eini Haaja.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 4/2024](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-4-2024): The Baltic Rim Economies 4/2024 discusses, inter alia, the upcoming snap elections scheduled for February 23, Germany’s economy and Germany’s role in the Baltic Sea Region.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 1/2025](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-1-2025): In The Baltic Rim Economies 1/2025 issue experts discuss various topics under the theme maritime transport.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 2/2025](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-2-2025): The Baltic Rim Economies 2/2025 issue focuses on sustainable nutrient management.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 3/2025](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-3-2025): The Baltic Rim Economies 3/2025 issue focuses on developments of Poland's political, economic and security environment.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 1/2026](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-1-2026): Baltic Rim Economies 1/2026 examines in depth the impact of artificial intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), satellite technologies and digital data on security policy and warfare.
- [Baltic Rim Economies 4/2025](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies-4-2025): The Baltic Rim Economies 4/2025 issue focuses on sustainable water management.
- [Pulloposti](https://centrumbalticum.org/pulloposti): Our weekly column Pulloposti (in Finnish) focuses on the development of the Baltic Sea Region. The Editor-in-Chief is Director Kari Liuhto (kari.liuhto@utu.fi).
- [Baltic Rim Economies](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-rim-economies): Baltic Rim Economies (BRE) is a discussion forum dedicated to the development of the Baltic Sea Region.
- [BSR Policy Briefing](https://centrumbalticum.org/bsr-policy-briefing): In the BSR Policy Briefing series experts of different fields give recommendations to policy makers in issues regarding the Baltic Sea Region.
- [Contact](https://centrumbalticum.org/contact): Centrum Balticum unites people, ideas and action around the Baltic Sea for the benefit of the whole Region.
- [News](https://centrumbalticum.org/news): Centrum Balticum has a solid expertise in the diverse matters of the Baltic Sea Region. Read our latest news.
- [Baltic Sea Region Forum](https://centrumbalticum.org/baltic-sea-region-forum): The Baltic Sea Region Forum brings together people interested in the development of the Baltic Sea area to discuss the events shaping our common future. The event provides a possibility for experts from different sectors to meet and share their knowledge. Centrum Balticum has organised the Baltic Sea Region Forum annually since 2008.
- [Publications](https://centrumbalticum.org/publications): We share policy-relevant knowledge on the Baltic Sea Region through our publications. Our publication series include Baltic Rim Economies, BSR Policy Briefings and Pulloposti column series.
- [EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region](https://centrumbalticum.org/eu-strategy-for-the-baltic-sea-region): Centrum Balticum supports the implementation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.
- [Projects](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects): Centrum Balticum unites people, ideas and action around the Baltic Sea for the benefit of the whole Region.
- [About us](https://centrumbalticum.org/about-us): The Centrum Balticum Foundation helps experts, policymakers and organisations across the Baltic Sea Region connect, collaborate and create impact. We are a non-profit foundation working to make regional cooperation easier and more effective through communication, knowledge-sharing and strong networks.
- [Etusivu](https://centrumbalticum.org/): Centrum Balticum unites people, ideas and action around the Baltic Sea for the benefit of the whole Region.

## Portfolio
- [ReNutriWater](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/renutriwater)
- [BALEX](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/balex)
- [Let’s Communicate!](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/lets-communicate)
- [EXOPRODIGI](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/exoprodigi)
- [ECOPRODIGI](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/ecoprodigi)
- [CSHIPP – Clean Shipping Project Platform](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/cshipp-clean-shipping-project-platform)
- [HA Capacity](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/ha-capacity)
- [EU climate policy in the Baltic Sea](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/eu-climate-policy-in-the-baltic-sea)
- [Cohesion through EUSBSR](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/cohesion-through-eusbsr)
- [Finnish Maritime Cluster](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/finnish-maritime-cluster)
- [Communications of the EUSBSR around Finland – also in Swedish](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/communications-of-the-eusbsr-around-finland-also-in-swedish)
- [Project on national communications of the EUSBSR I & II](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/project-on-national-communications-of-the-eusbsr-i-ii)
- [SmartComp](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/smartcomp)
- [PreKNIGHT](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/preknight)
- [Looking towards East](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/looking-towards-east)
- [Strengthening the role and visibility of Southwest Finland in Baltic Sea issues](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/strengthening-the-role-and-visibility-of-southwest-finland-in-baltic-sea-issues)
- [Cities for a Healthier Sea](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/cities-for-a-healthier-sea)
- [Turku process](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/turku-process)
- [Symbioter](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/symbioter)
- [Circular Ports](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/circular-ports)
- [CiNURGi](https://centrumbalticum.org/projects/cinurgi)

Centrum Balticum is an expert in Baltic Sea Region cooperation and unites people, ideas and action around the Baltic Sea for the benefit of the whole Region.